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Abstract 
 
The specialist responsible for providing prescribed exercise as a form of medicine to the South 
African population is the biokineticist. Biokinetics is a relatively new profession developed in 
response to empirical research supporting exercise as medicine. Although the role of the 
biokineticist is clearly defined by the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), there is 
still confusion concerning this profession and its services. At present, the dominant medical-
scientific and capitalist-economic discourses offer a narrowly mechanistic and instrumental 
understanding of the human body and its treatment, which contributes to this confusion. This 
dissertation proposes a new point of departure, enriched by historical and philosophical 
understandings of the human body, from which the biokineticist can begin to redefine him/herself. 
The study aims to shift biokinetics as a practice away from the reductionist and dehumanising 
influences of instrumentalist, scientific and neoliberal capitalist-economic discourses, and to restore 
to biokineticists, and their clients, the ability they need to interact as relatively autonomous 
individuals. The study draws on the ideas of Michel Foucault, specifically on his notions of 
‘discipline’, ‘docility’, and ‘the care of the self’ (1991; 2005), as well as Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari and their ideas of ‘becoming’ and ‘rhizomatic thinking’ (1983; 1987); ultimately 
presenting a philosophically enriched, holistic representation of the human body. From here 
recommendations for best practice in contemporary biokinetics are suggested that encourage 
interactions and connections between the professional and his/her patients, which move beyond the 
mere physiological interpretations currently dominating health discourse. 
 
Keywords: biokinetics, critical discourse analysis, history of physical education, exercise as health, 
medical-scientific discourse, commercialization of medicine, risk discourse, human capital, 
dehumanisation of the patient-consumer, Foucault, ‘mode of subjectification’, ‘the political 
rationality’, care of the self, Deleuze and Guattari, ‘societies of control’ in health, rhizomatic 
thinking. 
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Introduction 
 
Exercise has long been associated with health. Historical findings date back to the ancient Greeks 
(460-370 BCE) where Hippocrates advised that exercise was good for health, warning that 
moderation is fundamental. He went on to write three books on regimen, which included the 
importance of exercise with regard to health (Paffenbarger, Blair, & Lee, 2001, p. 1184; Berryman, 
2012, pp. 210-211). Following on from Hippocrates, adding value to the notion of prescribed 
exercise and its health benefits was Galen (129-210 CE). Galen first focused on health and later 
hygiene. His theories and writings dominated medicine and went unchallenged through the 
Medieval Ages (Berryman, 2012, pp. 210-211). More recent research conducted five decades ago 
by Jeremy Morris and associates (Paffenbarger et al., 2001, pp. 1185-1191) showed how vigorous 
exercise can protect against coronary heart disease (CHD). The notion that prescribed exercise can 
help improve health and wellness has gained support thanks to this research, as well as further 
empirical evidence demonstrating the beneficial effects of exercise in relation to various chronic 
ailments and diseases ranging from diabetes mellitus, hypertension, dyslipidaemia, orthopaedic 
related injuries, arthritis, obesity, immunology, peripheral arterial disease, metabolic syndrome, and 
pulmonary diseases to name a few (ACSM, 2006, pp. 205-231). As a result of the increased interest 
and supporting evidence regarding the beneficial effects of exercise on health and wellness, a 
specialist was created with responsibility for developing appropriate professional practice. The 
specialist responsible is known by various names in different countries, for example exercise 
physiologist, exercise specialist, exercise therapist and physical therapist (The latter recently has 
been contested as to whether it is more specifically related to the scope of physiotherapy) 
(Biokinetics Association of South Africa, 2016). Nonetheless, since the late 1970s in South Africa, 
the specialist responsible for prescribing exercise as a form of medicine is referred to as the 
biokineticist. 
In South Africa, a relatively sedentary society, there are rising levels of chronic diseases 
such as diabetes, chronic heart disease, depression, and obesity (Moss & Martie, 2011, p. 14; 
Mayosi et al., 2012, pp. 2030-2013; Coovadia et al., 2009, p. 817). Many of these diseases are non-
communicable and therefore preventable through particular lifestyle changes, such as introducing 
regular exercise. While the need for professional biokineticists in South Africa is therefore 
undeniable, a 2009 study showed that there were only 799 practicing biokineticists registered by 
Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) (Moss & Martie, 2011, pp. 14-19). This same 
study suggests that there is a statistically evident insufficiency of biokineticists when one considers 
the increasing numbers of potential clients in South Africa (Moss & Martie, 2011). 
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A major reason for the insufficiency of biokineticists in South Africa, in spite of the growing 
need for such a profession, is arguably general confusion regarding their role and the service they 
offer the population. This confusion is emphasized by a common question asked in South Africa: 
“What is the difference between a biokineticist and a physiotherapist?” Several significant factors 
contribute to this confusion, such as 1) the profession is relatively new in South Africa, and 2) 
although a scope of practice is clearly defined by the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) it remains wide, making the specification of the role of biokineticists difficult. However, 
this study focuses on a third important factor: the influence of the medical-scientific and economic 
communities, which promote dominant discourses that influence cultural understandings of health-
related problems and how they are approached. 
It is important to note that a biokineticist does not neutrally prescribe exercise in a social 
vacuum. As the professionals responsible for developing appropriate practices to promote wellness 
through exercise, biokineticists must take account of the discursive constructs by which the 
communities in which they operate might understand or misunderstand the human body and how it 
should be treated. It is also important to understand that the conception of the human body and its 
treatment is a discursive construction that changes over time and may vary across different cultures 
and communities. Further, the discursive constructs by which we understand the body and its 
treatment significantly influence our understanding of the role played by the biokineticist in 
promoting wellness and of how the biokineticist should interact with patients. 
 
a. Research problem 
 
At present, the dominant medical-scientific and capitalist-economic discourses still offer constructs 
that provide a narrowly mechanistic and instrumental understanding of the body and its treatment. 
Medical discourse remains inseparable from a kind of ‘scientism’ which promotes a mechanistic 
and ultimately dehumanising representation of the human body as a compartmentalised organism of 
physiological adaptations and responses. Alongside the discourse of ‘medical-science’, the 
prevailing capitalist-economic discourse promotes an instrumental view that commercialises our 
striving for healthy bodies through marketing campaigns under the guise of ‘healthism’, ‘fitness’, 
‘lifestyle change’, ‘healthy living’ and so on, making it hard to differentiate between professional 
advice and profit- driven information. In consequence of these discursive influences, the major 
construct that dominates the field of health care is ‘risk discourse’. That is, instead of promoting a 
proactive, patient-driven responsibility for lifestyle change that promotes wellness, there is a strong 
emphasis on the health risks that a population may face and on the development of specialized 
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authorities which patients must depend on to deal with them. Internalization of this ‘risk’ mentality 
disempowers patients by instilling fear and dependence and this understanding of the human body 
and its treatment does not properly serve the purposes of the biokineticist who must promote a 
proactive, patient-driven responsibility for lifestyle change while remaining sensitive to a holistic 
conception of patients as humans who are constructed by varying historical, social and cultural 
factors.  
 
b. Research hypothesis 
 
From the above, one may formulate the hypothesis that a major factor contributing to confusion 
regarding the role played by biokinetics as a profession is the influence of dominant medical-
scientific and capitalist-economic discourses. The main constructs concerning the body and how to 
care for it offered by these dominant discourses provide a mechanistic and instrumental conception 
of the human body and its treatment that does not adequately account for the role of the 
biokineticist as a professional who must promote wellness through promoting patient autonomy 
while remaining sensitive to a holistic conception of patients. The underlying assumption of this 
study is that this limitation may be addressed by providing a philosophically enriched conception of 
the human body and the treatment it needs to promote wellness which is more appropriate for the 
purposes of the biokineticist. Further, this understanding, in turn, will help redefine both what it 
means to be a biokineticist in South Africa and rearticulate the nature of the interaction between 
practitioner and patient. 
 
c. Research aim and objectives 
 
The main aim of this research is to clarify the role played by the biokineticist as the professional 
responsible for promoting a proactive, patient-driven approach to wellness as lifestyle change while 
remaining sensitive to a holistic conception of patients as humans who are constructed by varying 
historical, social and cultural factors.  
The research question has four parts: 1) “How may a contemporary biokineticist understand, 
in order to challenge, the prevailing mechanistic and instrumental conception of the human body, 
dictated by reductionist medical-scientific and capitalist-economic discourses?” 2) “How may one 
develop a new understanding of the human body which supports an alternative discourse of 
proactive patient-driven responsibility for wellness?” 3) “On the basis of a new understanding of the 
human body, how may one redefine the role of the biokineticist and rearticulate the nature of the 
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interaction between biokineticist and patient?” 4) “What recommendations may be offered for best 
practice in the field of biokinetics?” 
To answer these questions and achieve the main aim of the study, the research is divided 
into four main objectives: 
1) Critically analyse the historical development of the contemporary medical-scientific 
and capitalist-economic discourses that encourage a disempowering and dehumanising ‘risk’ 
mentality in health care practitioners and patients. 
2) Develop a philosophically enriched understanding of the human body, with the aid 
of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, which supports an alternative discourse of proactive patient-
driven responsibility for wellness. 
3) On the basis of this philosophically enriched account of the human body and its 
treatment, redefine what it means to be a biokineticist in South Africa and rearticulate the nature of 
the interaction between biokineticist and patient. 
4) Offer recommendations for best practice in the field of biokinetics. 
 
d. Research methodology 
 
The proposed research is broadly situated in the field of philosophy, and more particularly within 
the domain of applied ethics. Philosophical research typically involves the critical analysis of 
existing conditions or issues for the sake of building new theories that address these in some way. 
Research in applied ethics is, in addition, normative in the sense that it includes the obligation to 
make recommendations for best practice on the basis of the newly created concepts and theories. 
Philosophical research, by definition, is qualitative because it aims to create concepts and build 
theories concerning various aspects of what it means to be human in this world (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994, pp. 2, 5). Qualitative studies differ from quantitative studies in that they are directed 
towards developing an in-depth understanding of an issue instead of focusing on the gathering and 
quantification of measurable data to be used as evidence to support a hypothesis or claim.  
Like all scholarly disciplines, the field of philosophy has been characterized historically by 
different paradigmatic perspectives. In this research, the most viable contemporary paradigmatic 
perspective will be complexity thinking, as elaborated by Edgar Morin (2008, pp. 38-52). One of 
the most important implications for this study of a complexity paradigm is the insistence on viewing 
human existence in a holistic sense, which calls for interdisciplinary research.  
Within this paradigm, the main research strategy that will be employed is a form of 
discourse analysis in the mode proposed by Foucault. According to Whisnant (n.d., pp. 4-5), 
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discourse as Foucault conceived it, ‘is a social language created by particular cultural conditions at 
a particular time and place, and it expresses a particular way of understanding human experience’. 
Discourses can be thought of as sets of linguistically articulated rules, norms and stereotypes that 
shape our thinking, behaviour and way of life. Discourses can be analysed in terms of certain 
linguistic categories, such as the keywords and symbols that indicate a community’s main interests, 
assumptions and dominant views. Importantly, these sets of linguistically articulated rules, norms 
and stereotypes, as Whisnant (n.d., p. 4) argues, work actively to ‘structure social spaces’, and 
power struggles between them can ‘play a significant role in historical change’. Particularly when a 
new field of practice is being established, discourses compete for power to define its basic 
assumptions and methods of operation. Eventually some discourses converge to form a paradigm of 
shared assumptions. In the case of biokinetics; medical-scientific and capitalist-economic 
discourses have converged in this way. New discursive regimes must struggle against this 
entrenched and usually defensively protected set of assumptions and practices. This study 
represents part of a contemporary effort to promote a new paradigm of thinking and practice which 
challenges the shared assumptions of the dominant discourses. The most important of these for this 
research is the insistence on a holistic, non-mechanistic conception of the human body, which must 
be understood as existing in a complex environmental, cultural, psychological and historical 
context. This reaffirms the necessity of multidisciplinary research. While a specific area of focus 
has been selected, biokinetics, the research must to some extent extend across several other 
disciplines. 
 
e. Discussion of chapter breakdown 
 
In Section A of the study, a critical discourse analysis of ancient and contemporary societies is 
undertaken in order to assess the differences in constraints, rules, and truths surrounding the 
practice of exercise, health and the body. To begin, in Chapter 1, the history of the prescription of 
exercise as a form of health is discussed, specifically focusing on historical changes in the 
conception and treatment of the body in relation to changes in the dominating discourses of the 
time. It is argued that dominating discourses do not operate independently within a social vacuum. 
These discourses often overlap, each influencing the interactions, procedures and outcomes of the 
others (Popham, 2005, pp. 279-297).  
In Chapter 2, the focus is on the preference for so-called ‘scientific’ reasoning in medicine. 
Medicine, for instance, is fundamentally concerned with the treatment of illness by means of 
applied knowledge (Hunter, 1991, p.18), but since the 1950s has become increasingly influenced by 
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a mechanistic and instrumental notion of ‘science’ (Berg, 1997, pp. 19-29). This preference, 
according to Berg (1997, pp. 19-29), resulted in an almost mathematical reasoning previously 
undetected in the realm of medicine, which included increased specialization, increased reliance on 
diagnostic and prognostic reasoning, as well as standardization of vocabulary and treatment 
practices. As a result patient’s are often articulated as merely an accumulation of data; observed, 
examined and normalised, ultimately, having their subjectivity reduced while the empirical 
evidence is valourised (Popham, 2005; Foucault, 1991). Insofar as biokinetics follows medicine in 
its methods and procedures e.g. consults and assessments, health insurance policies, consent forms, 
treatment planning, etc., it is bound by similar ‘scientific’ constructs. As such, biokinetics adopts an 
authoritative and objectifying approach to patients that minimizes the patient’s input, agency and, 
effectively, his/her humanity. 
In addition, biokinetics as a profession has a tendency to believe all problems may be solved 
via empirical methods. Given this tendency, it is no surprise that a large portion of students doing 
their postgraduate degrees in this field focus on quantitative research. These studies are essential to 
the future development of this profession and by no means does the researcher of this study deny 
their value. However, a purely quantitative approach has the shortcoming of creating a 
compartmentalized understanding of the human body. This instrumental and mechanistic 
understanding of the human body oversimplifies the complexities of what it means to be a human 
trying to function well physiologically in a predominantly artificially created environment.  
In Chapter 3, attention shifts to the capitalist-economic discourse which dominates 
contemporary lifestyles and health care. The idea that health has become a commodity that can be 
sold for a profit shows up, according to Berg (1997, pp. 19-27), in the medical profession’s 
investment in ‘business related methodologies’, such as: statistical analysis, mathematical formulas 
and calculations of profits and costs. For example, a large number of medical forms capture only 
minor medical details; the majority of the information required being business/admin related 
(Popham, 2005, pp. 291-294). Popham (2005, p. 287) points to the large number of administrative 
employees within hospitals, private practices and health clinics suggesting that these often, if not 
always, outnumber the medical staff.  
The prevailing capitalist-economic discourse affects biokinetics insofar as it promotes an 
instrumental view which commercialises the striving for healthy bodies through marketing 
campaigns. ‘New public health’ is a collaboration of concerns, expectations and projects all 
involving conceptions of ‘healthism’, ‘fitness’, ‘lifestyle change’, ‘healthy living’ and so on 
(Petersen & Lupton, 1996). Within the South African context, there are a number of governmental 
drives promoting physical activity and the ideals of ‘healthism’ and ‘fitness’, such as the ‘Vuka SA 
– Move for your health’ initiative, Sport and Recreation’s Mass Participation programme, the Youth 
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Fitness and Wellness Charter, and the Health-Promoting Schools Initiative (Draper et al., 2006, p. 
94). These ‘new public health’ drives, however, are often tied to economic imperatives, making it 
hard to differentiate between professional advice and profit- driven information. 
A concept developed by Deleuze (1992) that is useful for clarification at this point is 
‘control society’. With this notion, Deleuze takes us beyond Foucault’s (1991) conception of 
‘disciplinary society’. From Deleuze’s (1992) ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, the insight 
emerges that an invidious, widespread network of ‘control mechanisms’ has replaced disciplinary 
sites of enclosure (hospitals schools, prisons, families and factories). This is incorporated to help 
elaborate on the negative effect that ‘higher order’ consumerist and corporate capitalism has on the 
practice of biokinetics from the side of both the ‘patient’ as consumer and the ‘professional’ as a 
profiteer.  
In Chapter 4, as a conclusion to the first section, the dehumanizing effects of a ‘risk’ 
mentality, which is a major construct dominating contemporary health care, is considered. ‘Risk’, as 
a concept is not limited to health, but inserts itself into all spheres of the economic system affecting 
modes of existence in work, leisure, family and sexuality (Beck, 1992, p. 10). In health care, ‘risk 
assessment’ emphasises the health risks a population may face and focuses on the development of 
specialized authorities which patients may depend on in order to deal with them. Risk assessment is 
no alien to the biokineticist, who is required to classify his/her client according to risk assessment 
criteria before exercise can be prescribed. Certainly, one should follow procedures to ensure the 
safety of a client. However, the emphasis on risks may be more closely tied to a capitalist-economic 
agenda of professional self-protection whereby patients are disempowered by creating fear and 
dependence instead of focusing, for example, on the sense of self and agency that may be developed 
through movement (Crawford, 1977; Novas & Rose, 2000). Giddens (1991, p. 3) suggests that this 
proliferation of risk stratifications reflects attempts to establish ‘controlled interventions’ in what is 
found to be unpredictable phenomena. For example, human life remains complex and unpredictable 
as athletes and exercise enthusiasts who are classified by the medical industry as low risk patients 
fall dead from heart attacks. Thus, it is essential to challenge the implementation of risk criteria 
which is naively emphasised without first considering the discursive agendas driving them and the 
social outcomes of overemphasizing risk. Arguably the treating of the human body promoted by 
‘risk’ as a construct does not properly serve the purposes of the biokineticist who must promote 
patient-driven lifestyle change.  
In the second part of this study, alternatives to these limited mechanistic and instrumental 
conceptions of the human body and its treatment promoted by medical-scientific and capitalist-
economic discourses are proposed. Because the treatment of the body is fundamental to the practice 
of biokinetics, an understanding of the body which exceeds interpretations of solely physiological 
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responses becomes important. To try and overcome the shortcomings of the prevailing dominating 
discourses concerning the nature of the human body, a philosophically and historically enriched 
conception of the complexities of the human body is developed. Two philosophies are drawn on to 
aid in this endeavour namely, Foucault and the works of Deleuze and Guattari. These thinkers and 
their work have provided the foundation for many studies in health, medicine and sport; all of 
which are closely related to biokinetics (Heyes, 2006; Fox, 2002, 2008; Markula, 2006; Miller, 
2009 & Petersen, 1997). From these studies, useful questions regarding autonomy, political 
awareness and the self, and its relation to the body, are brought forward. 
Chapter 5 is an investigation of Foucault’s (1983; 1991; 2005) theories concerning the 
nature of the individual/subject. Foucault (1991) understood the individual/subject to be a construct 
of the discourses and institutions which surround him/her. He called this ‘subjectification’ (mode d’ 
assuiettissement) (Foucault, 1983). Foucault’s concept of ‘subjectification’ forces one to reflect 
upon the dominating discourses and therefore, assess and identify the institutions of power of a 
particular era or society in order to gain an understanding of the self/subject. In this way it is argued 
that the objectification of the patient endorsed by today’s dominant discourses, the passive role 
given to and adopted by the patient, increased emphasis on risk criteria, and higher forms of self-
surveillance have all contributed to a diminished subjective experience. Here, the patient/subject is 
deprived of his/her subjective experience of independence and agency under the watchful eye of the 
practitioner and enforced by the common practices of the surrounding institutions of power.  
Foucault (1975) himself was very critical of medicine’s rise in social status and its 
expansion of power following the French Revolution. He compares it to that of the power 
administered by the clergy prior to the Revolution, and even argues that the acceptance of the 
medical industry’s claim to knowledge was as unjustified and uncritically accepted by the moderns 
as that of Medieval superstition (Foucault, 1975, pp. 31-32). For Foucault the medical view of the 
body which emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century (i.e. the ‘clinical gaze’) reflected 
broader social changes and processes of rationalization occurring in society at the time (Williams & 
Calnan, 1996, p. 1610; Foucault, 1975). Having outlined the rise of the medical profession from this 
historical perspective, Foucault (1975; 1991) then puts forward the notion that life itself is now 
being occupied and regulated through medicine by what he terms ‘the political rationality’. ‘The 
political rationality’ is described as a ‘corpus of knowledge’ which exists in modern societies and 
effectively dominates and dictates the processes of subjection through ‘habits, rules, orders, and an 
authority that is exercised continually allowing these relations to operate almost automatically’ 
(Foucault, 1991, pp. 128-129). 
Foucauldian constructionists draw attention to important elements of social control and 
surveillance which medicine exercises over our bodies (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 1610). What 
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Foucault termed a ‘panoptic system of surveillance’ is predicated upon a normalizing power 
whereby individuals are morally regulated into conformity (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 1610; 
Foucault, 1991). For Foucault, the medical profession along with other institutions including 
prisons, asylums, schools and military barracks, work together as an apparatus of control expanding 
the idea of the human body as a ‘docile’ subject (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 1610, Foucault, 
1991).  
These are other theories that explain the consistent rise in medicine’s social status such as: 
the bureaucratic and industrialized influence of customer reliance (Illich, 1976); improved 
marketing strategies (Illich, 1976); new technological developments adding to the success of these 
practices, and serving interests of powerful groups in society such as ruling capitalists (Navarro, 
1975, 1986, Waitzkin, 1979, 1983). But whichever discourse prevails at any given time, Foucault’s 
theory still holds strong, suggesting that the change in the dominating discourse merely reflects the 
shift in the position from which ‘the political rationality’ acts. For example, if biokinetics became a 
dominant discourse, as opposed to medical-scientific and capitalist-economic discourses, the 
mechanisms of ‘the political technology’ would merely filter down from biokinetics and into its 
lesser discourses (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 1611). As it currently stands, these mechanisms of 
control belonging to the current ‘political rationality’ are invested in the protocols and practices 
administered by the biokineticist and contribute to the creating of docile subjects/patients.   
The Foucauldian (1991) concepts of ‘observation’, ‘normalization’ and ‘examination’ 
provide conceptual tools to aid in identifying the influences of powerful dominating discourses. In 
effect they help identify the rules of play and, ultimately, assist in providing an alternative ethics of 
practice (Foucault, 2001, p. 143). Although Foucault denies liberation in the form of freeing oneself 
from the grasp of dominating discourses, he argued that a crucial part of attaining some form of 
autonomy consisted of understanding that there can be an alternative picture based on a different 
discourse (Heyer, 2006, pp. 138-140). As such, the strong connection between the discourse of 
wellness and the promotion of patient autonomy is amplified by employing Foucault’s notion of 
‘the care of the self’ as articulated in his lecture series ‘The Hermeneutics of the Subject’ (2005). 
In Chapter 6, Deleuze and Guattari’s theories concerning the nature of the human body are 
discussed. Their work was synonymous with post-structuralist thought in France during the 1950s 
which sought to liberate society from modernist confines (Best & Kellner, 1991). Their unique 
conceptualization of the world as ‘machinic’ provides an expression of the body that captures its 
complexity as a dynamic and ‘unfixed’ entity, which encourages, and successfully allows it to move 
beyond deterministic interpretations (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 1987).  
Using a lexicon of unique terminology, Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1987) build a theory in 
texts such as ‘Anti-Oedipus’ (1983) and ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ (1987) that navigates the complex 
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flow of desire. Unlike Freud, who emphasized its negative force, they emphasize the idea that desire 
is mainly a positive, creative, and powerful life force which must be embraced, rather than 
repressed. They admit that this is risky, because desire can be destructive, particularly because, as 
Freud pointed out, the end point of desire is the desire for one's own death. However, despite the 
necessary risks, human desire is what makes us immensely capable of new and creative feats. 
Desire, which is by definition never satisfied, motivates humans to keep pressing at the boundaries 
(to the point of risking death). Desire, therefore, keeps us on the move and enables us to transcend 
static, repressive models of thought such as those promoted by the state, medical discourse, and 
other normative criteria.   
In order to produce a process-orientated experience of ‘becoming’, rather than a goal-
orientated experience of ‘being’; Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise embodiment as an open and 
experimental asubjective experience (Fox & Ward, 2008, p. 1008). Within this dynamic 
representation of the body, the question, "what is a body capable of?” is central. It introduces 
ethology (action and affect) as a key component of embodiment in favour of aetiology (cause and 
effect) (Buchanan, 1997, p. 74). Therefore, instead of investigating regimes of identity 
(significance, subjectification, and biological interpretations) Deleuze and Guattari seek to 
understand the body’s potential to engage, connect, and influence both the environment and itself. 
There is an existing discourse on the notion of ‘flow’ in psychology, which is addressed in 
tandem with the Deleuzian-Guatarrian conception of the asubjective experience of embodiment. 
Two texts on psychology of ‘flow’ are investigated in this regard namely; Csikszentmihalyi’s 
‘Flow: The psychology of optimal experience’ (1990) and ‘The concept of flow’ by Nakamura and 
Csikszentmihalyi (2002). What is importantly noted here is that while in a state of ‘flow’ time is no 
longer perceived in a linear fashion and the boundaries between the self and the environment are 
perceptively diluted. These experiences are currently being empirically investigated and, in sum, 
offer valuable accounts of the way in which embodiment may be visualized e.g. not as developing 
into a static thing, but rather as becoming asubjective in nature (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).  
Following on from this ‘rhizomatic thinking’ is introduced into the discussion. Rhizomatic 
thinking is a model of thought presented by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) which is based on the 
unique rhizome root system. Its properties of connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity, asignifying 
rupture, cartography, and decalcomania help schematize a system of thought which attempts to 
transcend, if only temporarily, the hierarchical, homogenising, rational, and repressive models of 
thought (arborescent models) present within Western society (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp. 8-
21). Because of its inconsistency, and overall lack of structure, rhizomatic thinking cannot operate 
in a space completely devoid of arborescent (structured or logical) models of thought. Deleuze and 
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Guattari (1987, p. 20) write, ‘There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots 
in roots’. Hence, because rhizomatic thinking is able to consider both, the ‘fixed’ and ‘unfixed’ 
components inherent in life, as a form of thought, it closely resembles what Morin (2008) has 
termed ‘complexity thinking’.   
Representing a model for complexity thinking, the rhizome approach has currently been 
implemented in a number of different fields, such as: health, sociology, education, medicine, 
knowledge management, information systems, organisational activities, and art (Parsons & Clarke, 
2013; Reardon, Sanzogni, & Poropat, 2006; Semetsky, 2004). Its value is arguably found in its 
ability to embrace a dynamic atmosphere of change, creativity, and desire. For example ‘emergent 
motivators’ (such as those experienced in a state of ‘flow’- see Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) provide a useful image of how dynamic this atmosphere actually is. 
While in a state of ‘flow’ (often described by sportsmen and women as being ‘in the zone’) 
‘emergent motivators’ are said to spontaneously emerge out of the moment (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). As a result, end-goals, as the primary drivers of 
actions, are replaced by proximal goals (derived from ‘emergent motivators’) and feedback 
responses between actions and these new proximal goals become almost immediate, with the 
proximal goals continuously updating with each new action (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Similarly, unlike the ‘fixed’ (arborescent) perspective which attempts to 
‘chain’ the body down to definitions that are quantifiable such as those represented by medical-
scientific classification criteria, rhizomatic thinking provides a conceptualisation of the experience 
of embodiment which is ‘emergent’. 
Using this theoretical background, the researcher turns to the relatively new profession of 
biokinetics in South Africa and in Chapter 7, he address the task of redefining the biokineticist’s 
role and responsibilities as the professional responsible for promoting wellness through prescribed 
exercise. In light of the complexities of human interaction the researcher also aims to define the role 
and responsibilities of the patient as agent, and finally, develop a conception of what it would take 
to ensure an empowering relationship between them. The study concludes with recommendations 
for best practice.  
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Section A 
 
Chapter 1: A brief history of exercise and health 
 
It is important to note that a biokineticist does not neutrally prescribe exercise in a social vacuum. 
As professionals responsible for developing appropriate practices to promote wellness through 
exercise, biokineticists must take account of the discursive constructs within their communities and 
the way that they operate. In order to do this, they need to understand that the conception of the 
human body and its treatment is a discursive construction which changes over time and may be 
different across cultures and communities. This is important as the discursive constructs by which 
the body and its treatment is understood significantly influences how the biokineticist is articulated 
within a society, thereby influencing the role he/she might play in promoting wellness and treatment 
of patients. 
 
1.1 Critical discourse analysis 
 
One manner in which to analyse a discursive construct/structure is to undertake a critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). The underlying premise of any critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the 
philosophical rejection of absolutism\ naturalism, which is understood as context free, neutral, truth 
claims made about reality ‘as it exists’. In this sense, CDA argues that our understandings about the 
world can never be completely objective or absolute. Instead, CDA leans more towards a relativistic 
approach in that it supports the argument that reality can only be understood by humans through 
their methods of categorization. Furthermore, because human methods of categorization are 
potentially limitless, ‘human reality’ may in theory be open to multiple interpretations. However, 
CDA is not completely relativistic in that it acknowledges the existence of generalised discursive 
structures and recognizes their power to shape a widely shared understanding of human reality. For 
example, it is argued that the social processes, techniques and political inclinations of a society help 
to form discursive structures and that these become dominant in specific periods of time, providing 
members of a society with a shared representation of ‘reality’. 
Dominant discursive structures may be economic, medical, religious, mythological, military 
or scientific, all of which serve to differentiate, hierarchize, and homogenize, resulting in a social 
order that promotes certain actions and excludes others (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Foucault, 
13 
 
1991, p. 178).  They are subject to change, and as such, have differed throughout history (Jorgensen 
& Phillips, 2002). For example, in broad strokes, the church and its discursive practice 
characteristically governed societies of the Medieval era, whereas in modern society the capitalist-
economic discourse and its discursive practices, in part, govern societies. In this way human reality 
is open to change, and this change is explained by the discourse analysts as a result of disruptions to 
the dominant discursive structures.  
Disruption and change can occur within existing dominant discursive structures when key 
terms are successfully challenged by competing discourses. The reason key terms may be 
challenged is that they can take on diverse meanings in different discourses. A simple example of 
such equivocation would be the term ‘abduction’. It’s understood as a medical term within the 
domain of biokinetics, relating to the movement of a limb away from another part of the body, or 
from the body’s centre. Although it retains the connotation of ‘moving away’, it means something 
completely different in another domain. In the political domain, it is a form of ‘kidnapping’, as in 
the abduction of a key political player by a terrorist organization. Given that discursive formations 
are representations, which create social meaning by giving ‘truth’ to some statements and by 
denying the ‘truth’ of others (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 78), it is highly unlikely that there will 
ever be discursive competition over the medical and political meanings of this term. The word has a 
double meaning, but both meanings remain valid in their own domain, and neither meaning lays any 
claim to priority over the other. The situation is different if we compare the notion of a terrorist 
abduction with the meaning most common in popular culture, which associates abduction with 
aliens. In this case, a ‘common sense’ discourse constructs a human reality that easily 
accommodates the notion of a terrorist abduction, but has no place for the notion of an alien 
abduction. Anybody wishing to find a place in ‘common sense’ human reality (as opposed to 
movies and tabloids) for the term ‘alien abduction’ would have to contest its exclusion via a 
competing discourse, which accepts the existence of alien lifeforms. Discourse analysts, in sum, 
argue that our understanding of the world is ‘the product of historically situated interchanges among 
people’ which are both created and maintained by social processes, and that these processes are 
contested and fought over (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.5). 
Because meaning is ‘always created in political, discursive processes’, it becomes necessary 
to map out the struggle whereby signs are given fixed meanings in order to expose the fact that 
some fixations of meaning have become so conventionalised that we think of them as natural 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 26; 33). This is what makes CDA relevant to research; it 
understands that a symbiotic relationship exists between discursive practices and social 
construction. As such it attempts to ‘unmask’ discursive formations which erroneously give ‘truth’ 
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to false statements, thereby disempowering the individual and communities by limiting their 
interpretations of reality. 
 
1.2 Discursive structures of physical education 
 
In order to assess how certain meanings come to be considered fixed, a discourse analysis must be 
undertaken. However, such an investigation is hindered by the simple fact that individuals in a 
society (including the researcher) are often unaware of the structures creating ‘truth’ or ‘meanings’ 
in everyday life. For example, Foucault (1991) argues that ironically the political power of the 
discursive structure is most efficacious and therefore most invisible in forming those parts of us that 
we believe to be most personal and innate (that is in forming what some have termed our ‘essence’). 
Any discourse analysis is made difficult in that the researcher must personally attempt to 
‘disengage’ from these ‘fixed meanings’ in order to analyse them. 
In Discipline and punish, Foucault (1988; 1991) applies four analytical tools to assist him in 
analysing the discursive influences operating within the penal system during the 18
th
, 19
th
 and 20
th 
centuries. 
 
As a context, we must understand that there are four major types of these 
"technologies," each a matrix of practical reason: (I) technologies of production, 
which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign 
systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) 
technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them 
to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the 
self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others 
a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault, 1988, p. 17). 
 
Despite the fact that Foucault was analysing the penal system, the nature of dominant 
discursive structures suggests they are infused within all spheres of a society. By applying 
Foucault’s method of analysis, using these four technologies as a guideline, an understanding of the 
discursive structures acting on a society, past or present can be established; providing information 
about the ‘construction of social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge, and 
meaning’ of a certain era  (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 67; Gutting, 2005, p. 73).  
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In this chapter these four guidelines are applied to the history of physical education (since 
biokinetics alone, as a specialization, is a relatively new profession). In short, this chapter is an 
attempt to outline possible elements responsible for the discursive formations affecting physical 
education within specific ancient societies, namely the ancient Greeks and Romans, and then the 
societies of the Medieval (Christian), Humanistic and Scientific eras. In doing so, this chapter 
illustrates possible reasons for the changes in both practice and instruction and explains why these 
changes were not entirely a result of linear progression in rational thought; specifically regarding 
the epistemology of ‘exercise as health’. Instead it is argued exercise, the body, and health are not 
inherently ‘key terms’ that operate with political power, but rather are shaped and fixed depending 
on the systems in place. By revealing and criticising the discursive structures responsible for the 
crystallization of the concept ‘exercise’ in the form of ‘exercise as health’, this study aims to restore 
the free association of ‘exercise’ as a sign, i.e. restore ‘exercise’ as a floating signifier1. 
 
1.3 The ancient Greeks (8
th
 - 2
nd
 century BCE) 
 
A brief discussion of specific ancient societies follows, illuminating only central themes as the 
complexity surrounding each society is well beyond the scope of this study. 
  
Hippocrates wrote: ‘Eating alone will not keep a man well; he must also take exercise. For 
food and exercise ...work together to produce health’ (cited in Berryman, 2010, p. 1). 
 
The ancient Greeks are thought to have conceptualized ‘health’ as the absence of disease 
(Tipton, 2014). In addition, ‘exercise’ was prescribed as a preventative treatment for many 
conditions by physicians and philosophers, including Pythagoras, Herodicus, Diocles, Hippocrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle (Berryman, 2010; Tipton, 2014; Phillips & Roper, 2006; Grivetti & Applegate, 
1997). Most of these physicians and philosophers prescribed exercises for health benefits that were 
moderate in intensity (Tipton, 2014). Herodicus was one of the few exceptions who prescribed 
vigorous exercise (Tipton, 2014, p. 113). Generally speaking, ‘exercise as health’ was not a foreign 
subject; being conceptualised somewhat similarly to contemporary understandings. However, 
distinct differences in social practices and relations, meaning and power exist between their society 
and ours. In an attempt to understand these differences, this chapter asks the following questions: 
                                                          
1
 ‘Floating signifiers’ are ‘the signs that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their own particular 
way’ (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 28). 
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“From where did the ancients receive their information about ‘exercise as health’?”, “How was it 
received?” and “What social behaviours were considered acceptable?” 
Three important discourses (or technologies of production
2
) influencing the practice of 
‘exercise as health’ in the ancient Greek period were: education, mythology and morality. 
Ancient Greek education emerged during the period between the eighth and sixth centuries 
BCE (Demirel & Yidiran, 2013). It was strictly structured and controlled by the state and was 
practised from school-like institutions, known as gymnasiums (Riva, Loffredo, Piludu, & Conti, 
2010; Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, p 192). Here, students (males only) were given mental and physical 
instruction with the aim of deriving a ‘beautiful body, mental development and spiritual and moral 
hygiene’ (Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, p 192). A core component of the ancient Greek education 
system was physical education (Demirel & Yidiran, 2013). 
Mythology influenced the individual’s psychological make-up through popular stories like 
Homer’s The Iliad, in the form of huge statues of their gods placed in strategic spaces in cities, and 
images portrayed in artwork, pots, vases and cups (Grivetti & Applegate, 1997; Drinkwater, n. d.; 
Gymnasium, 2015). There are many examples whereby mythology is shown to be closely 
associated with exercise. For example, the famous Olympic Games originated as a patronage to the 
gods. Also popular sports of the time like wrestling, weight lifting, and gymnastics were believed to 
have been created by Theseus, son of the god Poseidon and the goddess Aethra, and concepts like 
leverage, skill and wit were explained through mythology (Grivetti & Applegate, 1997, p. 861S; 
Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 22). In fact, Grivetti and Applegate (1997, p. 861S) argue that athletics 
and sport in the ancient Mediterranean world begin with mythology. Furthermore, each gymnasium 
was assigned to a god, e.g. Hercules, Hermes and Thesues (Gymnasium, 2015). As mythology 
played such a vital role in ancient Greek society, it is no surprise that it influenced the practice of 
‘exercise’; arguably elevating ‘exercise’ to the status of a ‘holy/sacred’ enterprise (Phillips & 
Roper, 2006; Grivetti & Applegate, 1997; Laker, 2000).   
Athenian education also encouraged acceptable values and attitudes and it used physical 
education to instil them (Laker, 2000, p. 7). According to Foucault (1988, p. 19), the dominating 
ethical value, which encompassed the entire ethos of the ancient Greek nation, was self-love. He 
claims this notion of self-love was so apparent that it was responsible for bringing the famous 
Delphic maxim ‘know thy self’ into practice (Foucault, 1988, p.12). Thus in an attempt to develop 
‘spiritual and moral hygiene’, self-love formed a large part of everyday life, education and exercise 
(Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, p. 192, Foucault, 1988). In this way ‘exercise as health’ was not 
understood only in the context of the physician and his knowledge, as it is so often represented by 
                                                          
2‘ … that which permits us to produce, transform, or manipulate things’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 17). 
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essentialist approaches. Instead, self-love also influenced how it was practiced, understood and 
taught. 
Self-love was not, as may be the case today, interpreted as self-absorbed or self-indulgent, 
but rather expressed as an imperative for right conduct and proper practice of freedom for the Greek 
citizen (Foucault, 1997, p. 285). Slaves were not expected to attain it (Foucault, 1997, p. 288). 
Aristotle wrote of self-love, making a distinction between true self-love and vulgar self-love, 
favouring true self-love as the development of one’s rational powers expressed by the Greeks as 
phronêsis, which names the practical wisdom that guides any virtuous endeavour (Demirel & 
Yidiran, 2013; Homiak, 2015). The ethos of self-love meant that an enriched experience of 
‘exercise’ played a major part in the ancient Greek educational system. This holistic approach to 
exercise, with its rich ethos of autonomy, is mostly absent in contemporary settings whereby the 
‘active patient’ must navigate through the increasingly consumer-cultured medical industry unaided 
(see Chapter 3 & 4).  
In addition to these three nodal points in the production of ‘exercise as health’, various 
relations of power
3
, such as ‘harmony/symmetry’ and ‘fate’, influenced the notion of ‘exercise as 
health’. 
The privileging of harmony/symmetry filtered through ancient Greek society in many forms. 
For example, it was thought to produce good health between humors (as expressed in the medical 
epistemology of Hippocrates and Galen- see Berryman, 2010). It was also expressed in artworks 
and sculptures in the articulation of mythological gods (The twelve gods of Olympus were 
originally six males and six females), and in the relation between the mind and body (Demirel & 
Yidiran, 2013, p 192; Tipton, 2014; Riva et al., 2010). The belief in mind-body symmetry was so 
blatant that, as Laker (2000, p. 7) argues, an unfit or ‘out of shape’ body in Athens was considered a 
sign of poor education. This influence of the harmony/symmetry ‘mechanism’ on the practice of 
‘exercise as health’ was visible in the rationalizations provided by physicians who prescribed 
moderate intensity exercises to patients for health benefits. These prescriptions were seen as being 
responsible for re-establishing the harmony of the elements, while vigorous exercise was considered 
negative as it disturbed this harmony (Tipton, 2014). The force of harmony/symmetry also 
encouraged a certain kind of ‘exercise’, whereby individuals aimed to manipulate their physiques so 
as to emulate as closely as possible the perfect attributes of their gods who were depicted as ‘super 
humans’ or their heroes like Achilles who represented the idealistic ‘man of action’ (Grivetti & 
Applegate, 1997; Laker, 2000, p. 6) 
                                                          
3
 Relations of power determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an 
objectivizing of the subject’ (Foucault, 1988, p. 17). 
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Fate and its corollary acceptance were equally important relations of power which had an 
influence on the behaviour of citizens in ancient Greece. For example, in the popular story of 
Achilles, Hector is deliberately left to be killed by this god-like hero. Jove asks ‘Shall we save 
Hector…?’ to which Minerva protests against the idea of saving a mortal doomed long ago by 
destiny’ (Drinkwater, n.d., p. 49). Thus, even the threatened loss of their noble prince was not 
enough for them to tempt fate and save him. This story indicates that the notion of fate was 
embedded deep within the ancient Greek psyche and became a core part of the individual subject. 
Thus for the religious citizen of the Homeric period, fate was a powerful mobiliser of individual 
action and thus a considerable force. Fate encouraged a spirit of courageous acceptance with regard 
to various physical ailments and circumstances. This spirit of acceptance contrasts strongly with the 
promotion of obsessive tendencies and even an addiction for exercise in contemporary settings 
where ‘health’ is sold for profit and reproduced as a discourse of ‘risk’ from institutionalized 
medical- scientific perspectives (See Chapters 2-4).  
Ancient Greek societies had unique technologies of production and power and their 
customs, specifically surrounding ‘exercise as health’, were forged as a result of the competitive 
interactions between these technologies. This helps to explain why, despite the fact that their 
foundational understanding of ‘exercise as health’ matches contemporary understandings, the social 
customs surrounding exercise as a practice are very different. For instance, male Greeks exercised 
naked in large training facilities called palaestras and gymnasiums that were dedicated to various 
gods. They had idealistic tendencies towards perfect balance between mental and physical 
instruction, and strived for the perfect bodily proportions (symmetry) seen in their artworks and 
surrounding their cities in the form of statues. They represented health and medicine as a harmony 
(balance) between various elements known as humors. It becomes clear then that the ‘authority 
figures’, the philosophers and physicians, were not the only powers from which society’s rules 
regarding ‘exercise as health’ were established. Instead the ancient Greek individual would have 
aligned with mechanisms such as harmony/symmetry and fate when applying various ‘operations 
on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being’ in order to transform 
themselves to reach a ‘state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Foucault, 
1988b, p. 18). Beauty in appearance (symmetry), moderate exercise and diet (harmony) and the 
strong, well-proportioned male body were all signs of health, and were given a privileged position 
in ancient Greek society as a result of these technologies of production and power (Goldhill, 2004).  
In sum, for ancient Greeks, to be a well-balanced healthy individual, living a life of 
moderation was more than a personal endeavour encouraged by, for example, financial gain. Rather 
it was re-enforced by a strong connection to education, religion and moral inclinations. 
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1.4 The ancient Romans (2
nd
 century BCE- 5
th
 century CE) 
 
After conquering Greece, the Romans adopted many of the social customs and beliefs of the 
Grecian people (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 22). For example, they utilized many of the same 
buildings for physical training such as the gymnasiums and adopted many of the Greek gods as their 
own (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 24; Tipton, 2014, p. 114). However, there were distinct differences 
between the discursive structures of the Romans and the Greeks, especially with regards to physical 
education. For the Romans, military training was more advanced in the sense of discipline, control 
and standardization. For example as Mechikoff (2010) argues, the Roman soldiers were able to 
defeat the Greeks because they were able to master the ability to cooperate and fight together as a 
single unit.  
Military operations were paramount and therefore played a major role in the war-orientated 
Roman civilization (Conti, 2014, p. 2; Zimmern, 1983, p. xviii). As a result, education, which in the 
Greek civilizations was composed of symmetrical division between mental and physical instruction, 
was more closely associated with the latter in Roman civilization (Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, p. 
200). Further, Roman physical instruction comprised mainly of practices which prepared the student 
to become a soldier and included activities that ‘develop[ed] strength of body, courage in battle, 
agility in arms and obedience to commands’, while mental instruction remained rudimentary 
compared to the ancient Greeks who practiced it as an aspiration towards divinity or moral 
endeavour (Van Dalen & Bennett, 1971, p. 70). The Roman state required disciplined soldiers and 
practical politicians. Mechikoff (2010) writes: ‘The legions screened applicants for military service 
and selected only the best physical specimens. Equally important was the selection of men who 
could read, write, and do some mathematical calculations’ (cited in Gabriel & Metz, p. 43). Under 
such circumstance, students posing critical questions were perceived as a threat or challenge to the 
ideology of the state, and as a result many Greek philosophers living amongst the Romans were 
prohibited from teaching students the art of rhetoric and other autonomous behaviours (Simkin, 
2007). In sum, Roman education was merely a means to fulfil practical, military goals. 
As the Roman Empire expanded, so did its population. This resulted in a large number of 
individuals (over one million in an area ‘less than twelve miles square’) who were not directly 
involved in warfare (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 23). This large population has often been described 
as a nation of spectators. Unlike the Greeks who themselves participated in competitive games like 
the Olympic Games, the Romans preferred to train slaves and watch them compete in events like 
the gladiators (Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, p. 192; Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp. 24-25). In this respect 
these events were more for entertainment. The state capitalised on this obsession for entertainment 
using the gladiators to keep the masses docile, thereby preventing them from becoming too bored 
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and ultimately conspiring against the state (Mechikoff, 2010; Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 23). A 
parallel can be made here between the Roman society of spectators and contemporary American 
society, which is commonly referenced as the ‘sleeping giant’; kept docile through entertainment 
and dosed on junk food so as not to cause too much trouble for the state and its functions. Both 
societies are arguably governed through complex mechanisms which ensure the promotion of 
predominantly docile bodies among ‘the masses’ rather than autonomous, free thinking individuals. 
Another source of entertainment was provided by the popular custom of ‘bathing’. Large 
bathing areas were built and situated throughout Roman cities (Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp. 22-23). 
They acted as a space for social interactions with facilities nearby for competing in physical 
activities such as ‘weights, jumping, running, wrestling and a number of ball games’ (Phillips & 
Roper, 2006, p. 23). These areas replaced the Greek gymnasium as the central ‘hub’ of social 
interaction. This is significant as it symbolises how the power relations were transformed. That is, 
the Greek’s social actions, especially while in the gymnasium, were always judged as a 
representation of, or attributions to, the gods. By contrast, the Romans moved away from the 
gymnasiums (which could be expressed as a metaphor for moving away from the gods), preferring 
the experience of bathing and light to moderate physical exercise (purely bodily experiences of 
both, leisure and comfort) (Toner, 1995, p. 7).  
Thus Roman society arguably existed along two poles with regards to physical education. 
On one side it was a society immersed in activities of leisure and spectatorship; and this ontology 
was embraced by the majority of individuals who lived within the ‘protected’ walls of the Roman 
Empire. On the other side there was the military component which created bodies that were 
designed for war; they were strong athletic bodies produced by rigorous exercise and training. 
However, neither of these ontologies created a holistic frame consistent with ‘exercise as health’.  
There are some traces of ‘exercise as health’ found, for example in the works of Galen 
(129–210 CE), a Greek physician who lived during the epoch of the Roman Empire. He established 
an important system of observation for monitoring an individual’s health using five factors still 
relevant today, namely: ‘1) things consumed, 2) things being eliminated from the body, 3) things 
done as exercise, walking, riding, massage, sleep, etc., and 4) things happening from without’ (cited 
in Tipton, 2014, pp. 114-115; Singer, 1997). In addition, he prescribed exercises for patients 
affected with ‘disorders or diseases associated with arthritis, depression, dropsy, epilepsy, gout, 
tuberculosis, and vertigo’ (cited in Tipton, 2014, p. 115). He also recommended exercises using a 
small ball and these exercises are similar to contemporary exercise prescription which favours 
activities of moderate intensity (cited in Grivetti & Applegate, 1997; Tipton, 2014). In sum, he 
made a number of observations regarding the body and its environment. Celsius (25 BCE- 50 CE) is 
another famous physician of the time who encouraged moderate exercise for health benefits, 
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whereby exercise was considered to be ‘reading aloud, drill, walking, and running, but never to the 
degree of sweating or to the level of fatigue experienced by athletes’ (cited in Tipton, 2014, p. 114). 
Interestingly, these two physicians are part of a selected few who practised during these times of 
monumental expansion. Juxtaposing the limited physicians of historical importance arising from 
this era against the size of the Roman population, the masses of Gladiator spectatorship, the 
importance of ‘bathing’, and the desire and need for soldiers, it becomes apparent why ‘exercise as 
health’ did not feature as a major part of the discursive formation of this period.  
In sum, Roman society experienced the body as means to an end; first as a machine of war 
or violence. Seeing the body ripped apart by animals in the great coliseums, for example, was 
common practice. In addition, it was a nation constantly at war in which the body again would have 
been exposed to other violent acts and ‘openings’. Parallel to this, indicated by the popularity of 
bathing, the body was experienced as a site of pleasure and comforts. In this regard the idealistic-
values expressed by the Greeks were not present in the Roman’s representations of physical 
exercise or the body (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 24). Instead the ‘man of action’ or ‘god-like entity’ 
was replaced by the Romans for a purely practical approach whereby the body was represented as a 
machine of war, part of a spectacle as symbolized by the event of the Gladiators, or the source of 
sensory pleasure. Greek writers like Philostratus (170 – 248 CE) and Galen (129–210 CE) living 
during the Roman era expressed contempt for the loss of the common practice of phronêsis (the 
practical wisdom that guides any virtuous endeavour) which thrived in ancient Greece culture 
(Demirel & Yidiran, 2013; Homiak, 2015; Konig, 2005, pp. 267; 283; Drinkwater, n.d.; Grivetti & 
Applegate, 1997). As such, the Roman individual is thought to have approached exercise and the 
body from a completely different perspective; one that was more ethically passive and indifferent.   
 
1.5 The Medieval era (5
th
 - 14
th
 century CE) 
 
The Medieval era began after the fall of the Roman Empire to various tribes and clans. The Empire 
had recently been divided into two spheres, the Western and Eastern, and it was the Western Empire 
which fell to these tribes in the fifth century CE (Gaarder, 1995, p. 143; Drinkwater, n.d., p. 218).  
The Medieval era was far less advanced than the Roman. For one, the large population of 
Rome (greater than 1 million) was drastically reduced to forty thousand people due to constant war, 
pestilence and famine (Gaarder, 1995, p. 144). In addition, very little literature was produced during 
this period and the economy returned to a bartering system (Gaarder, 1995, p. 144). The church and 
state fought for supremacy throughout, and by the year 529 CE the church succeeded in closing 
Plato’s Academy, putting to rest the last of the Greek schools of philosophy (Gaarder, 1995, p. 143; 
Drinkwater, n.d., p. 218). In the same year the Benedict Order, the first of the great monastic orders, 
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was founded (Gaarder, 1995, p. 143). As a result, most of Europe soon became united under the 
banner of the Christian doctrine.  
The Medieval era is characterized as being a period of narrow, closed (conservative), and 
over-authoritative understandings. This inflexible nature resisted new ways of thought, while at the 
same time it reforged the Ancient’s understandings so that they aligned with Christian doctrine. For 
example, famous philosophers of this period such as St. Augustine (354-430 CE) and St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1225- 1274 CE) are said to have ‘Christianised’ the ideas of Plato and Aristotle (Gaarder, 
1995, p. 151; Drinkwater, n.d., pp. 220-223; Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 26). In sum, most 
knowledge produced in Europe during this period was, in one way or another, associated with 
theology. However the Arabs, who did not adopt the Christian doctrine, salvaged some of the 
ancient Greek philosophies, especially Aristotle’s, and progressed rather liberally with regard to 
science, philosophy and mathematics (Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp, 25-29; Ryan, 1984, p. 4; 
Gaarder, 1995, p. 145; Drinkwater, n.d., p. 219). Nonetheless, the majority of Europe was governed 
by a discursive structure heavily influenced by the church, and this meant that earthly 
understandings and values that respected human qualities were replaced by ecclesiastical practices 
(Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, p. 194; Gustafson, 2013, p. 157; Laker, 2000, p. 10; Gaarder, 1995, p. 
149).  
As a result, the unique and popular spectator sports of the Roman Empire ceased along with 
the understanding of the body as a war machine (Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp, 25-29). The mind-
body symmetry and the religious promotion of physical activity produced by the ancient Greeks 
were equally lost under this regime (Laker, 2000, p. 10). Instead the body was more closely 
associated with ‘impurity’ as a result of the church’s teachings of ‘eternal life’, ‘the soul’, and ‘sin’. 
For example, it was taught that in order to remain without ‘sin’ and achieve ‘eternal life’, ‘the soul’ 
must reject the vile and carnal cravings, desires, and temptations of the body (Laker, 2000, pp. 9-10; 
Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp. 25-29). Under such a regime, previous discursive structures, which 
promoted ‘exercise as health’, were challenged and removed by one in favour of promoting the 
body as a mechanism of ‘sin’ and ‘impurity’ (Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp. 25-29).  
However, some forms of physical activity persisted and were often permitted only during 
special holidays or festivals (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 27). Among these, ball games became a 
popular choice (Phillips & Roper, 2006, pp, 25-29). However, these physical activities were not 
performed for health related reasons, but instead were said to represent the battle between good and 
evil (Laker, 2000, p. 9). Rather it was the Arabs who managed to maintain the idea that exercise 
was a form of health as reflected in the works of Moses Maimondes who wrote, ‘Anyone who lives 
a sedentary life and does not exercise … even if he eats good foods and takes care of himself 
according to proper medical principles all his days will be painful ones and his strength shall wane’ 
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(cited in Ryan, 1984, p. 4). It took the Europeans a thousand years to adopt a similar understanding 
towards exercise.   
In sum, statues were not built during the Medieval era to honour the body, stadiums were 
not filled to see it perform, stories of human valour and fate were not common, and measures made 
to embrace bodily leisure and comfort were not promoted. Instead the majority of individuals in this 
period were encouraged to negate the body, repent, and follow the word of God, while enduring the 
physical hardships of a feudal system. They thus, arguably, had no or very little understanding of 
the benefits of exercise with regard to health. Although the knowledge was available to the church 
authorities, ‘exercise as health’ did not align with the agendas of the time and therefore held little 
political influence.   
 
1.6 The humanistic era (14
th
 – 17th century CE) 
 
The humanistic era began in Italy in the late fourteenth century (Mechikoff, 2010, p. 194). It was a 
period of rich cultural development and was characterized by the need to define oneself in this 
world as opposed to the next (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 30). A common phrase of this period was 
‘Horses are born, but human beings are not born – they are formed’ (Gaarder, 1995, p. 165).  
This new freedom to delight in the here and now created vast possibilities and opportunities. 
For one, schools in Italy slowly started to adopt a new ‘human epitome’ which aimed to replace 
discipline and blind obedience encouraged in the Medieval era with a new found emphasis on the 
individual and his/her inclinations, needs and interests (Laker, 2000, pp. 10-11). As such, 
‘imagination, ingenuity and diligence’ became favourable attributes (Gustafson, 2013, p. 163). 
However, the Church’s resistance to these humanistic endeavours remained a powerful force during 
the entire humanistic era, especially outside of Italy. The anti-humanist movement was soon 
established by the church and state which opposed the new ideas of liberation and freedom. Thus, 
despite the positive connotations of the humanistic era, it also had a ‘dark side’ and was a period in 
which the burning of heretics, the persecution of witches, magic and superstition, and brutal 
religious wars were common practice (Gaarder, 1995, p. 166).        
A number of important social changes and developments occurred during this period which 
helped fuel new thoughts and ideas. For one, a middle class developed, whose members were 
afforded new freedoms with regard to basic conditions of life (Gaarder, 1995, p.166). This class 
was formed by the aristocracy’s demand for individuals educated in commerce; that is able to 
administer new land rights, calculate taxes, and enforce other laws of the land (Gustafson, 2013, 
pp.156-157). The narrow and self-interested doctrines of the Church were thus challenged to 
24 
 
introduce practical disciplines of finance and common law into the schooling curriculums 
(Gustafson, 2013, p. 156). It is for this reason that some researchers have linked the origins of the 
humanistic era with the birth of capitalism (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 31; Gustafson, 2013, p. 156). 
New discoveries like the compass, firearms and the printing press changed the way in which 
the world was perceived (Gaarder, 1995, p. 165). The compass brought discoveries of new lands 
like the Americas. Firearms gave superiority to the Europeans over the Americans and the Asian 
cultures. The printing press exacerbated the notions and ideas of the humanistic period. In addition, 
it removed the Church as the sole dispenser of knowledge (Gaarder, 1995, p. 166).   
Pantheism was promoted by Giordano Bruno, Spinoza and later Hume, which suggests that 
God exists everywhere in nature and in life, and was a completely new way of comprehending God, 
the world, and human existence for the medieval individual. These individuals were indoctrinated to 
believe that heaven and Earth operated under separate laws and that God’s dwelling place was in 
heaven. In addition, Earth and human beings were considered central parts of God’s plan and in 
effect Earth was represented as the centre of the universe (Gaarder, 1995, pp. 170-171). However, 
new scientific discoveries of Galileo, Newton, and others contradicted these teachings and instead 
encouraged the ideals of pantheism. For example, their discoveries led to the replacement of the 
geocentric worldview, which stated that everything circles around the Earth, by a heliocentric 
worldview, which states that everything circles around the sun (Gaarder, 1995, pp. 170-171). This 
meant that other planets (heavenly bodies) were governed by similar laws as those witnessed on 
Earth; that is there was no impenetrable barrier separating the two (Gaarder, 1995, pp. 170-171). 
Not only were the Church’s doctrines forcefully questioned by these discoveries for the first time in 
over thousand years, but the importance and significance of human beings in the universe was also 
questioned (Gaarder, 1995, p. 176). These discoveries aided the objectives of the time in that they 
encouraged the need to reconceptualise the prevailing representations of the Medieval era for a 
more humanistic approach.    
Within this paradigm the social construction of the body also changed (Phillips & Roper, 
2006, p. 29). It became less and less associated with sin. Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499 CE) highlights 
this new representation of the body when he expressed the body as ‘divine lineage in mortal guise’ 
(cited in Gaarder, 1995, p. 166). As a result, educational systems, predominately in Italy, began to 
adopt dancing and fencing as practices that focused on the importance of the body and its 
capabilities, as well as mind-body appreciation. For example, the Da Feltre School applied similar 
principles of the ancient Greek mind-body symmetry, encouraging ‘daily exercises such as 
swimming, riding and swordplay, and generating love towards nature via hiking’ (Demirel & 
Yidiran, 2013, pp. 195- 196). However, despite these bodily practices which reflected the spirit of 
the time and favoured physical education as a worthwhile practice in itself, they remained a minor 
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part of the educational system in the rest of Europe (Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 31; Gustafson, 2013, 
p. 162; Laker, 2000, pp. 10-11). Instead the majority of European schools and universities 
continued to consider physical education as a means to an end, whether that end was war, social 
skills, or gracefulness (Laker, 2000, pp. 10-11). 
In 1569 CE, Heironymus Mercurialis wrote De Arte Gymnastica in which he defines 
medical gymnastics as a ‘preventative practice for the healthy, a therapeutic intervention for the 
elderly and sick, and rehabilitative for the disabled’ (Damirel & Yidiran, 2013, p. 196; Ryan, 1984, 
p. 6; Conti, 2014, p.3). His work has many similarities to contemporary rehabilitative medicine and 
as a result he has been described as the founder of modern rehabilitative medicine, in spite of the 
fact that the profession was a few hundred years away from being formally established (Ryan, 1984, 
p. 6). However, Mercurialis’s work was also iconic of the humanistic period because it moved 
beyond the ‘tranquillity, moderation, and restraint’ of the Greek humanistic point of view (Ryan, 
1984, p. 6; Gaarder, 1995, p. 167). Like many of the philosophers, artists and scientists of this era, 
he investigated ancient Greco-Roman texts and then modified them so that they aligned with the 
eccentric character of the humanistic era (Demirel & Yidiran, 2013, pp. 194-195).  For example, he 
used Hippocrates’s and Galen’s system of humors to explain health and illness, but in contrast to 
these physicians who promoted moderate exercise to provide harmony to the humours, he 
recommended vigorous exercise (Ryan, 1984, p. 6). Thus the valued traits of ‘imagination, 
ingenuity and diligence’ of this era encouraged him to created new and unique interpretations that 
pushed the boundaries of previous thought (Gustafson, 2013, p. 163).  
As a result, the body slowly developed a new image as old systems of power fell to newer 
ones. Knowledge of human anatomy, surgery and the cardiovascular system, enhanced by Michael 
Servetus (1511-1553 CE), Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564 CE), Michelangelo (1477-1564 CE) and 
Da Vinci (1452-1519 CE) respectively, created a multitude of new social orientations both inside 
and outside the realm of physical education (Hatch, 2002). Cadavers were dissected by Da Vinci 
and Michelangelo to enhance their artistic abilities, by Vesalius to educate students of medicine, 
and by Servetus to help prove that blood is the life source and is transported by the veins and 
arteries (Hatch, 2002). Thus the human body not only became a vehicle through which various 
virtues could be obtained, as Froebel highlighted, ‘without such cultivation of the body, education 
can never attain its object, which is perfect human culture’ (cited in Phillips & Roper, 2006, p. 33). 
However, it was also caught between the concept of God and nature, and both were becoming more 
and more open to further experimentation and investigation.   
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1.7 The scientific era (17
th
 – 21st century CE) 
 
The scientific era, like previous eras, resulted in the solidification of various shared representations 
of the body and its health. However, vast growth and technological advancements have allowed for 
such shared representations on a global scale, making them far more powerful. The concern here is 
that these global representations may come to be perceived by the average individual as permanent 
and unchangeable, resulting in apathetic attitudes towards institutionally created 'truths'. One 
relevant example is the modern conceptualization of ‘exercise’. 
The modern conception of ‘exercise’ is that it is one of the most valuable forms of medicine 
(American College of Sports Medicine, 2015). Besides the fact that it is relatively inexpensive, it is 
used to treat a multitude of health conditions including inter alia obesity, osteoporosis, high blood 
pressure, muscle dystrophy, and anxiety. It is also understood as a preventative health intervention 
for many non-communicable diseases. It improves general quality of life by providing individuals 
with more energy, strength and endurance, allowing them to complete their activities of daily living 
more easily, and, finally, it is used to treat mental disorders such as depression. Although it is not 
identical to traditional medicine, which prescribes herbal remedies, or contemporary medicine, 
which dispenses pills, it is similar in that it is prescribed to patients in specific doses by modern 
professionals, such as the biokineticist.  
In addition to treating medical conditions, it has a fundamental role in the conceptualization 
of contemporary ‘health’. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) defines ‘health’ as 
mental, physical and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease (WHO, 1948). Thus 
‘exercise’ effectively satisfies all the criteria of ‘health’ as set out by the WHO. There are other 
criteria which influence one’s health, e.g. the importance of age, culture, environment and personal 
responsibility; however, ‘exercise’ has become the phenomenon most readily associated with health 
(Bircher, 2005; Saracci, 1997). In fact, if exercise were suddenly shown to be ‘unhealthy’, the 
WHO would battle to find a replacement. 
‘Exercise as health’ is a concept that is arguably so well engrained it no longer appears to be 
doubted, but rather has become ‘common knowledge’ among contemporary urban populations. 
Health pedagogy has managed to establish this dominance through ‘political processes and 
struggles’ over time (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 36-37). In this way health pedagogy acts as a 
discourse, fixing the meaning of exercise, and making it a privileged sign or nodal point
4
.   
                                                          
4
 Nodal points are the privileged signs around which a discourse is organised. But these signs are empty in themselves 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 28). It is given explicit meaning from within a certain paradigm (in this case health 
pedagogy) and therefore forms a central part of that paradigm (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
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Simultaneously, other representations of exercise are restricted, e.g. exercise as fun, or 
exercise as a mindful and awakening activity. Instead, what most people think concerning exercise 
is a reproduction of what the health discourse has produced, namely ‘exercise as health’. For 
example, all exercises prescribed by the biokineticist are monitored (observed), tested (placed under 
examination), and prescribed (normalized) using scientifically based protocols which align with the 
contemporary health discourse (Minister of Health, 1994).  
The contemporary shift in the conceptualization of exercise places it less in the domain of 
therapeutic sports or education and more squarely in that of medicine. With this shift, the 
specialized field of biokinetics has evolved, to train professionals able to prescribe exercise as a 
form of medicine. Similar to the physician, the biokineticist is required to perform a consultation 
prior to any recommendation or treatment. This consultation is the first space of ‘real’ contact 
between the patient and the practitioner. It is therefore important in establishing the ‘rules’ of play 
within the practice of biokinetics. For example, before the biokineticist begins with any evaluation 
or examination he/she must obtain consent from the patient and, in response; the biokineticist 
agrees to keep all information about the patient confidential. The biokineticist is also required to 
gather the patient’s ‘medical history’ before examination and testing may commence. Other 
examples of medical rationale being applied to biokinetics include a focus on the disease rather than 
the patient. Further, the patient’s voice is understood as secondary or inferior to the professional’s 
voice (professional hierarchy), and there is a rejection of alternative methods of medicine (e.g. 
yoga). In addition, medicine produces objects and materials which are introduced into the practice 
of biokinetics, such as, the stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, plinth, and electrocardiogram (ECG), 
which further suggests medicine is a ‘technology of production’ in the practice of biokinetics, and 
thus physical education. 
Drawing attention to the scientific domain (which forms part of the medical-scientific 
discourse), are the methods of measurement utilised by the biokineticist during consultations. Here 
various technologies, such as the heart rate monitor, dynamometer, cybex or biodex, skinfold 
callipers and goniometer, are used to measure the physiological and biomechanical components of 
patients. In order to articulate these technologies the biokineticist must attain a certain kind of 
scientific rationale that gives understanding to forces, ratios, momentum, angular velocity, lever 
manipulations, and extrapolation techniques.  
Furthering this argument, which expresses science’s strong hold in biokinetics, is the fact 
that in South African universities, physical education is now rooted in the science department. 
However, this was not always the case. It was first introduced within the realms of the education 
department at Rhodes University in Grahamstown around 1945 CE, where the classes were taught 
in large halls. But in 1983 CE physical education was transferred into the science department under 
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a new guise, namely, ‘human movement studies’ (Department History- History of the Department, 
2015). From within this political-intellectual climate, programs for human movement studies 
developed, such as kinesiology studies, human ergonomics, and exercise science (Siedentop, 2008, 
p. 53). By the 1990’s, the kinesiology movement became an official umbrella term for sport, fitness 
and physical education (Siedentop, 2008, p. 53). As technologies developed, micro scientific studies 
were more commonly transferred into studies of kinesiology and new sub-disciplines emerged such 
as biomechanics, biokinetics, exercise physiology, motor control, sport psychology, etc.  In sum, 
the transferring of physical education into the science departments of major universities in South 
Africa has resulted in major changes to its reasoning and operations which, in turn, have allowed 
science to become a ‘technology of production’ of the new discipline of biokinetics. 
Other ‘technologies of production’ include the economic-capitalist and risk discourse. Here   
the biokineticist is responsible for stratifying his/her patients usually according to physiological and 
biomechanical risks criteria. Once stratified, the biokineticist uses the results to develop a health 
profile for his/her patient. Such health profiling, risk assessment and placement have become key 
components in the world of health insurance and corporate health, whereby both these entities 
attempt to entice their members to continually improve their individual health profiles in order to 
minimize ‘risk’; and they often do this using monetary incentives (Crawford, 1977). In this way, 
individualisation and consumer culture paradigms, promoted by commerce, are better articulated as 
a result of their association to the biokineticist’s risk stratification and health profiling techniques. 
As a result, biokinetics adds value to various economic imperatives, assisting in providing 
marketing opportunities for corporate industries. Simultaneously, the economic and risk discourses 
become  valuable ‘technologies of production’ for the practice of biokinetics as they progressively 
support the production of ‘healthy’ bodies.  
Unfortunately, the pervasiveness of these ‘technologies of production’ and their mechanisms 
of disciplinary control often remain hidden to those under their direct influence i.e. the patient, and 
even the biokineticist, which has a number of negative effects on the patient-practitioner 
relationship (see Chapter 5). Although in some cases these effects have been recognized and 
appeals have been made, it is arguably due to the lack of understanding from the general public 
surrounding the historical fluidity of these conceptualizations which ‘traps’ them within the habitual 
acceptance of these structures as ‘fixed’. In sum, the boundaries set by these structures often 
remain, and thus, set the limits to thinking and action within society regarding exercise.   
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1.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter explored how dominating discourses have influenced the practice of physical 
education from a historical perspective. Essentially what became clear was that the historical 
development of knowledge within a certain discipline, such as physical education, is not linear in 
nature. It therefore does not progressively improve from one stage to the other, but rather is always 
made relevant to the objectives of the dominant discourse of that time.  
Although some societies, for instance, those of the ancient Greek and Humanistic eras 
adopted notions of ‘exercise as health’, they remained unique due to their different discursive 
structures. Here the power relations, as well as social, self and production technologies, were shown 
to have a major impact on the decisions, thinking, and actions of each society, contributing to this 
uniqueness. Hence, ‘exercise’ was shaped and formed; that is, structured as a nodal point, given 
meaning and performed in accordance with these technologies. As a result, it was not always 
predominantly associated with health throughout history. 
What became apparent in this discussion is that the conception of the human body and its 
treatment is a discursive construction that changes over time and may vary across different cultures 
and communities. Without understanding this simple truth, individuals remain oblivious to the 
manipulations of their own discursive structure. They are ‘manipulated’ because discursive 
structures create ‘truth’ paradigms that construct thoughts and actions, and should one not make 
him/herself aware of similar patterns occurring throughout history, he/she will not be able to fathom 
the nature of its power in constructing their own reality, e.g. daily actions, thoughts and behaviours.  
Contemporary society’s association of ‘exercise as health’ is one example whereby meaning 
has become relatively fixed. The biokineticist, as a professional who prescribes exercise within this 
discursive structure is, therefore, held by certain constraints, policies, and structures through which 
he/she must associate exercise with health. Thus, it is important to note that a biokineticist does not 
neutrally prescribe exercise in a social vacuum. 
However, although ‘exercise’ may be expressed as a nodal point of the contemporary health 
discourse, it can also be represented as a ‘floating signifier’ in that it has not always been 
‘crystallized’ in health discourse, exclusively understood as ‘exercise as health’, and prescribed by 
medical professionals. Understanding that exercise has existed, and may still exist, as a ‘floating 
signifier’ creates awareness of the possibility of change whereby other representations are made 
more apparent. In other words, it allows one to consider the idea that meaning is not fixed, but 
rather part of an ‘ongoing struggle between different discourses’ (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 
28).  In this way, biokineticists who wish to remain autonomous, and thus, free to create new 
interpretations of exercise, are to arm themselves with techniques capable of challenging these fixed 
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interpretations of the practices of exercise. The discussion now turns to the dominate discourses, 
mentioned above, namely medical-scientific (Chapter 2), economic-capitalist (Chapter 3) and risk 
(Chapter 4), which currently influence the practice of biokinetics in an attempt to uncover some of 
these constraints, policies and structures through which the biokineticist practices and teaches the 
art of exercise. 
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Chapter 2: Critical discourse analysis of the medical-scientific 
discourse  
 
The predominant association of biokinetics with the medicalization of exercise is reflected in the 
definition of biokinetics provided on the official Biokinetics Association of South Africa (BASA) 
website. Here, biokinetics is situated within the broader field of preventative health care. It is 
described as: 
 
The profession concerned with preventive health care and related physical 
conditions, the maintenance of physical abilities and final phase functional 
rehabilitation, by means of scientifically-based physical activity programmes (What 
is Biokinetics?, 2014, p. 1). 
 
Confirming that the practice of biokinetics predominantly falls within the medical-scientific 
discourse, the terminology used by the HPCSA, BASA and Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 to 
explain the scope and profession of biokinetics consists mainly of medical and scientific jargon. 
Further still, biokineticists belong to the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), and 
often work in close relation with other medical practitioners such as doctors, orthopaedic surgeons, 
physiotherapists and nutritionists. Additionally, theoretical studies in biokinetics include many 
medically related subjects such as: cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, metabolic disease, 
chronic illness, obesity, postural ailments, etc. (What is Biokinetics?, 2015, p. 1). Lastly, 
biokineticists perform procedures which are similar, and in some cases identical, to those performed 
by other medical practitioners, including: physical evaluation, health risk appraisal, consultations, 
lung function and capacity testing, administering of electrocardiographs (ECGs), orthopaedic 
assessments, promotion of lifestyle changes, patient monitoring and surveillance, patient recording, 
progress reporting, and wellness promotion. The biokineticist is therefore closely affiliated with 
other medical practitioners and is, in fact, an official health practitioner with a registered practice 
number. Although biokineticists may not prescribe medication, they do prescribe exercise as a form 
of medication. The fact that the word ‘prescription’ and other medical terms have carried over into 
the practice of biokinetics again confirms the degree to which the medical-scientific discourse 
influences the field. Because biokinetics is a newly formed discipline, it is no surprise that its 
attitudes, terminology, interactions and practices, and expected outcomes are configured to meet the 
demands of traditional medical-scientific discourse. 
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To return to the research problem; it is important to recall firstly that the discursive 
constructs by which we understand the body and its treatment significantly influence our 
understanding of the role played by the biokineticist in promoting wellness and of how the 
biokineticist should interact with patients. In this chapter the predominant association of biokinetics 
with the medicalization of exercise is taken to be highly problematic. The biokineticist should 
promote a proactive, patient-driven responsibility for lifestyle change while remaining sensitive to a 
holistic conception of patients as humans who are constructed by varying historical, social and 
cultural factors. However, as this chapter will examine in more detail, the dominant medical-
scientific discourse embraces a ‘scientism’ that offers the biokineticist constructs that provide a 
narrowly mechanistic and instrumental understanding of the body and its treatment, and encourages 
an authoritative and objectifying approach to patients that minimizes the patient’s input and agency 
(Popham, 2005, pp. 287-288). For example, all exercises prescribed by the biokineticist are 
monitored (observed), tested (placed under examination), and standardized (normalized) using 
scientifically based protocols which align with the contemporary health discourse, but which, 
according to Foucault (1991), are equally responsible for the promotion of docile bodies (Minister 
of Health, 1994). As such, it becomes necessary to understand this influence of ‘scientism’ in both 
medicine and biokinetics in order to challenge its negative effect on the patient-practitioner 
relationship. 
 
2.1 What is ‘scientism?’ 
 
Medicine, for instance, is fundamentally concerned with the treatment of illness by means of 
applied knowledge, but since the 1950’s has become increasingly influenced by a 
mechanistic and instrumental notion of ‘science’ (Hunter, 1991, p. 18). 
 
Science has brought to medicine new knowledge, power and technologies like diagnostic testing 
machines, evidence based medicine (EBM), ‘smart pill’ and other advancements. Arguably these 
technologies make the professional’s job easier; tempting and luring him/her away from the 
difficult tasks associated with ‘applied knowledge’. ‘Applied knowledge’ is the practical application 
of knowledge, and to develop it requires experience within a specific field. It develops within 
‘specific cultural groups over specific periods of time and within specific and social settings’ 
(Fensted, Hoyningen-Huene, Hu, Kokwaro et al., 2002. p. 4). It thus ‘provides the basis for local-
level decision-making about many fundamental aspects of day-to-day life’ (Fensted et al., p. 3). In 
medicine, it refers to the traditional approach whereby the practitioner had ‘command of the entire 
diagnostic scenario’ (Rapezzi, Ferrari, and Branzil, 2005, p. 1493). Rapezzi, et al. (2005, p. 1493) 
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argue that this skill is a blend of ‘observational capacity, logical reasoning, culture, and abductive 
imagination’. ‘Applied knowledge’ in medicine is thus ‘a cumulative body of knowledge, know-
how, practices and representations maintained and developed’ by medical professionals (Fensted et 
al., p. 3). However, Hunter (1991) proclaims that medicine has lost capacity with regard to such a 
valuable set of skills in favour of a mechanical and instrumental notion of science. 
To better understand this, certain historical events need to be taken into consideration. To 
begin with, the ancient Greek, Persian and European physicians understood medicine within a 
holistic system known as humorism (Humorism, 2014). To be clear, this is a generalized statement 
as alternative methods of medicine have always existed and still do. However, it is safe to assume 
humorism remained a popular paradigm in medicine among European physicians up until the 
advent of modern medicine in the nineteenth century (Weisz, 2003; Humorism, 2014). Practitioners 
of humorism understood the body as consisting of four types of body fluids which influenced 
temperament and health according to the ratios of these fluids. For example, illness was understood 
as either an excess of one fluid or a deficit of another, while good health was thought to exist when 
there was equilibrium between the four humors. Humorism lacked significant empirical evidence by 
contemporary standards, but it persisted for over two thousand years as the major paradigm 
governing the practice of medicine.  
It was only in the nineteenth century that a new paradigm came to govern medical practice. 
The new paradigm was named the biomedical paradigm and was established as a result of the 
discovery of bacteriology (Lasker, 1997). Within this paradigm physicians began to understand, 
diagnose and treat disease differently. Instead of understanding health as related to the disposition 
of four humors, within the unique humoral composition of each individual as a whole, it became 
understood as the presence of certain kinds of bacteria/viruses. Thus, disease became a biologically 
determinable entity capable of being treated and eradicated with the aid of antitoxins and antibiotics 
(Lasker, 1997). Importantly, medicine as a practice came to adopt a causal relationship between 
bacteria and disease. For example, the presence of a virus or bacteria (the cause) in the body was 
responsible for the disease (the effect), which in simple terms meant: ‘gain control of the virus or 
bacteria and you gain control of the disease’ (Philosophy of Medicine, 2014, pp. 2-3). From within 
the biomedical paradigm a mechanical and deterministic conception of the body was made 
comprehensible thanks to the laws of physics and the new discoveries of science. In turn, this 
understanding, using empirical evidence to support its claims, dramatically influenced the power 
and ability of the new medical-scientific discourse to create knowledge (Philosophy of Medicine, 
2014). 
Other historical influences contributed to the establishment of the biomedical paradigm, but 
it was the scientific validity accompanying the discovery of bacteriology that acted as the catalyst 
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allowing medicine to increase its influence and power over the population (Lasker, 1997; Tosam, 
2014). According to Hunter (1991, p. 18), it was in this biomedical paradigm that medicine 
abandoned ‘applied knowledge’ for the ‘temptations’ the new techniques of science brought. 
To understand how medicine has changed under a scientific regime, it is necessary (1) to 
define what exactly is meant by ‘science’ or ‘scientism’, and (2) to show how it influences 
medicine.  
‘Scientism’ has become an umbrella term often associated with terms such as ‘mechanistic’, 
‘deterministic’, and ‘positivistic’. Haack (2013, p. 23), who has written extensively on the topic of 
‘scientism’, cautions us not to forget our traditional practices and skills in the wake of the 
technological advances science brings to us. She outlines six signs of ‘scientism’ which act as 
valuable tools for identifying its influences within other disciplines (Haack, 2013). A brief 
explanation of these six signs will be provided, including examples in medicine where these 
influences can be found. 
Haack’s (2013) first and second signs are similar. Both explore the honorific embodiment of 
science commonly expressed in what has become a popular phrase: ‘It has been scientifically 
proven’ (Haack, 2013, pp. 4-8). The use of this phrase in spaces of law, media, medicine, history, 
etc., and even to support moral opinion, for many is enough to eradicate doubt, often convincing 
individuals regardless of the claims being presented. Such honorific praises given to ‘science’ have 
motivated a number of sub-disciplines to paste the word ‘science’ onto the tail end of their title, e.g. 
management science, business science, health science, medical science, etc. Haack (2013) argues 
that ‘scientism’ in such forms creates the illusion that whatever is not science is no good or sub-
standard (Haack, 2013, pp. 4-8). However, as she remarks simply pasting ‘science’ onto a title does 
not automatically render that particular inquiry any more rigorous, praiseworthy, or infallible 
(Haack, 2013). The ideals of science can be dangerous when and if accepted almost dogmatically, 
without any scepticism (Rapezzi et al., 2005). This is why Haack (2013) warns us to be cautious or 
wary of merely accepting the teachings of science as truth, for even scientific inquiries can be done 
poorly (Haack, 2013, pp. 4-8). In medicine, titles such as medical sciences, health sciences, and 
nursing sciences, to name a few, have evolved out of the biomedical paradigm. However, these 
titles are under scrutiny as patients begin to realize, in the wake of fragmented mainstream medical 
care and other failings of scientific medicine, that these new and impressive titles have not provided 
medicine with certainty and are by no means error free, nor are they cure-all remedies (Holmes et 
al., 2006; Miles, 2009; Williams & Calnan, 1996).    
Although Haack’s (2013) first and second signs of ‘scientism’ are similar, the second sign 
specifically explores how the techniques used in science are incorporated into other disciplines. She 
continues to show the poor logic inherent in such transfers and the errors they present. She argues 
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that critical assessment is necessary when attempting direct transfers from science to other 
disciplines, explaining that often this is done for ‘display rather than serious use’ (Haack, 2013, p. 
8). Transfers of this nature in medicine are often problematic. For example, Miles (2009) argues 
that evidence based health science (EBHS), as a form of ‘scientism’, is more likely to ‘obscure a 
proper understanding of the human life and condition than to enable it’ (Miles, 2009, p. 943). One 
reason for this is that medicine is not merely an empirical practice; unlike science, it involves 
people. In the case of the empirical perspective offered by EBHS, the patient’s personal and 
interpersonal significance is often ignored as s/he is treated as more of an object of observation than 
a person (Holmes et al., 2006). It can therefore be considered irresponsible to directly transfer 
scientific empirical methods into medicine because of how it affects relationships between 
physician and patient.  
Haack’s (2013) third sign discusses the preoccupation with the demarcation of science. 
Since the twentieth century there has been an increased need to demarcate science as a practice of 
empirical meaning so as to distinguish inquiries of science from those labelled as ‘junk science’ 
(Haack, 2013). However, Haack (2013, p. 11) argues against any real evidence of a specifically, 
defined method, rather suggesting that ‘a loose federation of interrelated kinds of inquiry’ is the 
closest description one can hope to find which describes a scientific inquiry. An example in which 
science is constituted by such ‘interrelated kinds of inquiry’ is evidence based health science 
(EBHS) as it aims to create uniformity in creating a hierarchy for randomised control trials (RCTs), 
which are then depicted as scientifically sound (Holmes, et al., 2006). Holmes et al. (2006) draw 
attention to the fact that many academic institutions have endorsed EBHS. In opposition, they argue 
that EBHS (re)produces the exclusion of certain forms of research, deeming scientifically imperfect 
any research that is not of RCTs design (Holmes et al., 2006).  
Haack’s fourth sign investigates the ‘scientific method’ which has become accepted by 
many as the only method of inquiry worth adopting (Holmes et al., 2006). However, as mentioned 
above, such a method is difficult to define and is instead thought to exist as a ‘federation of 
interrelated inquiries’ (Haack, 2013, p. 11). Thus no single method exists that can be adapted to all 
problems in order to create a solution. Instead different methods are applied in situations, 
remembering that science has many branches and thus requires many methods. What may be 
distinct are the types of tools and techniques science may use during its inquiry, such as 
microscopes, telescopes, mathematical formulae, statistics, RCTs, etc. (Haack, 2013). But these 
techniques do not guarantee rigorous, well-reasoned or even correct work (Haack, 2013). Instead, 
rigorous methods of inquiry are also utilized in other non-scientific disciplines (Haack, 2013). 
Critical assessment should be applied when assessing the validity and reliability of claims which 
call on the famous ‘scientific method’ to justify its reasoning and actions.  
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In the fifth sign, Haack (2013) draws attention to ‘scientism’ by addressing its tendency to 
act outside of its scope of practice. Taking into account Haack’s (2013) description of ‘scientism’ 
thus far, specifically a lack of boundaries and a difficulty in defining what science is, this seems to 
be an obvious outcome. However, she elaborates by providing examples of ethical issues in which 
science has been called upon to provide solutions (Haack, 2013).  This seems strange as such ethical 
concerns are part of the humanities and usually include subjects like philosophy, human relations, 
psychology and ethical and conflict management, rather than what has been called science. For 
example, how does science offer meaning to a man having a 60% genetically probable chance of 
developing testicular cancer? With all its probability theories, statistical predictions and advanced 
technologies, science can never able to express human empathy; it cannot and does not attempt to 
develop the skills of compassion nor work at establishing trust relations. However, this did not stop 
people like Comte (1798-1857 CE), a founding father of science, from concluding that ‘philosophy 
is a bourgeois invention, that social science and psychology should be reduced to biology and that 
because science, a politically neutral endeavour can combat irrationalism and obscurantism, it 
should therefore, reign supreme in the understanding and organization of human society’ (Miles, 
2009, p. 943). As an answer to this dilemma, Haack (2013) suggests that a combination of 
disciplines should ‘guide’ ethical decisions instead of relying on one discipline, especially a 
discipline that attempts to answer all human inquiry when it itself does not value the fundamental 
subjective experience of human life. In sum, as health discourse becomes more intertwined within 
the influences of ‘scientism’, practitioners must learn to become more critical of their 
responsibilities and roles. To rely solely on ‘science’ is irresponsible as the ethical concerns 
inherent within human interactions, and thus health practice, fall outside of science’s scope of 
practice (Holmes et al., 2006, p. 183). 
The sixth sign warns against the tendency of science to want to explain all phenomena in 
existence, thereby becoming what Lyotard (1979) has expressed as a meta-narrative (Lyotard, 
1979). Meta-narratives masquerade as the idea that one inquiry should dominate all investigation, 
and with regard to the current discussion that inquiry is the scientific inquiry. For example, when 
‘scientism’ belittles other disciplines while simultaneously projecting its own potential, it is 
attempting to do exactly this. Here again it is appropriate to turn to EBHS as a case in point because 
it aims to define medical knowledge from a certain perspective: favouring objective evidence while 
negating subjective evidence. Holmes et al. (2006) argue that such techniques further marginalize 
many forms of knowing/knowledge. 
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2.2 Medicine and the techniques of ‘scientism’ 
 
In this section, three of Berg’s ideas (1997) will be used as examples of what has been 
discussed above as techniques of ‘scientism’. Berg (1997) claims such techniques were not always 
part of medical practice. These techniques became prominent in medical practice within the 
biomedical paradigm, namely: ‘increased specialization’, ‘increased reliance on diagnostic and 
prognostic reasoning’, as well as ‘standardization of vocabulary and treatment practices’ (Berg, 
1997, pp. 19-29). In addition, the following section will discuss how these techniques of ‘scientism’ 
have assisted in creating a new kind of physician and patient; one who is less of a person and more 
of an accumulation of data observed, recorded and put back together as a medical case.  
 
2.2.1 Specialization 
 
‘Recognize what I do’, says the physician while simultaneously 
shouting, ‘stop fragmenting an already overfragmented system’ 
(Cassel & Reuben, 2011, p. 1169). 
 
As you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head or the 
head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the 
body without the soul […] for the part can never be well unless the 
whole is well (Plato 427 BC - 347 BC). 
 
Specialization, in its essence, involves some sort of separation and isolation. It involves the 
limiting, separating and dividing of a whole, whatever that whole might be. It usually becomes 
favourable when information about a certain phenomenon becomes too vast to comprehend all at 
once, and adequate knowledge is only possible from a specific vantage point or perspective. In 
medicine, specialization includes sub-disciplines such as cardiac surgeons, dentists, orthopaedic 
surgeons, etc. The orthopaedic surgeon, for example, is responsible for a host of specialized 
procedures, which in themselves are too complex for general practitioners to include in their broad 
scope of practice. Without specialization it would not be possible for medicine to expand beyond a 
certain point. Thus the complex systems of knowledge seen in contemporary medicine rely on there 
being specialized roles played by individual components in order to function. The more complex 
the system becomes, the more specialized the roles of its participants. The level of specialization is, 
therefore, a good indicator of a system’s complexity.  
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A rather obvious example of specialization in medicine’s history is the divide created 
between physician and the public health professional, which evolved out of the biomedical 
paradigm. Both professions experienced numerous changes resulting in their roles becoming more 
specific and interactions between each other less common. A major reason for this loss of 
communication and interaction was that medicine attained a higher status amongst the general 
population within the biomedical paradigm. Lasker (1997, p. 21) writes, ‘difficult lifestyle changes 
promoted by the public health professional had become circumvented by the curative approach 
promoted by the medical sector for chronic diseases’. As a result, the physician’s approach became 
very different to the health practitioner’s approach and these differences in approach created two 
different ontological existences. For example, the human body, when expressed through the eyes of 
the medical professional, is analysed as individual parts which invariably are said to constitute a 
whole. From within such a framework, the whole is expressed as no more than the sum of its parts 
(Philosophy of Medicine, 2014). The ontological experience created by the medical profession is 
thus said to resemble a mechanistic reductionist conception of the human body (Philosophy of 
Medicine, 2014; Tosam, 2014; Williams & Calnan, 1996; Miles, 2009).  
The contrasting approach echoed by the unpopular public health professional suggests that a 
pattern of disease forms part of a system whose components are complexly interrelated (Philosophy 
of Medicine, 2014, p. 3). This ontology makes sense only within a holistic framework and is thus 
unpopular in today’s individualistic society.  
The ontological differences, along with cultural differences, and a growing imbalance in 
funding between medical professionals and health professionals created difficulties related to trust, 
respect and communication, and a reluctance to collaborate freely between the two specialities. 
These eventually became separate and virtually independent parts of the larger health system 
(Lasker, 1997, p. 17). In 1997, the committee of the American Public Health Association felt it 
necessary to clearly define these two roles and did so in the following manner: 
 
The role of the medical profession is distinctly preoccupied with the individual and 
his/her treatment and it’s professionals includes not only allopathic and osteopathic 
physicians, but also nurses, dentists, pharmacists, health educators, psychologists, 
nutritionists. Public health on the other hand, focuses on population interventions 
assuring provision of essential health services and its professionals consist of nurses, 
sanitarians, epidemiologists, health educators, food and drug inspectors, etc. (Lasker, 
1997, p. 3). 
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Since the original divide between medical professionals and health professionals, many 
newly defined roles and sub-specialties have evolved creating further specialization. For example, 
in 1942, fifteen specialty boards were in existence, by 1992, the American Board of Medical 
Specialists recognized twenty four primary boards and seventy subspecialties, and by 2011, over 
one hundred and fifty eight specialties and subspecialties were recognized by the board (Lasker, 
1997: Starfield, Shi, Grover, & Macinko, 2005). Today, specialization has advanced to such a 
degree that there is confusion amongst the general population regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of these specialists. Public confusion does not create much social good for either 
party (Starfield et al., 2005). In fact, there is even evidence suggesting confusion amongst 
specialists as to the roles of their colleagues. A monograph compiled by the committee of the 
American Public Health Association describes how medical and public health students from 
different backgrounds were unable to articulate the roles of their colleagues in relation to their own 
field (Lasker, 1997). This concern is echoed in an article in the 2012 American Medical Association 
Journal, ‘How much specialization is appropriate?’ (Detsky, Gauthier, & Fuchs, 2012). Detsky et al. 
(2012) are not only concerned by the confusion created by increasing specialization in medicine, 
but also worry about reduced patient care. For instance, in the past, doctors were responsible for 
home visits and tendered to entire families. Conversely, in contemporary society from the capturing 
of a patient’s information to diagnosis, treatment and payment, the patient will deal with a myriad 
of medical staff members and perhaps more than one specialist. As a result of this transition, the 
patient, whose name, family member’s names, and possibly even the dog’s name, were all known 
by the family physician of the past, is now treated as less of a person and more of an accumulation 
of data observed, recorded and put back together as a medical case.  
The latter fragmented approach has also resulted in time reductions whereby the patient 
spends less one-on-one time with the specialist. The time necessary to gain knowledge of the 
subjective experience of the patient, his/her family life, values and beliefs, etc., is said to be less 
important in this regime, and in this sense the medical care provided is reduced.  
Another challenge to patient care posed by specialists in high volumes is a reduction in the 
physician’s skills. In order to maintain their skills, specialists need high patient volumes (Starfield 
et al., 2005). A diluted pool of specialists is given less opportunity to practice, the result being a 
reduction in their skill which in turn reduces their quality of service.  
A fee-for-service system, which dominates contemporary medical practices, ensures that 
both the generalist and the specialist need to increase their patient visits in order to receive a greater 
profit; however, the specialist charges a higher fee, thus increasing the patient’s expenses (Starfield 
et al., 2005, p. 5). In addition, fragmented health industries often result in a single patient having to 
visit more than one specialist, especially if that patient has more than one chronic condition. In such 
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cases, health costs escalate rapidly, often exceeding the financial limits of poorer population groups 
(Starfield et al., 2005, p. 5). Thus in increasing the number of specialists as opposed to increasing 
the number of general practitioners, a greater social economic divide is produced. 
The reality is that medicine is riddled with uncertainty, even with the advances of 
specialization. Although it is obvious that some special population groups benefit from highly 
focused knowledge and skills, such as cardiac patients who require care and management before 
and after transplantation, device management and so forth, the existence of a specialist does not 
automatically transform medicine into a predictable practice. Medicine is not predictable: reactions 
to treatment differ from patient to patient; scientific knowledge has practical limitations; and 
physicians have limitations with regard to the interpretation of scientific findings within the context 
of particular patients. There are also ethical issues which arise in medicine, e.g. should only mild or 
moderate depressants receive medication, and at what age should Ritalin be prescribed to 
hyperactive children? (Starfield et al., 2005; Cassel & Reuben, 2011). Such are the complexities of 
medicine and the specialist, with all his/her expertise and scientific knowledge, does not eliminate 
the uncertainty.  
Some studies have suggested that specialists may not even be necessary (Starfield et al., 
2005; Campbell, Ramirez, Perez, & Roetzheim, 2003, Tosam, 2014). For example, specialists are 
inclined to suspect serious pathologies in general circumstances because of their training whereas, 
in contrast, general practitioners, because of their large scope, are able to diagnose a larger range of 
pathologies with more accuracy (Starfield et al., 2005, p. 5). A study has even shown how general 
practitioners, armed with guidelines, are able to provide similar care to patients with cardiac 
pathologies to that of cardiologists (Starfield et al., 2005).  
Considering these negative implications of specialization or its failures, “why is it that the 
number of specialists has continued to rise over the last few decades?” It is obvious that there also 
must be advantages to specialization, however it is arguably condoned and accepted not because of 
these positive and negative health outcomes, but largely because it is a relation of power used to 
discipline, dominate and thus better govern the population. 
A large number of studies have discussed the development, impact and effect of 
specialization in medicine (Eulner, 1970; Stevens, 1966; Halpern, 1988; Weisz, 2003), but few 
consider why medicine has seen such a dramatic degree of specialization since the nineteenth 
century and whether or not this increase is entirely justifiable. Of course an increase in complexity 
regarding the nature of studies and a correlating need to develop knowledge from specific vantage 
points allowed specialization ‘… to be seen as a manifest necessity of modern medical science’; 
however, Weisz (2003) offers an alternative reason as to why specialization was introduced into the 
medical scientific sector during the nineteenth century suggesting it was not as self-evidently 
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necessary as it might have seemed. Firstly, he (2003) makes it painfully clear that specialization did 
not take place without resistance, and he describes in detail the conflicts in various locations within 
both Paris and Britain. Important to understand is that before the event of the biomedical paradigm, 
specialization was not very common in medical circles. Weisz (2003) declares that specialists were 
lumped together with ‘charlatans’ and ‘quacks’ in eighteenth century Britain. But, by the nineteenth 
century, specialists became part of an elite group involved in academic medicine (Weisz, 2003). 
This group, according to Weisz (2003), associated themselves with what he terms the 
‘administrative rationale’: 
 
The administrative rationality of the ninetieth century, at its core, aimed to manage 
large  populations through proper classification, gathering together individuals 
belonging to the same class and separating those belonging to different categories 
(Weisz, 2003, p. 539). 
 
Weisz (2003) admits that science had a large part to play in the increase of specialization in 
the medical sector, however he insists that it was primarily because of the macro influence of 
nineteenth century ‘administrative rationale’ that specialization was eventually accepted despite the 
resistances inherent in the medical sector at the time.  
He also admits that specialization did not take place in one wide successful sweep; many 
countries resisted the notion, arguing that specialization encourages fragmentation of medical care, 
ultimately resulting in the loss or undervaluing of the personal or generalist physician; as witnessed 
in contemporary health settings (Cassel & Reuben, 2011). He is not convinced that new scientific 
knowledge of the time, such as ‘organic localism’ which was used to explain disease, was the 
reason specialization became accepted by medicine. He refutes these claims by informing his 
readers that many of the new specialties introduced did not harbour the ideas of ‘organic localism’ 
(Weisz, 2003). Instead, he attributes the initial acceptance of specialization to the initiatives of a 
‘community of doctors centred on an organized system of institutions devoted to advancing medical 
knowledge through rigorous empirical clinical research’ (Weisz, 2003, p. 546). He shows that these 
initiatives were aligned with other political advances taking place in Paris at the time (Weisz, 2003, 
p. 546). Such initiatives reflected a need to compete internationally with regard to research, and 
included coordinating a large network of institutions and individuals competing to develop new 
knowledge, forming the MD degree as a state diploma uniting both medicine and surgery, and 
developing particular structures in Parisian hospital systems, clinics, and institutions of higher 
education (Weisz, 2003). These events that took place in Paris are especially important because 
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Paris had become a centre of knowledge production during this period (Weisz, 2003). Notably, 
these events and changes in medical practice did not occur within a social vacuum.  
In sum, Weisz (2003) suggests that specialization occurred in medical practice largely 
because of a ‘community with similar interests’ and that this community wished to (1) use medicine 
beyond its scope of practice as a vehicle for the agendas of the ‘administrative rationale’, and (2) 
introduce inquiries of a particular nature while denying other methods of inquiry. Both are similar 
to Haack’s (2013) fifth and sixth signs, namely ‘looking to the sciences for answers to questions 
beyond their scope’ and ‘denying or denigrating the legitimacy or the worth of other kinds of 
inquiry’ (Weisz, 2003; Haack, 2013, p. 3). Today, methods of classifying the population are 
common practice in medical practice. For instance, health profiling in which cholesterol levels, 
blood pressure readings, body weight, etc. provide health related measurements for individuals; 
allowing them to be classified using normative techniques. These health profiles have the potential 
to administer certain privileges, or, conversely, deny them to an individual within, for example, a 
medical scheme. Further still, health screening of varying degrees has now become mandatory in 
many spaces within contemporary society, e.g. schools, workplace, travel, medical insurance 
policies, etc.  
Thus, specialization is not only a practical strategy used by medical practice to deal with 
epistemological complexity, but it also operates on a macro level as a technique of what has been 
termed ‘scientism’. 
 
2.2.2 Diagnostic reasoning as a function of ‘scientism’ 
 
Medical diagnosis is the process of determining which disease or condition is responsible for the 
presented signs and symptoms of a patient. Techniques include: a medical history, a physical 
examination, and perhaps one or two diagnostic tests. The diagnostic process is complex in nature, 
dealing with multiple sources of data that is then pieced together in order to make a diagnostic 
impression, and later, after further testing (if necessary), the diagnosis is made (Medical Diagnosis, 
2014, p. 1). Empiricism, logic and rationality have been part of the medical diagnosis procedure for 
centuries. However, within the biomedical paradigm, it has come to incorporate numerous special 
tests which utilize advanced technologies, implement medical algorithms to assists in medical 
decision-making, and incorporate ‘smart pills’5  to collect and transmit physiological information, to 
name a few (Haack, 2012, p. 1; Kim, 2012). All these advanced technologies are beneficial in 
                                                          
5
 The ingestible sensor (formally referred to as the Ingestion Event Marker or IEM) is part of the Proteus digital health 
feedback system: an integrated, end-to-end personal health management system that is designed to help improve 
patients’ health habits and connections to caregivers (Kim, 2012). 
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assisting the physician in his/her diagnosis; however, as mentioned by Rapezzi et al. (2005), they 
can act as temptations, ultimately limiting the potential and skill of the physician. 
Rapezzi et al. (2005) outline examples of such ‘temptations’ by comparing investigative 
strategies employed in popular fictitious detective stories to medical investigation. ‘Armchair 
detectives’, they explain, apply general knowledge and precedent from previous case histories to 
achieve success in an investigation. These detectives are not interested in direct contact with the real 
world and it is this lack of contact which ultimately leads to their failure. Similarly in medicine, 
specialists may isolate themselves from the real world (patient interaction) via the conviction that 
the ‘solution to every clinical dilemma is to be found on the web’ or in protocols or other methods 
of standardization (Rapezzi et al., 2005, p. 1493). The ‘temptation’ offered by technology is to view 
diagnosis merely in terms of information retrieval. Besides the high risk of misdiagnosis, this 
endeavour is intellectually draining, often resulting in valuable information being ‘elbowed’ out by 
‘useless’ information (Rapezzi et al., 2005, p. 1492). Rather, for a successful diagnosis, the vast 
quantity of information made available by advanced technologies can only be rendered useful 
through critical engagement and application to real-world situations, and thus active engagement 
with patients.  
Here attention is drawn to Haack’s (2013) warning against the uncritical acceptance of 
information that merely claims to be scientifically proven. She emphasizes the importance of 
knowing the world by other means besides that of science (Haack, 2012, p. 1). Transferring these 
concerns to medicine, the medical diagnosis, which is a cognitive process, limits its effectiveness 
when it relies solely on the new technologies of science. Technologies such as medical algorithms, 
sensory pills, optical coherence tomography, laboratory data, evidence based medicine (EBM), etc. 
should not be the only important elements in the medical diagnosis procedure solely because they 
are objective in nature. Rather, the patient’s subjective experience should be understood as an 
equally valuable component. Although contemporary medicine does not solely act on one side of 
the scale (e.g. either objective or subjective), it is clear that contemporary medical diagnosis favours 
an objective approach.  
However, the social orientation of medicine, as a practice involving interactions amongst 
people, upsets any attempt to reduce medical diagnosis to an exclusively objective, empirical 
enterprise. Nonetheless, the projection of ‘scientism’ into the medical diagnosis procedure attempts 
to do exactly this; creating what has been termed ‘a hierarchy of evidence’ (Miles, 2009). The 
effects are twofold. Firstly, medicine can convince itself that it is an enterprise of certainty with 
neatly calibrated and objectively sound outcomes, and thereby avoid having to understand the 
complexity of subjective experience. Secondly, almost in exchange for the loss in emphasis on their 
subjective experience, patients develop overconfidence in the medical diagnosis, causing them to 
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overestimate the abilities of the medical-scientific discourse (Miles, 2009; Cassel & Reuben, 2011; 
Tosam, 2014). As a result the illusion of certainty in medicine has created a patient who expects 
‘absolute cure without any risk, complication, pain or pressure’ (Chaturvedi, 2013, p. 703). 
Rationalizations of this nature, although clearly absurd for medical practice, is somewhat similar to 
Comte’s (1798-1857 CE) (a founding father of science) comment ‘True knowledge is derived from 
perpetual experience, absolute empiricism, insisting that truth and knowing can only arise from 
objective observation, experiment and analysis’ (cited in Miles, 2009, p. 943).  
Ignored much of the time by the scientific, positivistic, reductionist approach is the 
fallibility of medicine. This is understandable in view of the fact that science’s influence in 
medicine has led to a phenomenal amount of progress since the nineteenth century, including 
discoveries such as pain- free medication and extended longevity (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 
1613). These and a myriad of other actual and perceived successes of medicine have the effect of 
dismissing any counterarguments derived from alternative ways of knowing, which results in a 
strong tendency among patients to consider their physicians as ‘learned, assured, and 
quintessentially infallible figures’ (Miles, 2009, p. 942). It often becomes a matter of reputation 
preceding product. However, portraying medicine as infallible is dangerous. Miles (2009) argues 
that doctors who perpetuate the ‘myth of progress’ (the illusion that medical science only advances 
from strength to strength) can be accused of a serious intellectual dishonesty, which increases their 
self-delusion and raises unrealistic expectations in patients. An example would be the performance 
of diagnostic tests using advanced technologies without making the patient aware of the limitations 
of these tests. For instance, when a physician recommends an x-ray to assess a patient’s injured 
joint it provides evidence as to whether or not a bone is broken, but it does not offer information 
concerning the condition of the ligaments and surrounding musculature. Although diagnosis 
concerning the condition of the bone might not be a misdiagnosis, a patient who is unaware of the 
limitations of the test might be satisfied that the bone is not broken and persist no further with 
medical inquiry. Thus, because the patient is often unaware of the limitations of the x-ray, his/her 
confidence in the medical diagnosis is not questioned (see more Chaturvedi, n.d., p. 704). Yet, 
without an MRI scan, the condition of the ligaments and musculature are unknown and without 
treatment, the time of injury may be prolonged or the injury may become a reoccurring concern.  
In sum, the reality is that a physician’s diagnosis, even when using new technologies, is not 
without its limitations. However, in ignoring the limitations of diagnostic testing physicians have 
obtained a ‘godlike’ status and patients have developed an irrational overconfidence 6  in the 
biomedical paradigm (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p.1613). 
                                                          
6
 Overconfidence of this nature is not absolute. An increasing number of claims for malpractice and negligence, as well 
as, increasing numbers of health care quality assurance and risk management programmes within international health 
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This ‘godlike’ status is promoted by a ‘professional hierarchy’ that extends from within 
medial practice into biokinetics. For example, during the consultation it is the biokineticist who: 
ensures the ‘consent’ form is correctly understood and then signed, reassures the patient their 
information will be kept confidential, and thus safe; and guides and directs the flow of the medical 
history evaluation. In addition, because the biokineticist directs the flow of the medical history 
evaluation, he/she decides what information is relevant and what is not. Contrary to the aims of 
medicine, ‘professional hierarchy’ expressed within both diagnostic and screening procedures 
assists in creating a separation between the physician and the patient by creating a relational power 
imbalance. 
To hide behind these illusions of certainty produced by associating medical diagnostic 
reasoning with techniques of science is unsustainable. Medical practice is not an absolute enterprise 
and needs to also be understood in light of its limitations, not only in the glory of its previous 
successes; including those of science. 
 
2.2.3 Standardization 
 
Standardization is the ‘formulation, publication, and implementation of guidelines, rules, and 
specifications for common and repeated use, aimed at achieving optimum degree of order or 
uniformity in a given context, discipline, or field’ (Standardization, 2015). Standardization has 
become increasingly popular in the biomedical paradigm whereby medically related queries are 
consistently framed and then answered in step-by-step guidelines and protocols (Berg, 1997; Haack, 
2013). Medical practitioners may be inclined to support standardization because it enhances their 
status (Miles, 2009). However, such decisions may prove counter-intuitive. For example, Berg 
(1997) suggests that protocols, which are mainly developed by institutions, contribute to the illusion 
that individual practitioners are unable to solve health related queries efficiently by themselves 
(Berg, 1997; Shaywitz, 2011). Here, anomalies experienced while following standardized protocols 
are more likely to be a fault of the practitioner’s rather than the institution which created the 
protocol simply because the institution represents a large and universal authority. In this way, 
protocols promote the institution while simultaneously reducing the individual practitioner’s worth; 
contributing to a new kind of practitioner who becomes subject to the institution and its 
standardized protocol (Berg, 1997; Miles, 2009). This kind of re-framing of medical practice using 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
services suggest that medical practice does not always meet the patient's overexpectations (Miles, 2009). The irony is 
that the more infallible medical practice portrays itself to be, the higher the patient’s expectations become, which 
effectively results in greater patient dissatisfaction. 
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universal standards is instrumental in achieving what Haack (2013) labels ‘the omnipresence of 
‘scientism’’. 
Critics of this process argue that standardization of medicine acts as a form of social control 
as it narrows the potential avenues in which one may come to know the world resulting in a loss of 
identity, ‘cookbook medicine’, de-skilling, and reduced quality of care (Timmermans & Almeling, 
2009; Holmes et al., 2006; Illich, 1976; Berg, 1997). One manner in which standardization threatens 
to narrow the ‘ways of knowing’ is through evidence based medicine (EBM).  
EBM has become widely accepted as being more rigorous, praiseworthy and infallible than 
other methods of research in medicine (Miles, 2009; Holmes et al., 2006). One particular research 
methodology promoted by EBM is the randomized control trail (RCT). The RCT is represented as 
the gold standard of research studies. In most cases, an RCT study will achieve higher status and, as 
a result, receive less criticism. Bias of this nature is a representation of Haack’s sixth sign of 
‘scientism’ (‘Denying or denigrating the legitimacy or the worth of other kinds of inquiry besides 
the scientific…’), and thus aligns the medical-scientific discourse with the agendas of ‘scientism’ 
(Haack, 2013, p. 3). It is, however, a mistake to allow one methodological approach to dominate all 
research as research methodologies all have their advantages and disadvantages. Effectively, every 
methodology has its limits– a fact that is important to acknowledge within the context of a 
particular study.  
In the case of EBM which ‘regards the scientific understanding of the disease as the only 
relevant issue, while ignoring other factors’, there is a tendency to misrepresent the relationship 
between the partial nature of the disease and the totality of the person (Legget, 1997, p. 97; Miles, 
2009). For example, EBM has been described as an ‘extract and apply’ approach to patient 
relationships, whereby clinicians view patients as objects of information (extract) and care 
providers make decisions according to this information (apply) (Upshur, 2005). The emphasis on 
the objectification of the patient promoted within this framework results in less attention being 
given to the subjective experience of the patient. In sum, EBM has resulted in the favouring of the 
fact over the person in medical practice, essentially, limiting the practitioner's scope of practice 
because not all questions relevant to medical decision-making are scientific in nature.  
Furthermore, EBM and other standardization techniques paint the picture that all medical 
problems are neat and tidy. At the same time it offers effective and appropriate solution to these 
neatly framed problems (i.e. it treats medical problems as frequently asked questions (FAQs) with 
neatly framed answers) (Berg, 1997; Shaywitz, 2011). Physicians who understand that this 
approach is simplistic are often resistant to implement techniques of standardization and, as a result, 
are met with hostility by advocates. For example, physicians who resist standardization are 
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criticized for being outdated, conservative, narrow-minded, and ultimately responsible for current 
examples of inadequate health care (Shaywitz, 2011).  
There are, of cause, both advantages and disadvantages to standardization. Cases made in 
favour of standardization highlight successful standardized health care interventions, which have 
reduced mortality and morbidity (Cutler, 2004, Skinner, Staiger, & Fisher, 2006). Other advocates 
claim protocols may enhance the quality of care, reduce unwanted variations in practice, and may 
help to render medical practice more scientific; arguing that present medical practices are hindered 
by discrepancies between physicians (Cutler, 2004; Skinner et al., 2006; Shaywitz, 2011). One point 
Shaywitz (2011) makes in favour of standardization is that low-cost providers can be employed to 
assume the role of highly paid ‘experts’ in administering care. Shaywitz (2011) refers to this 
process as ‘off-loading’. From an economic perspective, ‘off-loading’ makes a lot of sense as health 
care is expensive and its cost would be reduced if it were to become standardized. In sum, 
advocates argue that by using algorithms to standardize medical decision-making, the entire 
practice of medicine will be made more efficient i.e. medical practice may become performance 
orientated (Shaywitz, 2011; Fernando & Henskens, 2013). Here again, similar to evidence based 
medicine (EBM), that which can be made ‘explicit [explained] is more important, more scientific, 
more of value, than that which cannot be (or is not) made explicit’ (Berg, 1997, p. 1085). 
However, by accepting algorithms into medical practice a large portion of the complexities 
inherent in the decision-making process will be ignored due to the fact that not all information can 
be neatly formulated and packed into mathematical formulas. Haack (2013) reminds us to be critical 
of approaches that deny other forms of knowing (Haack, 2013). Although algorithms may limit 
discrepancies between medical practitioners and appear to improve medical-scientific discourse by 
making it more scientific, medicine is far more complex and requires more than the narrow and 
limiting outcomes that algorithms present in order to acquire new knowledge. Hence, in some ways 
advocates are correct in stating medical practice will be made more efficient through 
standardization techniques, but, “at what cost since standardization often also means depreciation in 
the value of health care?” Not surprisingly the outcome of reduced health care costs does not come 
without a price.  
Lastly, the formalizing of the medical-scientific discourse in the form of standardized 
procedures leads to a hierarchical distinction whereby paramedical workers are considered less 
important than medical workers (Berg, 1997). This is because their work is more difficult to 
formalize. For example, a nurse’s work is often difficult to formalize, while work done by other 
practitioner’s, such as laboratory data collection, circumscribed procedures and medication dosages 
description, is easily or already formalized (Berg, 1997). The nurse may attempt to formalize 
his/her work via protocols and other scientific techniques, but this is often to his/her own detriment 
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likely resulting in the reduction of the practice to nothing more than a managerial enterprise (Berg, 
1997). This, in turn, ignores central roles which are far more difficult to formalize, but yet still vital 
to medical care (Berg, 1997). Hierarchical distinctions of this nature are counter-intuitive to 
workplace respect, trust, and cooperation creating unnecessary tension among healthcare 
professionals. 
 
2.3 Conclusions 
 
The techniques of ‘scientism’ discussed in this chapter have been shown to affect the patient, 
changing the way he/she is understood, treated and ultimately how he/she acts within the medical-
scientific discourse. A recurring theme suggests patients have come to be understood as objects to 
be observed, examined and normalized. Here the patient’s subjective experiences are considered 
less important while family doctor have become a thing of the past having been replaced by 
techniques of specialization, advanced diagnostic procedures and standardization. In this 
environment, ‘bits’ of information, not identities or persons, are accumulated and recorded by the 
plethora of classification techniques and other related forms. In sum, the evidence is given 
preference over the patient and his/her narrative story.  
The biokineticist, as a health professional, also operates within this environment. For 
example, he/she is encouraged to adopt the ideology that all problems may be solved via empirical 
methods. In addition, most research projects derived from within the field of biokinetics are 
quantitative in nature, suggesting that other methods of inquiry are unequally represented e.g. 
qualitative research. Important to note is that a purely quantitative approach has the shortcoming of 
creating a compartmentalized understanding of the human body and is therefore, inconsistent with 
the foundational philosophies of medical practice which are to encourage care and compassion.  
Hence, if biokineticists are to move beyond these effects of ‘scientism’ which have affected 
both itself, as well as medical practice, they must learn to appreciate and respect the humanistic 
traits traditionally inherent in medicine or find alternative methods which encourage multiple ways 
of knowing the body. 
Furthermore, ‘scientism’ in medical practice has encouraged patients to perceive medically 
related queries as closed, neatly, packaged entities. This oversimplification develops an almost 
naive overconfidence in medical practice, causing patients to treat physicians as ‘godlike’ figures 
and expecting treatment without risk and service without error. Without informing patients of the 
limitations in contemporary medical practice the outcome enviably becomes unsustainable as 
patients either end up resenting medical practice because of its failure to meet their ‘irrational’ 
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expectations or they turn to alternative methods, which often end up being more harmful to their 
health. The outcome of not presenting these limits has prevented an important element of medicine, 
namely trust, from developing among practitioners and their patients.  
If biokineticists are to move beyond this dilemma created within their discursive structure 
they need to resist the lure of authority and specialization created by the biomedical paradigm and 
rather cultivate methods of establishing relationships of trust. They might do this by placing value 
on the patient’s voice, believing it carries information capable of helping in determining more 
precisely what the diagnosis is and what treatment is necessary; thereby allowing the patient to 
become a central component in his/her medical/health experience (i.e. empowering the patient) 
(Charon, 2010, p. 1898). Arguably, open relationships of this nature will not create unnecessary 
power distinctions between practitioners and patients. 
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Chapter 3: Critical discourse analysis of the economic-capitalist 
discourse  
 
… in the crisis of the hospital as environment of enclosure, neighbourhood clinics, hospices, 
and day care could at first express new freedom, but they could participate as well in 
mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of confinements. There is no need to 
fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons (Deleuze 1992, p.4). 
 
In this chapter I shift attention to the capitalist discourse that dominates contemporary lifestyles and 
health care. I argue that medical practice has fundamentally changed in character in response to the 
idea that health has become a commodity that can be sold for a profit (Berg 1997, pp. 19-27). 
‘Societies of control’ is a concept developed by Deleuze (1992) in his ‘Postscript on the Societies of 
Control’ that is useful for clarification of this point. Arguably, before commercial interests became 
dominant, traditional medical practice could be characterized in terms of what Foucault (1991) 
refers to as ‘disciplinary societies’. But as forms of commerce have increasingly been injected into 
medical practices, medicine has come to adopt the characteristics of Deleuze’s (1992) ‘societies of 
control’. In other words, an invidious, widespread network of ‘control mechanisms’ has replaced 
disciplinary sites of enclosure (hospitals, schools, prisons, families and factories). In medical 
practice, ‘control mechanisms’ arguably take the form of ‘investor interests’, ‘deregulation’, the 
Consumer Protection Act (CPA), ‘transparent access systems’, and the ‘new public health’ 
initiatives. These ‘control mechanisms’ will be discussed in more detail below to help elaborate on 
the negative effect ‘higher order’ consumerist and corporate capitalism has on the practice of 
biokinetics from the side of both the ‘patient’ as consumer and the ‘professional’ as a profiteer. 
 
3.1 Deleuze’s ‘societies of control’ in contemporary health care 
 
Deleuze’s (1992) theory of ‘controlled societies’ is built upon Michele Foucault’s (1991) theoretical 
account of the ‘disciplined society’. In some cases the two societies represent a bipolar relationship. 
For example, Foucault’s ‘disciplined society’ contains mechanisms of control that act from within 
certain ‘enclosed spaces’ such as schools, factories, hospitals, etc. These ‘enclosed spaces’ have 
their own unique understandings, rules and laws, e.g. school training and laws of discipline begin 
and end at school. Conversely, Deleuze’s ‘controlled society’ is not confined by ‘enclosed spaces’. 
In the ‘controlled society’, which Deleuze projects as a kind of ‘post-disciplined society’, the 
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individual never stops beginning, while at the same time he/she never finishes either. Thus there is 
an imperative of lifelong learning (Raunig, 2009).  
With this notion, Deleuze (1992) takes us beyond Foucault’s (1991) conception of 
‘disciplinary society’. From his ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, the insight emerges that an 
invidious, widespread network of ‘control mechanisms’ has replaced disciplinary sites of enclosure 
(hospitals schools, prisons, families and factories). For example, in the traditional medical institute 
the hospital is characterized as an ‘enclosed space’ with its own specific rules and regulations 
(Deleuze, 1992). Here the suffering of the patient was entirely dealt with from within this ‘enclosed 
space’ of the hospital. Thus the hospital had both its own unique rules and the patient had a 
definitive starting and ending point, i.e. patient is only a patient while under the surveillance of the 
staff from within the ‘enclosed space’ of the hospital. However, in contemporary settings in an 
attempt to cut costs, hospitals are continually finding new ways to outsource patients, i.e. 
rehabilitation is often outsourced. As such the hospital’s boundaries, which previously defined a 
person as a patient, have extended to new spaces of medical care like medical clinics, wellness 
centres, health spas, etc.  
In addition, newly introduced forms of commerce assist in blurring the boundaries between 
medical practice and capitalist agendas. In Deleuze’s (1992) ‘controlled society’, capitalism is no 
longer concerned with production and property (These are the concerns of a ‘disciplined society’). 
Rather, capitalism in ‘controlled societies’ concentrates on marketing and selling (Deleuze, 1992, p. 
6). Deleuze here refers to the concerns of capitalism in ‘societies of control’ as a ‘higher order 
production’. It is because of this new concern for ‘higher order production’ (marketing and selling), 
that capitalism can commodify areas beyond produced goods and property, such as health care. For 
example, health care has become progressively marketed by investor interests, insurance companies 
and third parties, and is now sold to the consumer/patient via the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) 
and other new health legislations allowing direct consumer-product relationships. In effect, investor 
interests have allowed medicine to expand exponentially, but the interests of these investors often 
override the authentic voice of health professionals, deregulation creates opportunities for conflicts 
of interest and thus manipulation of the patient, CPA creates consumers where patients once 
existed, transparent systems resemble other online economic systems like banking, shopping, etc. 
allowing medicine to become associated with these market related applications, the ‘new public 
health’, in allowing non-biological understandings of the body to be introduced into health 
campaigns, provides a platform whereby commerce is given a voice in health care. As a result, the 
‘enclosed space’ of medicine defined by strict codes of professionalism and a recognized institute 
are slowly giving way to dominant economic pressures and as such is beginning to resemble a 
Deleuzian ‘control society’ of ‘open’ rather than ‘enclosed’ spaces. 
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3.2 The commercialization of health care: prioritization of investor interests 
 
What was a revolution in American health care, it occurred over ten or 20 years. It started 
in the mid-1960s and by the mid-1980s it was virtually complete. What was a revolution was 
the entry into the [healthcare] … delivery system, not the pharmaceutical industry or the 
medical products or medical supplies, but the medical care delivery system, the entry of 
investors. That was the revolution. That was a new idea, a revolutionary idea, and that 
changed everything (Relman, 2007, pp. 375-376). 
 
The commercialization of health care is a controversial topic, especially amongst medical 
sociologists. According to Rodwin (2007), commercialism in American medicine began to 
influence health care as soon as ‘new money’ was introduced into the health care system. This ‘new 
money’ was apparently a result of Medicaid and Medicare, and the rapid expansion of private, 
employer-based insurance (Rodwin, 2007). Service providers soon were established in order to 
satisfy the growing demand for services such as marketing and advertising, brokering, consulting, 
information technology, financial services, case and disease management, billing and collecting, 
and so forth. In contemporary private health care, a patient’s medical insurance form captures only 
minor medical details; the majority of the information required being business related (Popham, 
2005, pp. 291-294). Popham (2005, p. 287) also points to the large number of administrative 
employees within hospitals, private practices and health clinics. These often, if not always, out-
number the medical staff. These examples highlight just how thoroughly contemporary health care 
systems are permeated by an economic discourse. Arguably, health care quality has become 
restricted by medical insurance policies to the point where doctors are not required to assist a 
patient beyond the confinements set by the patient’s medical aid scheme. As a result, patients and 
practitioners have both become subjected to the interests of business and it is from within this 
growing environment that investors’ interests have become a powerful component of medical 
decision-making (Rodwin, 2007).  
Medical sociologists have focused on a number of effects of commercialization and many of 
their conclusions suggest that economic and political forces should be kept separate from medical 
initiatives. For instance, according to Day (2008, p. 165), investor interests are capable of 
overriding those of the doctors, patients and other health professionals. As a result, there is a 
concern that patients may be re-positioned from what was once termed a ‘medical practice 
philosophy’ that ensured the patient’s best interests come first, to a ‘capitalist- economic service 
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philosophy’ which cautions ‘let the buyer beware’ (Day, 2008, p. 165). Similarly in South African 
Health care there exists two contrasting philosophies according to Rowe and Moodley (2013, pp. 1, 
5), namely: the National Health Act, which promotes a ‘socialized model of care’ that incorporates 
an ‘Ubuntu’ philosophy thereby engendering an authentic fiduciary practitioner-patient relationship, 
and the Consumer Protection Act, which favours market values over traditional medical values of 
care, comfort and compassion, and as such encourages a more relaxed standard of truth telling’. 
Day (2008, p. 166) argues it becomes less likely for an institution to support professional practice 
when profit driven investors become involved. Therefore, a capitalist-economic repositioning of 
health care challenges the ‘trust’ relationship between professional and patient. Furthermore, 
according to Timmermans and Almeling (2009, p. 24), ‘money and markets are assumed to have a 
corrosive influence on medical practice, turning patients and their ills into dollar signs, and leading 
to further dehumanization of patients and corruption of medical practitioners’.  
Nonetheless, regardless of these concerns, private health care in South Africa is structured in 
such a way that there are incentives for the practitioner to act on behalf of his/her own interests as 
health professionals in private practice, like the biokineticist, ‘earn profits and bear the risk of loss 
from their practice’ (Rodwin, 2007, p. 387).  Therefore the motive of profit plays a large role in 
how they ‘advise, prescribe, refer, and make clinical choices’, to the point where it may even be at 
the expense of the patient (Rodwin, 2007, p. 387). Thus, with the inception of commerce into 
private health care, a conflict of interest arises for the professional as he/she also has an obligation 
to act in the patient’s best interest.  
 
3.3 Deregulation and ‘decentralization’ of medicine 
 
Public policies and professional ethical bodies are established, and have been since the beginning of 
organized medicine, to manage and minimize situations in which conflicts of interests may arise in 
health care (Rodwin, 2007). These bodies are responsible for regulating activities whereby 
practitioners may receive commission for advertising, selling of medical products as kickbacks, or 
for referring patients to doctors (Rodwin, 2007). However, since the mid-twentieth century until 
today, these regulatory bodies have been urged to relax their constraints over entrepreneurship 
(Rodwin, 2007). For example, in South Africa the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) has been continually challenged to reduce their more restrictive ethical policies; a process 
known as deregulation
7
 (Ethical Related FAQs, 2014, pp. 11-12). For instance, big business and 
                                                          
7
 ‘The term deregulation is very broad and can be defined as the removal or dilution of regulation(s), .e.g. in August 
2006 , the Ethical Rules related to advertising were amended, allowing degrees of latitude for health care providers to 
advertise. It could be argued that this was a form of deregulation’ (Ethical Related FAQs, 2014, p. 11). 
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stores like ‘Clicks’ are now allowed to own pharmacies where previously it was prohibited (Ethical 
Related FAQs, 2014, p. 11). Another example of deregulation occurred in 2011 when the HPCSA 
appealed to have their ethical rules exempted from the Competition Act. The appeal was rejected by 
the Competition Commission and it was concluded that certain ethical rules did not constitute 
contraventions of the Competition Act and that others related to ‘canvassing’ and ‘stationery’ were 
overly restrictive (Ethical Related FAQs, 2014, pp. 11-12). In addition, the Commission stated that 
when compared to international standards, the HPCSA’s ethical rules were far more restrictive than 
in other countries. Due to the findings of the Competition Commission, certain ethical policies may 
not even be defended in a court of law (Ethical Related FAQs, 2014, p. 12).  
Currently what is taking place in health care, and specifically South African private health 
care, is a slow transition from a protected profession into a market dictated service. It has been 
argued that the problems brought to light by ‘conflict of interests’ will play a larger role in the 
South African private health care in the future as investor interests and deregulation, as opposed to 
the needs of the patient, progressively influence professional decisions. In addition to the 
progressive commercialization and deregulation of the profession, increased consumerism in 
contemporary health care also takes place from the side of the patient, as may be seen, for example, 
in the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). 
 
3.4 Consumer Protection Act and the rise of the consumer/patient 
 
The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) has recently been added to South African health policies. The 
CPA converts the patient into a consumer and provides him/her with certain rights
8
. In sum, these 
rights allow the consumer/patient to become the ultimate decision-maker in his/her own health care. 
Arguably, the CPA challenges traditional medical practices by allowing market place values to 
dictate important relations in health care. 
 
Because of the commercialism of health care, various traditional social relations and roles in health 
care are being replaced. For instance, the consumer is now able to sue the doctor for harm caused by 
goods and services of professional care because of strict liability provisions in the CPA (Rowe & 
Moodley, 2013, p. 1). In other words the complainant no longer has to prove negligence on the part 
of the doctor, but instead may hold the doctor accountable for supplying him/her with a faulty 
                                                          
8
 ‘All patients are considered as “consumers” from a legal perspective. This means patients also enjoy the rights of the 
consumer: the right to equality in marketing; right to privacy; the right to choose; the right to disclosure of information; 
the right to fair and responsible marketing; the right to fair and honest dealing; the right to fair, just and reasonable 
terms and conditions; the right to fair value, good quality and safety; and the right to hold the supplier accountable’ 
(Rowe & Moodley, 2013, p. 7). 
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product (Rowe & Moodley, 2013, p. 7). Here the consumer/patient has been empowered and the 
doctor/ professional have been disempowered. A similar power shift exists in how the practitioner is 
now expected to obtain the patient’s informed consent. In the past, physician’s took on a ‘paternal- 
like figure’ and patients were more easily inclined to give their consent to these figures (Rowe & 
Moodley, 2013). However, as consumerism increasingly influences the institution of health care, 
this process has become more complex for the practitioner. For example, the CPA provides the 
consumer/patient the right to fair and honest dealings, while at the same the practitioner is 
prohibited to use coercion or other means of persuasion so as to entice a consumer/patient to accept 
a particular product or service (Rowe & Moodley, 2013, p. 7). Arguably, the CPA encourages the 
practitioner to sell his/her service to the consumer/patient rather than relying on his/her ‘paternal-
like figure’ (authoritative status) to coerce the patient into signing the informed consent. Therefore 
it is the consumer/patient who makes the decision to accept the practitioner’s service or 
alternatively look elsewhere for a better service. Thus the CPA again empowers the 
consumer/patient. 
Although the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) empowers the consumer/patient in many new 
ways, it also has some negative consequences. For instance, as the patient moves closer to the 
consumer, so too does the health care professional move closer to the profit driven vessel and 
conflicts of interest are proportionately increased. For example, ‘Many magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) centres and other freestanding medical facilities seek out doctors as limited partners with no 
role in management’ in the U.S (whose ethical policies are less restrictive than South Africa’s) 
(Rodwin, 2014, p. 1328). ‘This kind of ownership by doctors encourages doctors to refer their 
patients to these facilities, to share the profits that their referrals generate’ (Rodwin, 2014, p. 1328). 
Thus private firms incentivise ‘doctors to prescribe, refer patients, or practice medicine in a way 
that furthers the firm’s interests’ (Rodwin, 2014, p. 1328). Doctors are also paid by suppliers to 
‘promote their products through public speaking and to serve on advisory boards’ (Rodwin, 2014, p. 
1328). In South Africa, ‘fee-for-service permits fraud in the form of over-claiming, false claims, 
tariff manipulation and over-servicing’ (Ncayiyana, 2012, p. 772). An underlying problem is that 
‘sick’ people (patients) are vulnerable, and when sick they are inclined to cling to the traditional 
perception of the health care professional whereby the professional is understood as a person of 
fidelity. However, as discussed earlier, the CPA is more likely to produce business-minded health 
professionals and as such these professionals arguably no longer feel it their duty to act in this 
manner. Instead, health care professionals are more likely to exploit the vulnerable 
consumer/patient as seen in the examples above. 
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3.5 Transparent access systems 
 
New technologies that favour what has been termed ‘consumer culture’ (Pearl, 2014) are fast 
becoming popular within health care. According to Pearl (2014), consumers are interested in ‘fast, 
online, open access systems’ which reduce time wasting. Transparent health care systems, such as 
‘electronic health records’ (EHR), ‘virtual care’, and ‘Medscheme’s electronic health records’, 
appeal to contemporary consumers-patients by removing the redundancy of refilling in of personal 
information on health records, instead making this information transferable among other health 
professionals while still adhering to codes of client confidentiality by ensuring the data is password 
protected. As such, transparent systems reduce the need of the traditional heath care practice 
whereby the physician is required to store the patient’s personal file in physical form, behind a 
locked door
9
. In this way, transparent systems renounce a portion of the physician’s power as sole 
keeper of the patient’s medical information. In addition, transparent systems appeal to modern 
consumers, not patients, as they are directed at how, when and where information and treatment can 
be obtained, whereas the patient of thirty or more years ago was inclined to remain in the care of the 
same family doctor with whom a relationship of trust had been established (Pearl, 2014). Thus the 
patient is more inclined to view transparent systems as depersonalized, whereas the 
consumer/patient, who is attracted to these systems, is likely to favour them. Arguably then these 
‘consumer friendly’ transparent systems will continue to advance upon health care as long as the 
patient is represented as a consumer. 
Discovery Health is South Africa’s largest medical aid insurance company with 2.4 million 
members (Ncayiyana, 2012, p. 772). Discovery Health has recently integrated an online system 
which allows its members to log on at any time and view their health profile. In addition, this 
profile can be updated remotely by an affiliated health professional such as the biokineticist. 
Arguably, Discovery Health’s online system bears close resemblance to a transparent system as its 
members obtain efficient feedback via a ‘depersonalized’ online system. Therefore Discovery 
Health, which is ‘a private, investor-owned, for-profit company’, in this way appeals to the 
advancing consumer/patient culture in contemporary health care (Ncayiyana, 2012, p. 772). 
 
3.6 The ‘new public health’ 
 
The ‘new public health’ is a collaboration of concerns, expectations and projects all involving 
conceptions of ‘healthism’, ‘fitness’, ‘lifestyle change’, ‘healthy living’ and so on (Peterson & 
                                                          
9
 Although health care practitioners are still required to keep these physical documents, in some cases soft copies that 
are password protected are acceptable (Guidelines on the Keeping of Patient Records, 2008).  
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Lupton, 1996). It attempts to broaden previous understandings of public health and is fundamentally 
concerned with action. Included in its lexicon are campaign phrases such as: ‘Lose weight!’, ‘Avoid 
fat!’, ‘Stop smoking!’, ‘Reduce alcohol intake!’, ‘Get Fit!’, ‘Practice safe sex!’ etc. (Tinning & 
Glasby, 2010 p. 112). The self-management practices promoted via these campaigns are willingly 
followed by millions of individuals in different parts of the world. Take for example the role of the 
‘new public health’ in creating awareness about the ills of obesity; as a result of their influence 
there are few places in the world where societies are not aware of the health risks associated with 
being overweight (Thanem & Linstead, 2007).  
Capitalistic economic discourse affects biokinetics and other medical professionals insofar 
as it promotes an instrumental view which commercializes our striving for healthy bodies through 
marketing campaigns like the ‘new public health’. In a South African context, there are a number of 
governmental drives promoting physical activity and the ideals of ‘healthism’ and ‘fitness’, such as 
the ‘Vuka SA – Move for your health’ initiative, Sport and Recreation’s Mass Participation 
programme, the Youth Fitness and Wellness Charter, and the Health-Promoting Schools Initiative 
(Draper et al., 2006, p. 94). These campaigns have become important platforms from which health 
initiatives are able to influence social relations on a local scale. However, it is the ‘new public 
health’ which acts as an important platform for marketing campaigns targeting social relations on a 
global scale.  
The global awareness the ‘new public health’ enjoys is promoted by (1) its ability to utilize 
advanced communication technologies, and (2) new health legislations that allow direct consumer-
product relationships. For example, in previous years, health interventions were only capable of 
influencing an individual or small community, but today entire countries are influenced by the ‘new 
public health’ initiatives, e.g. think of the impact a decision made by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) has on societies. Thus by incorporating a host of communication techniques, such as media 
networks, school education, propaganda promoted in gyms and wellness centres, in South Africa 
specifically, creating popular dialog and discussion, e.g. Tim Noake’s ‘Banting diet’ and the Sport 
Science Institute of South Africa’s (SSISA’s) ‘Healthy Weight’ programmes, and internationally, 
through campaigns like Virgins Active’s ‘Live Happily Ever Active’ and through the popular 
‘Weight Watches’ programme, the ‘new public health’ is able to successfully market its policies. In 
addition, the ‘new public health’ has increased its supply of ‘followers’ as a result of a decrease in 
restrictive legislations previously circumventing health care and how it was marketed. Thus the 
‘new public health’ is a powerful producer of health discourse.  
Arguably, the ‘new public health’ is an effective means of governmentality as it successfully 
manages both the individual and group behaviours, and it does this on a global scale. It is able to do 
this because its pedagogy objectifies the human body and portrays it as vulnerable. From this stand 
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point it then encourages the individual, through obligation and responsibility, to adopt various 
lifestyle changes in order to improve their health status both individually and collectively (Petersen 
& Lupton, 1996). Smoking, diet, alcohol use, and physical activity are common variables of these 
lifestyle changes which the individual is encouraged to monitor and manipulate so as to align with 
required health norms. However, healthy living is not as simple as these campaigns present, i.e. 
losing weight is not always as simple as avoiding fatty foods, exercising and cutting down on 
carbohydrates. The ‘catchy’ branding and advertising utilized by the ‘new public health’ often 
reflect controversial topics in a light of certainty, omitting large portions of information (Tinning & 
Glasby, 2010). But according to Hancock et al. (2000, p. 1), the body is no longer understood solely 
as being subject to the notions of biological foundations, rather ‘cultural, social, and linguistic 
influences’ all compete with biological understandings and thus act as important influences in the 
promotion of what has been coined ‘good health’ or ‘feel good health’. Thus, ‘healthy’ living is far 
too complex to be presented in a light of certainty as a multitude of discourses define the complex 
issues surrounding health. In sum, the ‘new public health’ helps oversimplify the chaotic, complex 
and controversial subject of health, often presenting their initiatives as simple and easy to achieve.  
Arguably the ‘new public health’ is tied to economic imperatives which make it hard to 
differentiate between professional advice and profit driven information. For example, the ‘new 
public health’ is fundamentally concerned with its ability to produce individuals who continually 
strive to become ‘healthy bodies’. It does this by convincing the individual that physical appearance 
is a signifier of worthiness or moral integrity, and as such the individuals is continually encouraged 
to self-survey and monitor their own behaviours (Tinning & Glasby, 2010). In this way the 
individual’s health becomes his/her responsibility; a testament of his/her self-control, disciplines, 
and will power (Thannem & Linstead, 2007). However in the past, health care initiatives endorsed a 
more authoritative approach whereby the professional was the main (if not only) source of 
knowledge and the patient was considered a passive agent when it came to his/her health. But by 
allowing the individual to become a more ‘active’ participant in relation to his/her health, the ‘new 
public health’ has seemly empowered the individual. The individual may interpret this new 
responsibility as liberating. But with the waning voice of the authoritative professional comes more 
and more deregulation and as a result decentralization of medicine, as mentioned above. Hence in 
contemporary health care, economic and other agendas are now associated with the body and how it 
is problematized. Arguably, the ‘active’ individual is more likely to be exploited by commercial 
interests and market values that appeal to his/her desires as a result. 
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3.7 Capitalism in biokinetics 
 
The biokineticist is not immune to the economic influences currently experienced in health care in 
forms such as those mentioned above, e.g. transparent systems, Consumer Protection Act (CPA), 
and other deregulation activities. The fact that this professional is not historically invested in 
traditional protocols such as client confidentiality, mentioned earlier, may also mean that he/she is 
less ‘threatened’ by new economically driven health care than the physician.  In addition, the 
biokineticist is a registered practitioner responsible for promoting a healthy lifestyle through the 
modality of exercise and therefore acts as valuable site for corporate investors who want to 
penetrate this sector of private health care.  
The Biokinetics Association of South Africa (BASA) recently decided to include a 
description of the biokineticist on their website which promotes the value of this profession in 
economic terms (What is Biokinetics?, 2015). 
 
[…] they maximize employment productivity and benefit economic stability; and 
they promote quality of life and individual independence, rather than more costly 
institutionalized and supported care (What is Biokinetics?, 2015). 
 
Juxtaposing the newly added description of the biokineticist with contemporary pressures of 
commercialism in health care (see above), it would be naive to consider this amendment as an 
isolated incident. Arguably, in this amendment BASA has publicly voiced their acceptance of their 
member’s economic value in society; implying that the biokineticist’s actions should reflect their 
economic value. In sum, BASA’s amendment allows the biokineticist to widen the available 
constructs that determine the kind of practice he/she administers, and it has done this in a capitalist- 
economic direction. In addition, BASA’s website is the only accredited website specifically for 
biokineticists, providing a valuable platform for companies wanting to sell their products to these 
professionals.  
Arguably, the Biokinetics Association of South Africa (BASA) plays a role in creating 
interactions between the biokineticist and corporate interests. For example, products such as Bio 
Connect, Quantifi-Revolutionary Jawbone UP system and 247 Highway are currently marketed on 
BASA’s website. Because these products are marketed on BASA’s website, they are more 
appealing to the biokineticist. Furthermore, they are sold to the biokineticist at a discount price. Not 
only are professionals buying the products of these companies, but products like Jawbone UP are 
worn on the wrist and, as a result, should the biokineticist buy it, it would be visible to potential 
buyers like the biokineticist’s clients/patients. Thus by affiliating themselves with BASA, these 
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companies improve their potential of successfully infiltrating the exercise market. In this way 
BASA creates a platform whereby companies are able to objectify professionals as buyers and 
sellers of health care. 
 
[…] risk stratification is part of a comprehensive transformation that aims to 
increase individualization and privatization of social risk (Lemke, 2004, p.555). 
 
The biokineticist, as an expert, is also entangled within third party initiatives which help to 
create new ‘individualization and privatization of social risk’ (Lemke, 2004, p. 555). For example, 
medical insurance companies, like Discovery Health, incentivise (profit motive) their members to 
be tested by a biokineticist, i.e. ‘Vitality points’ are allocated to members who complete a 
biokinetics assessment and the ‘Vitality points’ acquired by the member are further translated into 
financial benefits or rewards. There is collaboration between the biokineticist, who encourages the 
members to perform health related practices, and Discovery Health, which encourages members to 
collect ‘Vitality points’. However, because Discovery Health creates a client that is motivated by 
profit, it succeeds in manipulating the ‘institutionalized form of control’ health care commands. 
Arguably, Discovery Health allows the body to be opened up to the ‘logic of investment and the 
imaginary of possible losses and desired profits’ (Lemke, 2004, p. 555). As such the body is 
expressed as (1) malleable by the biokineticist who teaches that exercise, smoking cessation and 
healthy eating are elements of optimization of quality of life, and (2) as an entity for obtaining 
financial gain because of the insurance company’s ‘reward system’. In sum, the biokineticist is not 
acting as an agent of health discourse alone, but his/her actions are tied to capitalist-economic 
agendas whether he/she acknowledges them or not. This is because the patient of the biokineticist, 
who is also a member of Discovery Health, is not visiting the biokineticist for health related reasons 
only, but also has business related intentions whereby he/she aims to achieve a profit through the 
optimization of his/her own ‘body’ (human capital).  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, it has been shown above that new acts of commerce witnessed in contemporary 
health care are iconic of Deleuze’s (1992) ‘controlled society’ as no end point ever seems to be 
reached. For example, consider the ‘consumer’ (governed by desire) of health care as opposed to 
the ‘patients’ (governed by need to reduce suffering) , whereby the ‘consumer’ is always in need of 
better health (continuous), while the ‘patient’ is only in need of health care while he/she is a patient 
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(discontinuous). Arguably, for the ‘consumer’ the pursuit of ‘healthiness’ continues long after 
he/she is dismissed from the hospital. For example, contemporary health care provides many 
opportunities whereby the ‘consumer’ can perpetually progress as a ‘healthy’ agent. For instance, 
Discovery Health and their transparent online system mentioned earlier, whereby the Discovery 
member is encouraged and able to update his/her health status by persistently participating in 
various health related activities. These Discovery members are continually encouraged via 
incentives to improve their health status. In sum, there is no specific end point in sight as there are 
always new ways of improving upon one’s health status. These practices of continuous self-
monitoring and progression resemble the never-ending flux of Deleuze’s (1992) ‘controlled 
society’, whereby the individual is thought to exist in an imperative of lifelong learning.  
According to Deleuze (1992, pp. 3-7), the ‘controlled society’ consists of ‘perpetual’, 
‘undulatory’ ‘modulations’ that are without boundaries. These ‘modulations’ are said to express a 
type of universal administrative control capable of transferring across all spaces of society. The 
‘modulation’ is determined by a twofold appellation: ‘it consists on the one hand in forming 
modules and on the other it demands a constant self-(de)formation, a tendency to permanent 
modification of the form, to transformation, to formlessness’ (Raunig, 2009).  Arguably, Deleuze’s 
(1992) modulation can be likened to the concept of ‘healthy bodies’. Following this line of thought 
‘healthy bodies’ resemble what Deleuze (1992) calls a ‘module’, i.e. it is always the goal and 
therefore does not ever change. However, the ‘deformation’ and ‘continuous change’ of Deleuze’s 
(1992, p. 4) representation can be likened to the objectives one applies to achieving ‘healthy bodies’ 
because the objectives are continually changing. For example, the pedagogy surrounding weight 
loss, as means to achieving ‘healthy bodies’, is changing continuously, i.e. at one time a high fat 
diet is promoted and then it changes to a low fat diet and low intensity training is recommended and 
changed to high intensity training, etc. There is no end to the perpetual flux of recommended 
objectives one may use in order to obtain ‘healthier bodies’. 
The ‘new public health’ is another example where the objectives continuously change but 
the goal, namely achieving ‘healthy bodies’, remains the same. Similarly, in the ‘new public 
health’, ‘healthy bodies’ is always the end goal (module) but it is never achieved in full as there is 
always more one can do to become ‘healthier’. As ‘healthy bodies’ are now defined through 
multiple knowledge sources and no longer only through biological understandings or professional 
interpretations, an insurmountable amount of choices are provided to the individual. It is in this 
way, whereby the individual is provided with a  constant supply of self- (de)formations practices, 
that the concept of the ‘healthy bodies’ acts as a Deleuzian (1992) ‘module’, and is therefore able to 
control the behaviour of the individual by demanding constant modification of his/her parts. From a 
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perspective of commerce, there is no end to the amount of products that can be sold to the consumer 
wanting to buy ‘healthy bodies’. 
Chrain (2014) suggests that: ‘Markets control us by convincing us that our desires can only 
be directed toward the products that are made available to us’. Should this be the case then the 
consumer/patient of contemporary health care is no longer only utilizing health care for authentic 
reasons of being ill or care of the self. Rather, capitalist forces have coerced the consumer/patient 
by manipulating the desires of the consumer/patient, e.g. the desire to feel worthy, be popular, have 
no fear, etc. In this system Chrain (2014) argues ‘There is nothing to subvert, no grand authority to 
overthrow, no sovereign, not even an explicit disciplinary program. We are slaves of our own 
desire, or rather it is our desire that is enslaved’. 
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Chapter 4: The dehumanizing effects of a ‘risk discourse’ 
 
Risks stratification ensures that each individual is provided with a personal profile and 
additionally ensures a ‘dynamic adaptation and profitable optimization’ of their conditions. 
The vision of social progress is replaced by a therapeutic regime of self-improvement which 
rests on specific forms of subjectification (Lemke, 2004, p. 558). 
 
4.1 Risk discourse in ‘societies of control’ 
 
One of the major constructs dominating health care in contemporary ‘societies of control’ is ‘risk 
discourse’. It has been argued by modern sociologists such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991) that 
contemporary societies are obsessed with risk. Beck (1992) claims risks are witnessed in ‘all 
aspects of modern human life, namely: work, leisure, family and sexuality’ (Beck, 1992, pp. 10 & 
23). For example, financial risk advisers outline financial risks in current market trends and then 
provide solutions and guidelines based on their analysis to their clients helping them to steer clear 
of the ‘pitfalls’ of market crashes and losses in share prices. Similarly, life insurance brokers warn 
their clients of possible future risks involved in everyday life, offering them advice on how to 
reduce or prepare for them. In the same vein, the risk discourse is especially visible in health care. 
Health professionals, for example, point to the risks of contracting sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs) and in turn offer preventative advice and guidelines to their patients. Similarly, preventative 
guidelines have developed out of new discoveries in coronary studies and other non-communicable 
diseases. New genetic risk assessments are capable of influencing important decisions, such as 
whether or not an individual will choose to reproduce in the future. The notion of ‘risk assessment’ 
is not alien to the biokineticist, who is required to classify his/her client according to risk 
assessment forms before exercise is prescribed. A biokineticist, for example, will know that 
biokinetic risks contraindicate certain exercises for cardiac patients. Further, he or she might assess 
the biomechanical risks that influence the way in which individuals move during sport, work, and 
other activities.   
Arguably, the idea that life is full of risks is in no way modern, but as both Beck (1992, pp. 
10; 23) and Giddens (1991; 1999) insist, the contemporary promotion of a ‘risk discourse’ is a 
uniquely modern phenomenon. Sociological studies since the 1980s have become increasingly 
concerned with modern risks (Zinn, 2010). How these risks are managed and embodied by the 
individual, how they affect social relations, and what kind of government or corporations utilizes 
risk discourse are important topics of discussion in sociological circles and have become the norm 
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when investigating the organization of contemporary societies (Douglas, 1992; Lemke, 2004; 
Williams & Calnan, 1996; Zinn, 2010; Hacking, 1990; Bernstein, 1997). Even the emergence of 
biokinetics, as a new practice, is part of the contemporary shift in health care away from enclosed 
disciplinary domains such as hospitals. In becoming an area of generalized concern, focus in health 
care shifts to preventative measures and individual responsibility. On the face of it, this appears to 
be a good thing. Preventative health care is tied strongly to the notion of ‘risk assessment’, 
emphasizing the health risks that a population may face, and focusing on preventing future illness or 
injury by avoiding present behaviours that are said to increase the risk or predispose the individual 
to such diseases or injuries. Further, in what seems to be an indication of welcome progress towards 
an empowering humanistic attitude in health care, dependence on a single, authoritarian medical 
professional is replaced with an almost moral responsibility to participate actively in one’s own 
preventative health care. Certainly, ‘risk assessment’ remains one of the vital procedures that must 
be followed to ensure the safety of a client. However, ‘risk discourse’ may have dehumanizing and 
disempowering consequences, particularly when it is tied closely to an economic agenda in a 
‘society of control’. It is essential, therefore, to challenge unquestioning implementation of risk 
assessments, or perhaps the naiveté of one-sidedly endorsing them, without first considering the 
discursive agendas driving them and the outcomes of overemphasizing risk. 
Although I do not wish to deny the value of beneficial risk assessment, in what follows I 
will discuss certain reasons for concern regarding the contemporary ‘risk discourse’ in health care.  
 
4.2 Risk discourse and the identification of ‘human capital’ 
 
In the occupational setting, risk discourse helps to shape the identity of the employee by creating 
frameworks of ‘human capital’ potential. Here the corporate biokineticist, who influences 
dismissals, temporary lay-offs, classification, and wellness of employees; helps to stratify and 
classify each employee accordingly. These stratifications help in determining the employee’s 
productive potential in relation to his/her physical capabilities, thereby representing the body as a 
‘resource’. In sum, the biokineticist (health professional) uses risk discourse to portray human 
existence as a form of ‘risk capital’, whereby the body may be articulated as a ‘disposable 
resource’. Here, for example, the employee’s ‘disposal’ (removal) is made easier by the fact that 
he/she is articulated as a mere variable of production in the form of ‘human capital’.  
Risk discourse, in ‘societies of control’, acts an enterprising form of selfhood and creates 
‘new relations with expertise’, thereby ‘reconfiguring power relations in significant ways’ (Novas 
& Rose, 2000, p. 505). For example, the corporate biokineticist constantly surveys the high-risk 
employee during exercise, encourages the overweight individual to lose weight, and monitors the 
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injured employee through rehabilitation in an attempt to have such employees ‘fit for work’ in the 
quickest possible time. In sum, the employee’s ill health or injury may be represented by the 
biokineticist as the employee’s failure to adhere to required norms related to body weight, strength, 
flexibility, or endurance. Thus the corporate biokineticist assists in reinforcing the employee’s 
‘responsibilities’ to remain ‘fit for work’, thereby redirecting the blame onto the individual. Further 
still, the integration of a ‘health risk’ discourse in corporate settings helps to minimize the social or 
environmental context in which health risks are produced. Crawford (1977, p. 674), for example, 
points to the irony that companies have begun screening workers for certain susceptibilities using 
‘at-risk’ behaviours such as smoking, use of alcohol, or improper diet, while the environmentally 
hazardous conditions created by their products are not being addressed. Essentially, economically 
motivated strategies to reduce ‘declining productivity and expanding absenteeism’ are presented in 
terms of a health risk discourse that reminds an employee that there is always something more 
he/she can do in order to better avoid health risks; thereby reinforcing the idea that maintaining 
personal health is an employee responsibility. There are even repercussions for the employee who 
fails to meet certain health care norms such as ‘face sanctions, dismissals or early retirement’ 
(Crawford, 1977, p. 673). As a result, the biokineticist (health professional) has the potential to 
influence relationships between employee and employer, employee and their insurance company, 
employee and their family. 
In this complex-social setting the professional promotes risk discourse by (1) educating the 
lay populace about health risks, and (2) by providing solutions in the form of treatment. Together 
these new relations participate in framing the body as a mechanism of production whereby the 
corporate ideology, which promotes ‘the prevention of loss and the optimization of future rewards’, 
is articulated within the embodied experience of the employee (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 1614). 
Such a rationalization of the body clearly ‘ignores subjectivity, affectivity, life, and beings’, and 
therefore can be said to refuse to ‘enrich and enhance the whole experience of human living’ in 
favour of an economic-capitalist reduction (Pellegrino, 1984, pp. 257-258; Morin, 1999, p. 7). It 
would be naive not to criticize an approach which does not recognize the ‘contribution of emotions, 
love, [and] repentance’ (Morin, 1999, p. 7). Neither does this approach ‘challenge the physician 
[health professional] to know his own values and to give a reasonable account of them before daring 
to undertake the delicate task of deciding with another person what is ‘good’ for that person’ 
(Pellegrino, 1984, p.257). As such, it is important to criticize so as to determine the ‘limits of logic, 
determinism, [and] mechanics’ which are presented by an approach, which categorizes human 
potential under the dehumanizing guise of ‘human capital’ in the name of 
health/progression/efficiency (Morin, 1999, p. 7). In sum, instead of obsessing over the risk 
potential of the employee, it is suggested that an understanding of the effects an illness has on the 
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humanity and values of the employee be included into the investigation so as to insure a more 
holistic approach (Pellegrino, 1984, p.256).  
 
4.3 Risk discourse and the ‘object of intervention’ 
 
On the other hand, ‘risk discourse’ acts as source of a new, richer identity and ‘object of 
intervention’. For example, in private practice there are numerous sites in which the patient is 
offered a ‘healthier’ identity by the biokineticist. First, however, the biokineticist must perform a 
risk stratification assessment on the patient. Risk stratification is based, in part, on the presence or 
absence of certain health risk factors, e.g. smoking, hypertension, dyslipidaemia, impaired fasting 
glucose, obesity, etc. It also involves the identification of major signs or symptoms of 
cardiovascular, metabolic and pulmonary disease. Once this information is known, patients are 
stratified based on the ‘likelihood of untoward events’ (American College of Sports Medicine, 
2006, pp. 27-28). Following the risk stratification assessment, the patient is prompted to participate 
in an exercise intervention in order to minimize the identified health risks. For example, obese 
individuals are encouraged to reduce their weight through exercise participation in order to prevent 
the possible early onset of cardiovascular and metabolic diseases such as hypertension and diabetes.  
However, in the case of Discovery Health Insurance, whereby members are rewarded 
according to the status of their health profile, the risk stratification also has the potential to reduce 
certain benefits, in this case financial. In other words, should an individual not subscribe to these 
identified interventions, he/she is subjected to a ‘processes of exclusion or mechanisms of 
repression’ (Lemke, 2004, p. 561). As a result of its double-sided agenda, risk discourse ensures the 
individual ‘wilfully’ participates in particular ‘actions’ which encourage the ‘optimization of human 
capital in the name of self-determination, personal preventative provisions, and freedom of choice’ 
(Lemke, 2004, p. 561). This coercive, rather than productive, side of risk stratification assessment 
suggests that risk discourse may also be used to govern and control individuals in contemporary 
societies via ‘intensified self-management and regulation’ processes (Tinning & Glasby, 2010, p. 
116). For example, ‘fitness’, in all senses of the word, may be constituted as what Foucault (1982) 
might term an ‘ethical substance’ one works upon in relation to the self and in relation to others 
(Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 502). The idea would be that in working to address health risks, a person 
also creates ‘enterprising, responsible, prudent, and self-actualizing forms of selfhood’ (Novas & 
Rose, 2000, p. 503). In other words, health risks may circumscribe new ‘modes’ and ‘fields’ of 
responsible action becoming a ‘central point of reference to expand moral duties’ (Lemke, 2004, p. 
559). For instance, the individual actively engaging in regular exercise is immediately 
circumscribed by a multitude of new decisions such as: the what kinds of shoes to be worn while 
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training, where to park the car in relation to the destination, how much money to spend on exercise 
clothing and gear, where to meet, socialize, engage and converse, etc. These new interactions act as 
identity-forming agents, which help to align the body with current understandings of the ‘fit body’, 
‘beautiful body’ or the ‘healthy body’. Arguably then risk discourse is an important component in 
the recoding of a person’s identity (Tinning & Glasby, 2010, p. 112). In sum, it becomes wise to 
question and beware of risk discourse as it is a powerful mode of behavioural modification. This is 
because it persuades individuals to adopt the ideology that any alteration from his/her ‘health 
related responsibility’ is an act against what is good, right and virtuous. In addition, self-
management practices are more effective when they adopt a moral association. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, physical appearance has become a signifier of worthiness, suggesting that the body has 
become a fundamental site from which the individual is able to express publically such virtues as 
‘self-control, self- discipline and will power’ (Tinning & Glasby, 2010, p. 110).Thus in promoting 
the body as an ‘object of intervention’, risk discourse, with the aid of health pedagogy, prohibits 
certain lifestyle choices in favour of others. It does this by assuring patients/consumers they will 
acquire all manner of internal and external ‘goods’ (such as happiness and popularity) if they adhere 
to the promoted lifestyle choices. In other words, risk discourse hierarchizes certain lifestyle 
choices in favour of others. In this way no competition in the form of diversity is promoted, and as a 
result, individuals are encouraged to remain within the engrained processes of current discursive 
formations by using coercive force which ‘instils inhibitory fear in those who might have doubted’ 
and provides ‘evidence to those who are already convinced’ (Morin, 1999, p.9). Arguably in 
redirecting the individual’s focus via intensified management and governing strategies, risk 
discourse helps minimize potential threats to the current discursive structures, and in doing so 
creates dehumanized, politically-docile individuals, i.e. individuals who ‘know, think, and act 
according to interiorized culturally inscribed paradigms’ (Morin, 1999, p.8). Hence the individual’s 
behaviour is controlled and thus structured under the guise of ‘reduced risk’ or ‘better health’. 
 
4.4 Risk discourse, absolute ‘truth’ and the ‘active patient/consumer’ 
 
In a ‘society of control’, the individual is no longer expressed as a ‘passive recipient’ of the health 
care professional’s advice, but rather is seen as an ‘active seeker of information and consumer’ of 
professional testing and other health care services (Lemke, 2004, p.558). In this way the consumer 
(active seeker) negotiates his/her way through the multitude of potential risks presented by modern 
health care, and then must compare them to other sources of knowledge before making a decision 
regarding his/her health.  
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However, there are a multitude of sites from which health risks are projected and these offer, 
for example, authentic or not, biochemical, genetic and scientific ‘truths’ about exercise and diet. 
As a result of these expanded forms of responsibility and control, the modern responsible-patient 
‘becomes active in the shaping of the enterprise of science’ and medicine (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 
506; Rabinow, 1999). According to Novas and Rose (2000), the patient may do this in one or many 
ways, e.g. in the form of placing hope in a cure, or in reducing the risks of a disease followed by 
such actions as searching and posting new research findings on ‘web forums, donating parts of 
one’s income towards promising projects whose aim it is to find a cure, joining fundraising 
activities to support the search for a cure, a willingness to take part in experimental trials for 
potential therapies to cure the disease’ (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 506).  
A problem arises when the layperson is unable to investigate the validity or reliability of the 
information received for whatever reason, e.g. insufficient time, poor resources, lack of knowledge, 
etc., and purchases a product that may actually be detrimental to his/her health. Sadly these 
practices often result in greater social health related concerns. For instance, the pressure to reduce 
one’s risk through actions which both maintain and regulate behaviour has resulted in poorer health, 
e.g. ‘exercise addiction’ – a disorder which presents as a result of the overemphasis on sedentary 
behaviour, and ‘orthorexia nervosa’ – a condition which presents as a result of the overemphasis on 
healthy eating (Tinning & Glasby, 2010). In effect, the individual who attempts to navigate his/her 
way through the terrain of risk discourse unaided is often misguided and ill prepared. Further still, 
the health risks presented in risk discourse are often poorly researched or subject to change with the 
advances of techno-scientific knowledge. For example, probability theorems and algorithms are 
applied in health risks, but as Haack (2013) argues, these predictions are often formulated 
incorrectly by transferring scientific theories into non-scientific disciplines, rendering these risks 
invalid (Lemke, 2004). Also, athletes and exercise enthusiasts who are classified by the medical 
industry as low- risk patients can fall dead from heart attacks. In genetics, new ‘genetic risks’ are 
capable of predicting the probability of developing a future disease; the irony here is that these tests 
cannot predict when or how severe the predicted illness will be, yet these risks result in actions 
which effect immediate relations between the individual and his/her ‘employers, family members 
and insurance companies’ (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 505). As a result, Lemke (2004, pp. 551-552), 
who investigated the relationship between genetic determinism and risk discourse, suggests that 
risks are not necessarily natural or universal phenomena, and therefore may not exist outside of the 
explanations used to describe them. In other words, risks do not necessary reflect natural facts 
alone, but are rather construed as ‘instruments and effects of a more complex social-material 
reality’ (Lemke, 2004, p. 551). In this regard, both Lemke (2004) and Beck (1992) agree that risk is 
‘open to social definition and construction’ (Beck, 1992, pp. 10, 23; Lemke, 2004, p. 551). Giddens 
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(1991, p. 3) suggests that the proliferation of risk stratifications (risk discourse) reflects attempts to 
establish ‘controlled interventions’ in what is found to be unpredictable phenomena. If this is true 
then risks are entangled within cultural knowledge, morals, beliefs, political, scientific and personal 
understandings, and therefore do not necessarily reflect only rational thought based on scientific 
understandings.  
Yet risk discourse is presented to the public with an air of certainty via media and other 
communication channels like the ‘new public health’ (see Chapter 3). In addition, risk discourse has 
become a radical organizer of individual and group behaviour. This inevitably means that 
responsible forms of selfhood in contemporary societies are developed via the negotiation between 
health risks presented in insurance companies, health initiatives, the biokineticist’s practice, and 
health and fitness media. Arguably then, the validity of risk discourse presented by health initiatives 
like the ‘new public health’ are questionable and thus require further investigation, especially 
considering that this information has been recontextualized by political and economic interests 
‘often having its ambiguities and uncertainties edited out’ (Tinning & Glasby, 2010, p. 116). 
Instead of the ‘active consumer/patient’ ‘pushing and shoving’ his/her ideas about health 
into one understanding that has hopelessly failed to accommodate them, it is perhaps time to 
consider new ways of conceiving our own health (Morin, 1999, p. 11). Thus there is a need to 
encourage a more humanistic form of the ‘active patient/consumer’, who is empowered to develop a 
sense of self and agency that is removed from the shadow of ‘risk’. To do this, different ways of 
knowing reality must be encouraged and not forbidden. Despite the certainty expressed by risk 
discourse, ‘Wisdom is still a rare commodity, creativity is still inexplicable, and aesthetic 
experiences delight some of us and not others’ (Pellegrino, 1984, p. 256). By reintroducing the 
importance of the humanities, for example, in health discourse, new methods may become apparent 
which better prepare individuals to ‘analyze, judge and sort out competing values’ (Pellegrino, 
1984, p. 256). Such a method is described by Morin (1999, p. 7) as ‘corrective rationality’ and 
includes the cultivating of a rationality which is quite simply ‘corrective’. Here the things like the 
environment, repetition, culture, other people, memory and logic are used in agreement with 
assertions and the empirical data to which it applies in order to establish coherency.  
Building the character of the new ‘active consumer/patient’ so that it becomes ‘corrective’, 
as Morin (1999, p. 7) explains, is arguably a better method in which to prepare the new ‘active 
consumer/patient’ for the complexity of uncertainty presented in ‘societies of control’, thereby 
allowing him/her to avoid the pitfalls of disjunction and reduction produced through risk discourse 
(Morin, 1999, p.17).  
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4.5 Risk discourse and individual vs environmental responsibility 
 
According to Giddens (1999), modern risks are predominantly ‘manufactured risks’, meaning that 
they exist as a result of human influence on the environment, e.g. acid rain, pollution, global 
warming, deforestation, global crime, etc.  In the same vein, as mentioned earlier, some theorists 
suggest that many major health risks are predominantly caused by environmental factors and thus 
argue that there is an overemphasis on the individual in risk discourse. The consequence of this 
overemphasis is that blame for producing health risks is often conveniently displaced from 
corporations and institutions onto individuals (Day, 2008; Novas & Rose, 2000; Lemke, 2004; 
Zinn, 2010; Crawford, 1977). For instance, the following contemporary health risks are all 
environmentally induced but are often presented as individual responsibilities; social anxiety 
disorder (which is related to overpopulation or overcrowding); sick-building syndrome (caused 
from working in sealed buildings); orthorexia nervosa (an eating disorder developed from an 
obsession with healthy eating); E-thrombosis (caused from prolonged immobility such as 
office/computer related work); earbud-related hearing loss (caused by high audio sounds delivered 
through new-technology headphones), and computer vision syndrome (a work related health risk 
caused from long durations in front of a computer) (6 Modern Age Health Problems, 2011). The 
question these theorists ask is whether or not environmentally provoked health risks are handled 
with the same degree of scrutiny as those health risks which can comfortably be attributed to an 
‘individually responsible’ individual.  
Thus the individual who engages in ‘risky’ practices may be ‘labelled, classified or 
stratified’ as reckless or immoral. These individuals may be rejected from certain social relations as 
a result. For example, smokers are relocated to designated areas because their choice to smoke 
increases the risk of illness on the part of others (secondary smoke is a well-known and legitimate 
health risk). Some may argue that one should weigh the actual effect the small percentage of smoke 
has on bystanders against the greater effect of ‘social anxiety disorder’, which is one of the most 
common health related problems facing modern society. In so doing, one may be inclined to 
reconsider the removal of an entire group of people from certain spaces as a result of their ‘bad’ 
habit (6 Modern Age Health Problems, 2011). However, this argument is not at all likely to gain 
sympathy because it is very easy to hold individual smokers entirely responsible for risking their 
own health, and to consider them morally reprehensible for producing health risks for others.  
Interestingly, this strongly unsympathetic, exclusionary stance towards individual smokers 
may be contrasted without response to the producers of significantly polluting emissions from 
motor vehicles, factories, machinery and other appliances (Crawford, 1977). These and many other 
harmful products are sold to the public with hardly a murmur of sanction incurred by the producers. 
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Thus it may be wise to query the reason why large corporations producing and profiting from the 
distribution of tobacco and cigarettes are not held more responsible for the health related harms of 
their produce. Instead the action of the individual, which by comparison is minor, is targeted by 
health risk discourses. 
In this way risk discourse discriminates against the individual by infringing upon his/her 
human rights. Instead, a discourse which encourages individuals to resist the tyranny of ‘political 
demagoguery’ by freeing their minds and enabling them to ‘discern the values that underlie’ these 
public policies should be implemented (Pellegrino, 1984, p. 258). If this is not done soon there is a 
fear that the humanistic elements of medical care will not be guaranteed within the increasingly 
technological atmosphere of medicine (Pellegrino, 1984, p.253). 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed the ways in which non-absolute calculations of risk have come to affect 
the individual through a process known as ‘risk discourse’. Risk discourse has come to pervade 
health practices in the form of government and surveillance of the body, managing to create truth 
programmes which function in the ‘framework of power strategies and political rationalities’, and as 
a result govern what actions are made available to the individual and what actions are not (Lemke, 
2004, p. 554). The biokineticist, as an enforcer of risk discourse, is challenged to reassess his/her 
role in creating naive followers of risk discourse rather shifting their attention to the humane aspects 
of the health care such as developing compassion towards the suffering patient and learning to 
respect the different values of each patient (Pellegrino, 1984, p.256).  
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the purpose of the biokineticist is to promote 
patient-driven lifestyle change. It should be clear from the above discussion that this purpose is not 
properly served by treating the human body in the manner promoted by medical-scientific, 
economic-capitalist and risk discourses. In Section B, I turn to two alternative accounts of the body, 
offered by Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari in an effort to overcome the shortcomings of the 
prevailing dominating discourses surrounding health care practice. Section B thus offers the kind of 
philosophically and historically enriched conception of the complexities of the human body that 
would better serve the purpose of promoting patient-driven lifestyle change.  
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Section B 
 
Chapter 5: Understanding the human body through Foucault 
 
5.1 ‘Mode of subjectification’ in biokinetics 
 
‘Reality’ was explained in Chapter 1 to be a product of human categorization, and human 
categorization was said to be influenced by the discursive structures presiding over a particular 
period in time. What can be drawn from these two statements, when considering their effects on the 
subject (individual), is that each subject is effectively determined by the discursive structure. 
Grossly generalizing Foucault’s (1991, p. 178) argument, he considered the subject to be a product 
of his/her environment and, as such, saw the modern individual as continually influenced by a 
multitude of forces, e.g. biological, cultural, medical, psychiatric and linguistic, etc. However, the 
subject cannot be completely determined by these forces as each subject is different. Thus, these 
influences are internalized only after a process of negotiation and navigation takes place between 
the subject and these forces. This process Foucault (1983, p. 66-67) termed the ‘mode of 
subjectification’ (mode d’ assuiettissement).  
Thus far, this study has focused on the subjection of both patients and practitioners in the 
field of health pedagogy; with a particular focus on biokinetics. Section A offered an outline of the 
dominant discourses which influence biokinetics, and these were analysed in an attempt to 
determine the main outcomes of the discursive structure and how they influence the process of 
subjection. The objectification of the patient endorsed by today’s dominant discourses, the passive 
role given to and adopted by the patient, increased emphasis on risk assessment, and higher forms 
of self-surveillance were said to all result in a diminished subjective experience. Thus there is a 
concern that the ‘modes of subjectification’ promoted by the discourses are not suitable for 
producing autonomous or self-aware individuals/patients. In sum, there exists an asymmetrical 
relationship within these discourses, which favours the power figures regardless of the diminished 
subjective experience among individual patients.  
The question following this line of argument is: “Why then are these operations tolerated by 
the patient if he/she is not entirely determined by discursive forces?” In asking this question, by no 
means is it being suggested that patients never complain or consistently fail to take legal action 
where necessary, or that there are no cases whereby practitioners resist the ever-encroaching effects 
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of commerce or standardization. But despite such forms of resistance, medical practice is 
progressively increasing its orientations towards commercialization and standardization within the 
discursive field with very little effective change in this regard. The discussion now turns to 
Foucault’s conceptualization of ‘the political rationality’, which is offered as an explanation for the 
passive state of the contemporary patient/consumer. 
 
5.2 ‘The political rationality’ and the practice of biokinetics 
 
According to Foucault (1991, p. 29) there has existed, since the classical age, a ‘corpus of 
knowledge and power’, which has progressively infiltrated strategic spaces, systems, and even 
individuals throughout society. What is remarkably new here is the idea that power does not belong 
to a single dominating discourse and should it be removed, the entire discursive structure would 
collapse. Instead, these mechanisms provide an almost invisible administration of control over the 
operations of the subject. Characteristically, it acts elusively to establish ‘rigid obedience, order and 
a desire for certainty’. Its mechanisms groom subjects via ‘habits, rules, orders, and an authority 
that is exercised continually allowing these relations to operate almost automatically’ (Foucault, 
1991, pp. 128-129). Examples of similar operations are seen in biokinetics where patients 
participate in regular exercise (habits) which is structured and regulated (rules and order) by 
biokineticists, new public health initiatives, and medical aid schemes. Their activities are 
continually monitored, measured, and processed by these authorities (authority that is exercised 
continually). 
Foucault’s (1978a; 1991) historical perspective outlines two areas of particular interest in 
medical practice, namely: 1) anatom-politics, and 2) bio-politics. The former suggests that medicine 
dominates the body, seeing it as a machine, which must be instructed by various procedures of 
power that are efficient and economical in nature. The latter suggests it dominates the population by 
using normative data and other classification techniques. Interestingly, similar mechanisms where 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, regarding the practices of anatom-politics, where risk discourse and 
commerce techniques were shown to encourage the patient to adopt self-surveillance and self-
monitoring practices that were promoted by professionals. An example of bio-politics can be found 
in the medical-scientific discourse, specifically in Weisz’s (2003) description of ‘administrative 
rationale’ (see Chapter 2), which suggested that medical progression, particularly in the form of 
increased specialization, was rooted in a desire to classify the population. In addition, in Chapter 2 
it was noted that within the biomedical paradigm, a division occurred between 1) medical 
professionals who adopted an ontology which focused on the individual body and its reduction to’ 
cause and effect’ systems of explanation, and 2) health professionals who adopted a holistic 
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ontology which focused on the population as a whole. A parallel can be made here between these 
two ontologies and Foucault’s (1978a; 1991) conceptualization of anatom-politics and bio-politics. 
In short, it is argued by Foucault (1991) that a ‘corpus of knowledge’ exists in modern 
societies, which dominates and dictates the processes of subjection. Together this ‘corpus of 
knowledge’ and its mechanisms and activities are called ‘the political rationality’, described as a 
means of ‘categorizing individuals and distinguishing them through their identity, and it imposes on 
them a law of truth that must be recognized in them. It is a form of power that makes individuals 
subjects’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 544). These operations motivate the subject, rather than using corporal 
force, to participate in particular actions.  
As a new profession, does biokinetics then act as another location from which the 
mechanisms of ‘the political rationality’ operate? In effect, are its mechanisms built into the 
techniques of objectification, stratification, normalization, examination, and commercialization 
currently witnessed with increasing intensity in biokinetics? It is argued below they are indeed and 
that they are expressed in various degrees of intensity.  
 
5.3 Functions of ‘the political rationality’ 
 
Foucault (1991) ascribes three specific functions to ‘the political rationality’. What will follow is an 
outline of these three functions and an indication of where they exist in the field of biokinetics. 
Arguably, understanding the field of biokinetics in terms of ‘the political rationality’ affords a better 
investigation of its everyday practices, which in turn may inspire an alternative to the current docile 
approach characteristic of most contemporary patients.  
The three functions of ‘the political rationality’ are: 1) it strives to know the body; 2) it 
explores the body, breaks it down and re-arranges it, and 3) it reduces the body as a political force 
at the least cost and maximizes it as a useful force (Foucault, 1991). 
With regard to the first function, striving to know the body, this is made apparent in 
biokinetics by the mechanisms which increase the visibility of the patient. Firstly, new definitions, 
both medical and non-medical now define the body of the patient creating new identities previously 
unaccepted in the medical field, e.g. the consumer/patient. These new identities are numerous, 
resulting in an increased number of ‘known’ bodies. Previously a patient was only identified with 
the physiological responses of their body, e.g. the ‘diabetic’, ‘cardiac’, ‘hypertensive’ and 
‘orthopaedic’ patient. However, the medical body is no longer only confined to the physiological 
explanations of the body. As discussed in Chapter 3, new public health (NPH) initiatives ensure that 
other discourses are given authority to define what it means to be ‘healthy’. As a result, the number 
of ‘known’ bodies has increased to such a degree that all patients can in effect be expected to fall 
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into some or other ‘known’ category. Take for example the numerous categories of weight-related 
bodies based on height to weight ratios i.e. body mass index (BMI) scores; these include 
underweight, normal weight, overweight, obese one, obese two, obese three, and morbidity obese. 
Risk stratification techniques also ensure that bodies are categorized into low, moderate or high 
risks. Distinctions are made amongst medical insurance schemes, which categorize the body into 
platinum, gold, silver and bronze; each category has its own rewards and benefits. Thus in sum, the 
body is broken down into a multitude of subjection options which the ‘actual’ body of the patient, 
in turn, is encouraged to adopt according to the signs and symptoms they present. In this way the 
‘actual’ body is no longer the focus. Rather the focus is in ensuring the subject has an identity to 
choose from. Such regulated categorisation in terms of known ‘types’ allows for quick explanations 
of subjective experience, related to which would be a standard menu of available options for 
efficient health promotion.   
Subjective experiences are also regulated through surveillance techniques which ensure that 
the body is made more visible, either to the actual subject in the form of self-surveillance (anatom-
politics), or to others in the form of specialists or professionals who oversee or monitor the 
activities of the patient using techniques of normalization (bio-politics).    
According to Foucault (1991), surveillance exists throughout society. He outlines its 
historical progression from the classical age until the late nineteen hundreds and provides early and 
rudimentary examples of the ‘gaze’ seen in the architecture and design of military camps whereby 
the camp is laid out to support the ‘network of gazes that supervise one another’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 
171). Later the hospital, school and factory began to adopt intensified versions of objectification 
and partitioning whereby heavier older systems of surveillance, for example, were replaced by the 
‘calculation of openings, of filled and empty spaces, passages and transparencies’ (Foucault, 1991, 
p. 172). Surveillance and supervision increasingly became more important in the development of 
these spaces to the point where supervisors became ‘indispensable, constantly present and distinct 
from the workers’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 173-175). The ‘gaze’ being an important part of ‘the political 
rationality’ then explains why the oversupply of medical professionals in the medical-scientific 
discourse, discussed in Chapter 2, is tolerated. It helps in creating an uninterrupted system of 
surveillance. Thus the vast number of administrative employees, specialists and other personnel in 
hospitals provides a constant supply of the medical ‘gaze’, or judgement, which helps to constrict 
the actions of the patient who forever feels as if he/she is being watched. In this way his/her 
behaviour is more easily guided into a particular ‘known’ direction. Another example is seen in the 
increasingly popular utilization of multidisciplinary approaches. For instance, the eight week 
Healthy Weight programme conducted from the Sports Science Institute of South Africa (SSISA) 
employs three professionals – a psychologist, a biokineticist and a dietitian – to survey the patient 
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throughout the programme. The programme has seen a large amount of success, and arguably a core 
part of it is a result of the intensified and continuous system of surveillance it utilizes. Lastly, the 
corporate biokineticist can be used as another example of surveillance whereby the medical ‘gaze’ 
is extended into the work space so that the patient not only experiences it from within private 
practices and wellness centres, but also in the workspace where he/she spends the majority of 
his/her time.     
The second function of ‘the political rationality’ whereby the body is explored, broken down 
and rearranged relies on an understanding of the ‘known’ body discussed above. This is because the 
‘known’ body is the end result of this function. In other words, the actual body is explored and 
broken down and then rearranged into one of the ‘known’ bodies categorised by professionals. 
Foucault provides examples in society whereby ‘the measurement of overall phenomena, the 
description of groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between 
individuals, [and] their distribution in a given ‘population’’ have become regular processes 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 190). He concludes that these processes of exploring, breaking down, and 
rearranging of the body are present and occur in varying degrees within the operations of many 
modern discourses and institutions.  In short, these processes have become ‘normalized’.  
Normalization, according to Foucault, has five specific functions, namely: it compares, 
differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, and excludes various activities (Foucault, 1991, pp. 182-
183). In effect, with reference to the exploring, breaking down, and rearranging of the body, these 
processes have become normalized during the biokinetics consultation as follows: 1) The body is 
explored using comparative techniques whereby the patient is compared and judged by the ‘gaze’ of 
the biokineticist; 2) the body is broken down using differentiation techniques of the biokineticist 
which ensures that the body is divided into particular categorizes. These include medical history 
questionnaires, risk assessments, orthopaedic testing and postural analysis, static measurements 
(body mass index (BMI), height, weight, resting blood pressure and heart rate) and dynamic 
measurements (cardiovascular fitness, muscle strength, endurance, flexibility, and functional 
capability), etc. Lastly, 3) the rearranging of the body adopts three of the normalizing functions, 
namely: hierarchizing, homogenizing, and excluding. The new public health (NPH) hierarchizes the 
‘fit-healthy’ body, the ‘slim body’, and the ‘healthier’ body (Tinning, 2010). The biokineticist 
hierarchizes the musculoskeletal injury over the skeletal injury because he/she understands this 
injury better. As a result, he/she may be inclined to force the patient into a specific injury 
categorization, which he/she is familiar with as opposed to seeing the injury as an unknown. The 
homogenizing function of normalization is best represented in the effects of bio-power where 
individuals are ranked according to normative data values as excellent, good, or poor. This kind of 
ranking usually allows individuals to be categorized according to age, gender, ethnicity, height, and 
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weight related norms, i.e. these act as population comparisons. Exclusion occurs in the rearranging 
phase of the process, for instance in the biokineticist’s report which may suggest that the client is of 
certain cardiovascular fitness ,thereby excluding him/her from receiving a said amount of points for 
his/her medical insurance policy (see Chapter 4). Certain health choices might result in exclusion 
from specific spaces, for example the smoker (see Chapter 4). Lastly, various modes of training are 
restricted to high risk patients so that there is an exclusion of these patients from various activities.  
Normalization practices are so important in the practice of biokinetics that it is plausible to 
assume it would be substantially devalued, as a professional practice, should it be deprived of such 
techniques. While normalization processes are not in anyway new, Foucault (1991) has tracked 
them from the commencement of the classical period and into modern society; their strong and 
fundamental presence in the relatively new field of biokinetics is noteworthy. In sum, what is 
shown here is that the desire to normalize has become fundamentally more intensified in 
contemporary health discourse and society, resulting in further intensification of the subjection 
processes of the subject/patient/consumer/client.   
Foucault (1991, p. 306) argues that normalization is a proliferating form of disciplinary 
control with wide-ranging powers made apparent through new disciplines. He also explained that 
status was replaced at the end of the classical age in medicine, factories and schools by ideas of 
belonging to a ‘normal’ group, making people homogeneous while simultaneously making it 
possible to measure subtle differences between them (Foucault, 1991, p. 184). Arguably biokinetics 
has become one of these new disciplines Foucault mentions as it is caught up in power relations of 
normalization. It is no secret (as mentioned above) that a biokineticist’s ‘normalization’ and 
‘stratification’ technologies are utilized by insurance companies, health pedagogy and other 
industries in incentive driven campaigns which focus on both group and individual behaviour in 
contemporary society (practices both anatom-politic and bio-politic in nature).   
The last objective of ‘the political rationality’ is to reduce the body as a ‘political force at 
the least cost and maximize it as a useful force’ (Foucault, 1997). Here the instrument of 
examination is introduced into the discussion because it ensures further usefulness of the body by 
introducing a process of documentation, making the body into a case (Foucault, 1991, p. 191). In 
this way the ‘fit’, ‘over-weight’, or ‘rehab’ patient (known body) of the biokineticist becomes an 
object of description; one with a status determined according to the ‘measurements, the gaps, the 
‘marks’ that characterize’ him/her as a case (Foucault, 1991, p. 192). In biokinetics, when the body 
is framed by risk discourse as a mechanism of production allowing it to be represented as a form of 
‘capital’ (see Chapter 4), it too becomes caught up in an accumulation of data whereby medical 
forms, report cards, and personal programme prescriptions embody it in a system of right and 
wrong actions that ultimately place it in a ‘network of writing’ which ‘capture and fix [it]’ and 
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ensures that it becomes an object of perpetual examination (Foucault, 1991, pp. 184; 189-190). The 
individual, who is exposed to health related interactions of this intensity and frequency whereby 
regular testing and examination become ritualized, is afforded less time to worry about political 
movements within the company or even the state. Such ritualized examination reduces the political 
power of the individual over time (Foucault, 1991, p. 26). This is because the immersion of the 
individual in health related initiatives, which consist of rewards, punishments, competition and 
exclusion, ultimately creates a ‘perpetual battle between a network of relations constantly in 
tension’, whether these derive from the biokinetic, medical-scientific, economic or risk discourse. In 
sum, the potential power that an individual might have wielded is diverted into a relation of strict 
subjection or domination, which in turn creates a more obedient, disciplined and docile individual 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 138). In the case of the employee, his/her usefulness to the company has not 
only improved from a health-related perspective, e.g. reduced absenteeism, but also from a 
management and economical point of view whereby he/she has become more obedient, disciplined 
and docile, i.e. manageable/controllable through this process.  
The aim of ‘the political rationality’ is to create obedient, disciplined and docile bodies 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 138), and one way it achieves this is by manipulating the individual into 
believing that he/she is increasing his/her usefulness, whether this is financially, medically or 
environmentally related, when in actual fact he/she is being ‘trained, exercised and ritualized’ to 
become an obedient and docile body. Ideally these docile bodies must eventually respond 
automatically to the signals of ‘the political rationality’ (Foucault, 1991, pp. 128-129). For example, 
employees must realize by themselves when they fall outside of health-related normative values 
(e.g. body mass index (BMI) scores, blood pressure, or strength ratios) and immediately seek 
assistance accordingly from the required professional so as to correct these deviations in the shortest 
possible time.  
In short, it is argued that the techniques responsible for the subjection of the patient 
discussed in Section A do not operate exclusively from within the medical-scientific, economic and 
risk discourse, but rather function as part of a ‘body, a craft, a system’, which Foucault (1991, pp. 
62; 162; 206; 208) has termed ‘the political rationality’. ‘The political rationality’ brings to our 
attention the creation of docile bodies through the influence of specific instruments, namely: 
normalization, standardization, and examination. Its mechanisms are omnipresent and thus able to 
influence the subject and his/her decisions during everyday practices. 
What makes ‘the political rationality’ so effective is that it functions ‘continuously, act[s] 
subtly, and remain[s] invisible’ (Foucault, 1991, pp. 206; 208). Consider, for example, evidence 
based medicine (EBM), which is perceived as a medical endeavour even though it is scientific in 
nature (see Chapter 2). It is not considered a threat to medicine as long as science and medicine are 
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thought as inseparable; as is now the case thanks to the biomedical paradigm. Thus despite the fact 
that EBM literally contradicts the goals of traditional medicine, this has not hindered it from 
becoming a powerful producer of medical research. This is because the majority perceive it as non-
threatening, seeing it as merely a function of the medical-scientific discourse. Only those who aim 
to restore to medicine its traditional values and status harbour resentment towards EBM because 
they perceive it as an outside threat. In short, EBM is arguably a good example of a mechanism of 
‘the political rationality’ because it remains under the radar and effectively helps to mechanise 
medical practice, while simultaneously ensuring the patient (body) becomes a source of 
‘continuous’ visibility through techniques of objectification.  
Another example can be seen in the introduction of the consumer/patient into medical 
practices. In Chapter 3 it was argued that the consumer/patient was immersed in the Deleuzian 
‘society of control’ whereby interactions are seemingly ‘open and without boundaries’, ensuring 
that ‘transparent access systems’ and the ‘new public health’ initiatives act as mechanisms that 
provide almost unlimited access to information about the body. The effectiveness of these 
techniques is seen in the deregulation of ethical policies and non-confinement of the patient to 
physical spaces like the hospital, i.e. the patient can exist almost anywhere. However, these systems 
act under the guise of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and present themselves as being ‘user 
friendly’ and have, as a result, been accepted as part of the operations of biokinetics. Effectively, an 
outcome of these systems ensures that the boundaries of interaction remain hidden (online systems 
for profile updates, ‘Apps’ that help one self-survey, and web-cam tutorials), while the 
consumer/patient is exposed and the body made more visible to market trends and other commerce 
related objectification techniques. 
In sum, the body can arguably be compared to an enterprise whereby its underwriting is 
completed by these mechanisms which infiltrate it from all directions, spaces and time within 
contemporary society. Biokineticists, although part of a specialised and new profession, utilize 
these same methods of underwriting, ensuring that this ‘corpus of knowledge’, known as ‘the 
political rationality’, is extended and re-enforced throughout the field of biokinetics. Power has its 
principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted ‘distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, 
gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are 
caught up’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 202). Thus as Foucault states, ‘The individual and the knowledge 
that may be gained of him belong to this production’, securing the notion that knowledge and power 
(the political rationality) are inseparable (Foucault, 1991, pp. 28; 194). In every look, in every 
touch, in every piece of evidence or advertising, in every piece of equipment and every second the 
subject is exposed to these mechanisms of political rationality.  
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5.4 Humanism, liberalism and Foucault 
 
The question which is raised following this line of argument is: “Can one ever escape these 
mechanisms in hopes of achieving a humanistic approach or does a humanistic approach not result 
in increased self-delusion and raise unrealistic expectations by merely providing another avenue 
from within which ‘the political rationality’ may operate?” 
The answer, according to Foucault (1991) in Discipline and Punish, would be the latter. 
This is because the subject is dominated by these mechanisms. He/she embraces them in everyday 
life, and as a result can never escape them (Foucault, 1991, p. 28). Therefore, a humanistic 
approach, offered as an alternative to the objectifying paradigm, may merely come to act as another 
means in which to know ‘the body’ using mechanisms of ‘the political rationality’. It cannot remove 
all current relations of power in order to free the subject, but rather acts as part of what knowledge 
is made possible or acceptable by the current discursive structure. Therefore, it is still bound by the 
same constrictions as, for example, evidence based medicine (EBM). However, the mechanisms of 
‘the political rationality’, Foucault (1991) suggests, must not be represented as entirely negative in 
nature. For instance, they do not resist or exclude competition, and are productive in that they 
enhance the development and the spread of knowledge.  
Thus far this study has firstly, undergone a process of identifying and analysing the current 
dominant discourses surrounding biokinetics; secondly, identified a number of techniques of 
subjection in biokinetics which are found in various other disciplines throughout society, and lastly, 
explained how these techniques exist within a corpus of knowledge described by Foucault (1991) as 
‘the political rationality’. If the mechanisms of ‘the political rationality’ were wholly deterministic, 
this study would find itself in a stalemate. In short, the predicament to be resolved is how to rewrite 
the biokinetic subject so that he/she may operate from a more empowered position which caters for 
spontaneity and expression of ‘free will’. Critics of Foucault have suggested that his theories over-
exaggerate the hold discursive influences have over the individual, so that the individual is 
portrayed as essentially passive and uncritical in nature (Williams & Calnan, 1996, p. 1610; 
Wheatley, 2005). This kind of criticism might well have held for some of Foucault’s earlier 
analyses, but he responded to it in later works, particularly in his concept of The Care of the Self 
(1990; 2005), which marks his turn to ethics and his rethinking of the problems of subjectivity and 
autonomy. In this work he explores a kind of self-fashioning that would help individuals escape 
from complete discursive constitution via micro-disciplinary techniques. The idea would be to do 
this without returning to a discourse of humanism. For Foucault, humanism is suspicious in nature 
and therefore hopelessly fails to offer the subject any liberation from the dominant discourses or 
institutions (Foucault, 1988, p. 15).   
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Humanism, Foucault (2005, p. 544) argues, is a constraining, normalizing, and managerial 
mechanism of the institution or state that limits the potential of possibilities of subjectivity available 
to the individual. An example is expressed in the humanistic conception of patient autonomy that 
currently is gaining increasing popularity in bioethical circles (Moreno, 2007). Here the 
autonomous patient is commonly perceived as a liberal entity with more rights and afforded more 
forms of equality than the so called ‘passive patient’ of the past. However, Moreno (2007, p. 418) 
argues that its existence in modern medicine has instead ensured that commerce related mechanisms 
are allowed to infiltrate the practice of medicine to the point whereby the lines between a medical 
disorder and an unfulfilled desire have become blurred. In other words, autonomy ironically acts as 
a front, promoting at face value liberal and humane agendas, behind which the true mechanisms ‘in 
play’ are capitalist in nature, thereby opening the patient/consumer to new, more insidious 
mechanisms of control (see Chapter 3).  
Secondly, humanism, expressed in René Descartes’ (1596-1650 CE) iconic phrase ‘I think 
therefore I am’, is comfortably aligned with the dominant medical discourse since it ensures that the 
subject becomes obsessed with obtaining a truth about him/herself as opposed to achieving a truth 
via right actions, which Foucault (2005, p. 522) argues was the case in antiquity. This new 
obsession ‘strives only to reduce the gap between what I am truly and what I think myself to be; 
what I do, the actions I perform, only have value insofar as they help me to know myself better’ 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 523). Hence the expression ‘I need to find myself’ commonly employed by 
students who have just completed their final year of schooling and are thinking about taking a ‘gap 
year’ before beginning their tertiary education. They believe that somewhere out in the world, 
external to their being, there exists a discovery of immanent truth about themselves. This kind of 
mentality is perfectly consonant with the form of professional categorizations which become 
internalized, e.g. ‘overweight’, ‘fit’, ‘fast’, ‘strong’, ‘weak’ bodies. However, because these 
categorizations describe the physical nature of the body, they help to create a distinction between 
the body and the mind (self), whereby the body is perceived as foreign to the self. In effect it 
becomes acknowledged as an object that must be disciplined, monitored, and measured. Ultimately 
the body, through these disciplinary measures, becomes an enemy to the subject, i.e. an entity that 
holds it captive to a regime of constant management (Heyes, 2006).  
Foucault (2005) contrasts this managerial regime with what he calls the care of the self; an ethos 
predominant in antiquity. Referring to the ancient Greco-Roman ethos, Foucault (2005) outlines a 
few practices (askesis) that may be used as tools to help formulate a care of the self. They include: 
promoting new forms of subjectivity; establishing a certain relation of rectitude in the self between 
actions and thoughts; an ethical withdrawal which allows sufficient ‘distance between oneself and 
one’s actions that constitutes the necessary state of vigilance’, and developing an opposition to 
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political inactions (solitude) (Foucault, 2005, pp. 523; 537). By applying these principles, a patient 
would not be appealing to a humanistic version of autonomy (since this is perverted in the 
prevailing discourses), but instead would aim to create new forms of his/her own subjectivity which 
are ‘unknown’ to these discourses. In this way Foucault encourages the subject to embrace the 
uncertain, not in a quest for truth or self-discovery, but rather as a departure from the need for 
external validation of the self. Distance between one’s actions and oneself becomes important in the 
sense that any actions performed by the autonomous patient (e.g. making the final decisions 
regarding his/her treatment) are governed by ‘the political rationality’. Becoming aware of one’s 
own actions results in a ‘sharpening’ of one’s skill and ability for identifying the mechanisms of 
‘the political rationality’ and their effects on the body. In this way biokinetics may find itself more 
aligned to the practices of the care of the self should it adopt a philosophy that strives to determine 
the ‘condition and undefined possibilities of the subject’s transformation’ as opposed to its ‘limits’ 
as an object’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 526). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
In sum, Foucault’s conceptualization of the self is useful. It moves the discussion of identity into 
the realm of political actions, whereby forces (discourses and institutions) act to gain control and 
invest their relations of power within the construction of the subject. This then opens up new 
discussions of how individuals may either be empowered or disempowered depending on their 
current position within the discursive structure. However, such a conceptualization of the subject 
fails to provide a reading of the body which moves beyond these mechanisms of domination. His 
response to this dilemma is found in his ‘trajectory’ conception: the care of the self. This concept is 
an embracing of uncertain and ‘unknown’ forms of identity through the adherence of a number of 
self-formulating practices in an attempt to achieve rather than to discover a ‘truth’. However, the 
self-formulating practices provided seem somewhat outdated and generalized, or perhaps 
incomplete due to the fact that Foucault died while he was still constructing these theories of the 
care of the self. In addition, because these practices were discovered in works of antiquity (Socrates, 
Plato, Alcibiades, Seneca, Rufus, Galen, and Plithy, etc.), their value and meaning are arguably 
misplaced when articulated into contemporary settings. It is ironic that Foucault presents solutions 
from older extinct discursive structures when he so meticulously elaborated on the constraining 
properties that a particular discursive structure has on the individual at a particular time. “For 
example, how practical is it to suggest that one must apply ‘distance’ or set aside time for oneself in 
a discursive structure that demands rigorous surveillance, normalization and examination?” “Aren’t 
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such practices as Pliny (23- 79  BCE) (cited in Foucault, 1988, p. 27) advises, e.g. to set aside a few 
moments a day, or several weeks or months for a retreat into oneself, simply incompatible with 
discursive structure that requires progressive and continuous connections and interactions such as 
those recommended in health discourse via new open, transparent systems?” “Instead, is there not a 
need in contemporary health discourse for new practices which encourage individuals to create, 
formulate, and experience their own unique identities?” Arguably what remains important in 
Foucault’s conception of the care of the self is that the process of creativity is where our power is 
revealed (Foucault, 1988, p.140).  
Thus the concern in contemporary settings is not to apply practices which were beneficial in 
antiquity under a different discursive structure, but rather to encourage new practices which help 
formulate undefined limits and possibilities of self-transformation compatible with current 
technologies of power. The discussion now turns to Deleuze and Guattari and their work which 
sought to establish new and creative ways of understanding the body, its limits (or lack thereof), and 
its function. 
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Chapter 6: Understanding the human body through Deleuze and 
Guattari 
 
Rather than constructing concepts (or systems) based on the singular, they seek to embrace 
the multiple. Rather than developing concepts that are similar to those they seek to replace, 
they seek to differentiate. Rather than seeking to become the major or dominant paradigm, 
they become minor (Reardon, Sanzogni, & Poropat, 2006, p. 162). 
 
Deleuze (1925-1995 CE) and Guattari (1930-1992 CE) were part of the French post-structuralist 
wave of the 1950s. Gilles Deleuze was a professor of philosophy recognized for his studies on 
Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Proust. Felix Guattari was a psychoanalyst and 
political activist (Best & Kellner, 1991). Together they wrote a number of important works, of 
which Anti-Oedipus (1983) and A Thousand Plateaus (1987) have become their most influential. 
These two texts have been applied to a vast range of domains, including: politics, art, education, 
health, and sociology. ‘Rhizomes’, ‘assemblages’, ‘desiring-machines’, ‘affects’, ‘desiring-
production’, and ‘becoming’ are examples of the unique terminology developed within these books. 
Among many other things, this new lexicon serves as alternative psychoanalytic ‘language’ in the 
wake of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s criticism of Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939 CE) ‘Oedipal complex’ 
and its association with psychic repression. Arguing that signs cannot be fixed and reduced to serve 
any singular theory or interpretation, they also borrow and adapt signs from other discourses 
(including economics, psychology, biology, and science) to build a theory of ‘materialism’ that 
attempts to create alternatives to normalized and universal systems of logic. In sum, Deleuze and 
Guattari anticipate a restructuring of thinking as an activity in which in it becomes rhizomatic and 
thereby approaches life as a practical process of becoming.
10
 Thinking, in other words, becomes 
open and experimental rather than directed towards seeking deterministic representations (Best & 
Kellner, 1991). 
Key to this new approach to thinking is the concept of desire, which is argued to have the 
potential for removing social repressions caused by the state, capitalism, psychoanalysis, and 
scientism (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 1987). The conception of power as productive, in Foucault’s 
work, is taken up by the term ‘desiring-production’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s. ‘Desiring-
production’ is responsible for the development of knowledge, the creation of institutions, for 
stimulating social interactions, for the motivation and drives of an individual, and so on. But for 
                                                          
10
  If the primacy of identity is what defines a world of representation (presenting the same world once again), then 
becoming (by which Deleuze means ‘becoming different’) defines a world of presentation anew (Colebrook, 2002, p. 
26). 
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Deleuze and Guattari, productivity also simultaneously and inherently includes the potential for 
explosive creativity, change, and disruption of pre-existing realities. It is an important feature of 
desiring-production that it inherently has the capacity to upset repressive power relations of 
domination and subordination. 
 
6.1 The world as ‘machinic’ 
 
The Deleuzian-Guattarian (1983; 1987) world is completely made up of organic and non-organic 
‘machines’ (or dynamic mechanisms). For instance, the body is seen as a machine that is composed 
of a mouth-machine, a hand-machine, a tongue-machine, a skin-machine, etc. Each one of these 
machines has its own unique functions. For example, the mouth-machine eats, the hand-machine 
grabs and touches, the tongue-machine tastes, and the skin-machine allows certain substances to 
pass through it and others it rejects. Together these machines form what Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, p. 37) term an ‘assemblage’. An assemblage is a temporary collection of machines acting 
together which cannot be reduced to its individual parts. In other words, the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts. A living body is a good example of such an assemblage. To reduce the body to its 
parts (organs, tissues, and muscle structures) is too neglect the entirety of the embodied experience 
which is comprised of both explicit knowledge (explained) and tacit knowledge (unexplained). 
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that institutions are assemblages that cannot be 
reduced to the buildings, people and policies that constitute them, and the state is an assemblage 
which cannot be reduced to constitutive parts such as land, people and politicians. Every machine in 
an assemblage is connected to another machine forming a ‘coupled machine’. These ‘coupled 
machines’ form an endless network of interconnected machines, which form what is referred to as 
an immanent flow of production. The flow of production is said to be stimulated by desire as it 
passes through each ‘coupled machine’, and the entire process is referred to as ‘desiring-production’ 
(Deleuze &Guattari, 1983, p. 5-8).  
The unconscious, represented as machinic, opposes Sigmund Freud’s (1856-1939 CE) 
representation of it as a theatre where fantasies are played out (Elliot, 2012). In the Deleuzian-
Guattarian world of machines, desire is produced by the unconscious-machine and is not seen as 
something which must be repressed in order for individuals to function in a society as Freud 
suggested with his concept of castration. Nor is it, as conceptualized by Jacques Lacan (1901-1981 
CE), associated with lack. Rather it is conceptualised as positive, having endless potentials, and 
being responsible for the production and creation of new experiences of ‘becoming’. It is therefore 
something which is essential to life and joy (Colebrook, 2002, p. xxii). However, Deleuze and 
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Guattari do not deny that desire can be destructive. For example, the intransitive nature of desire is 
changed when a social assemblage uses biological interpretations, discursive structures, and modes 
of subjection to commit it to particular ends (Buchanan, 2007, p. 3). Here the social assemblage, 
through the production process, both provides desire with an object and forces it to reproduce 
ready-made or ‘known’ representations (Buchanan, 1997). Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is only 
when desire is forced to reproduce ‘sameness’ that it becomes repressive.  
A problem arises because identity and the social assemblage are entangled in the same 
projection of desires, i.e. one does not exist without the other. Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 159) 
write: ‘But who is this we that is not me, for the subject no less than the organism belongs to and 
depends on a stratum?’ As such, they take particular care to explain that individuals cannot simply 
rid themselves of the social assemblage or the reasoning/logic of their time, cautioning that any 
attempt to disentangle oneself from the social context (deterritorialization), if done violently, could 
result in a reconnection (re-territorialization) that would involve far greater entanglement and may 
result in it becoming cancerous; that is producing in excess whatever the social machine demands, 
thereby, losing its degrees of diversity, differentiation, and mobility (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
503). Braidotti (2006, p. 143) writes about such cancerous behaviour which can take the form of 
addiction: ‘Addiction is not an opening up, but a narrowing-down of the field of possible 
becomings’. 
 
6.2  Subjectivity and ‘becoming’ 
 
It may seem odd to use a philosophy that defines the world as an assemblage of machines to launch 
an attack on the mechanization of medicine/health pedagogy and its effects on practice. However, it 
is exactly by representing life as machinic that Deleuze and Guattari are able to shift focus and set 
up a counterargument to the well rooted ontology of dualism surrounding the mechanization of 
medicine/health pedagogy. For instance, the machinic world has no subject and object. It is 
asubjective.
11
 This means that it does not acknowledge the existence of a self that pre-exists the 
experience or event (Fox & Ward, 2008, p. 1008). As a result, functionality and the capacity to 
connect (compatibility) become important indicators and points of investigation of embodiment. 
This replaces restrictive essentialist discourses concerning what the body means, and how to reduce 
it to its essence (Parsons & Clarke, 2013, p. 93). However, as Buchanan (1997, p. 75) cautions, the 
                                                          
11
A sense of the self is explained as the result of a momentary delay which occurs as the flow of production moves from 
one set of ‘coupled machines’ to the next set of ‘coupled machines’. Thus the sense of the self is that which develops 
alongside the producer-produced interaction of desiring-production as an almost secondary effect (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983, pp. 7-8). 
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body must not be reduced to the functionality of a ‘previously stipulated clinical condition’, but 
rather understood as an ‘a posteriori product of newly connected capacities’. By applying a 
Deleuzian-Guattarian approach to human development, Duff (2010, p. 622) argues that human 
development is not merely shaped by an ‘unravelling of biological codes dividing it into sequential 
stages of development’, but rather includes ‘socialization and education, employment and training, 
kinship structures, popular culture, meaning making and so on’. She adds that the quality of 
experiences and relations rather than the quantitative increments defined by the chronological 
property of age are central to human development (Duff, 2010, p. 622). Therefore it is the collection 
of affects
12
and relations a body is capable of (ethology) that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptualization of embodiment highlights, and not the cause and effect relations (aetiology) 
which produce binary distinctions between, for example, man and nature, subject and object, and 
state and citizen (Buchanan, 1997, p. 74).  
Duff (2010, pp. 626; 628) concludes, ‘Power grows as the body becomes more capable of 
entering into novel relations with other bodies, and thus more capable of affecting and being 
affected by other bodies’. With regard to fitness, the ‘becoming-fit’ body increases its affects as it 
forms new intense relations to air, food, gravity, water, rest/sleep, etc. These new affects of the fit-
body are never fixed and, as such, one never reaches an end state of being fit. Understanding fitness 
as a process of affects and relations (‘becoming’) admits that we cannot know in advance, but rather 
must discover through active engagement with the world what we are capable of (Deleuze, 1992, p. 
212–214). ‘Becoming- fit’ is therefore a fluid, dynamic and unique account of embodiment 
juxtaposed against the essentialist approach which strives to ‘lock’ an identity into sameness and 
consistency (Markula, 2006, p. 36).  ‘What we are talking about is not the unity of substance but the 
infinity of the modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane of life’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 254). In sum, the Deleuzian-Guattarian body is composed of ‘multiple’ identities 
capable of constant metamorphosis which must not be interpreted simply by comparisons to norms, 
risk assessment criteria, or body image, but rather understood as an ‘outcome of the lived body/self 
and its relations with its material and psychosocial environment’ (Fox & Ward, 2006, p. 476). In 
short, the focus of embodiment must change from the product of knowledge to the process of 
learning in order to become experimental in nature (Cull, n.d.). 
In the field of psychology, research is now showing particular interest in a concept known as 
‘flow’. Although the term ‘flow’ is not a derivative of Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term, it 
does, however, provide a valuable image of their asubjective experience.  
                                                          
12
 ‘Study of relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterise each 
thing. For each thing these relations and capacities have an amplitude, thresholds and variations or transformations that 
are peculiar to them (Deleuze, 1988, p. 125). 
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‘Flow’ or ‘optimal experience’ is described as a state whereby one is absolutely absorbed 
within an activity. Many professional athletes have experienced states of ‘flow’ during their careers, 
but it is not limited to athletes. In fact, most people can experience it depending on the 
circumstances. According to Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002), an important requirement for 
achieving flow is an adequate challenge to one’s skills, that is, the individual’s skills need to be 
fully involved in overcoming the presented challenges of the activity. While in a state of ‘flow’, 
both time and one’s sense of self are affected, so that time is no longer perceived in a linear fashion 
and the boundaries between the self and his/her environment are perceptively diluted. For example, 
in the case of a cricketer, the batsman perceives the bat and himself as a singular entity 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 5).  For argument’s sake, one may suggest that the cause of the 
distortions in both time and self-perception are the effect of an intense connection between the 
cricketer and his/her environment created by this state of ‘flow’. In the Deleuzian-Guattarian world 
of machines, this connection would be between different ‘machines and assemblages’. Thus, just as 
the connection between the cricketer and the bat is responsible for bridging the gap between these 
two entities, creating a somewhat asubjective experience, so too are connections of desire between 
machines said to create asubjective experiences in the machinic world of Deleuze and Guattari.  The 
work done by Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi offers a valuable account of the way in which 
experience may become asubjective, and offers empirical evidence in support of this phenomenon. 
Other common shifts in attention and perception while in a state of ‘flow’ include: a 
heightened sense of control despite a loss in self- awareness; absorption in the process; the 
development of ‘emergent motivators’, and a reduced focus on end-goals or product 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 5). Arguably, all of these changes in perception are not synonymous 
with a self-contained (closed/fixed) entity. Rather they describe something more fluid, dynamic, 
and unstable. For example, the production of ‘emergent motivators’, which are a by-product of 
being immersed in a ‘state of flow’, offers some insights into the fluidity of this experience. 
Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p. 91) explain that end goals, usually used as motivators, 
are replaced by ‘emergent motivators’, which act as proximal goals. These proximal goals provide 
immediate and constant feedback, are regularly updated and developed and, as such, one’s actions 
become almost automatic. In this way ‘emergent motivators’ depict the creative and adaptive 
functionality of the body, revealing its ability to form new possibilities in every moment or 
situation. In sum, it offers useful contributions to the question posed by Spinoza, and later taken up 
by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 256): “What can a body do?” Conversely, when one focuses on 
the end goal/product, the act becomes a reductive endeavour as it attempts to encode relations into 
one singular point of origin (Buchanan, 1997, p. 86). This is exactly what oedipalization entails. It 
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is legislative as opposed to inventive (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 121). Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ambition is to reconsider such methods of encoding.
13
 
 
6.3 Rhizomatic thinking 
 
The discussion now turns to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of rhizomatic thinking offered 
as model of thought that attempts to transcend, if only temporarily, the hierarchical, homogenising, 
rational, and repressive models of thought present within Western society.  
“What does it mean to think rhizomatically?” Or rather, because it is the functions, affects, 
and relations of things in which Deleuze and Guattari are interested, and not its essence or meaning, 
the question should rather be: “What is rhizomatic thinking capable of?”  
The rhizome is a unique root system, which instead of burrowing linearly down to form tap 
roots in the ground, runs parallel to the ground forming a lateral root system (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 6-15). As a result, on the surface plants appear to be isolated entities; however, due to the 
horizontal nature of the root-system, they are in actual fact all connected. Rhizomes are decentred 
and therefore do not start or grow from one specific point in an orderly fashion. Instead they grow 
from the ‘middle’ outwards. This decentred property allows a rhizome to merge with new 
environments even after being uprooted, cut, or broken. Deleuze and Guattari offer the rhizome as a 
model of thought and action, arguing that its value is in its ability to remove the oppressions caused 
by traditional thought (arborescent thinking), and its distinct order and direction, currently 
dominating Western society.  
In A Thousand Plateaus (1987) they outline six principles of rhizomatic thinking, namely: 
‘connectivity’, ‘heterogeneity’, ‘multiplicity’, ‘asignifying rupture’, ‘cartography’, and 
‘decalcomania’. What will follow is a brief summary of these six principles and how they relate to 
other terminology used by Deleuze and Guattari, such as ‘machines’, ‘desire’, ‘affects’, as well as 
their social significance.  
The Deleuzian-Guattarian world of machines is, quite simply, rhizomatic. For instance, 
machines are continuously connecting, forming assemblages, disassembling, and reconnecting to 
other machines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, pp. 43-44). Much like the plant of a rhizome root-
system, which appears isolated from above the ground but is actually connected by its root system 
below the ground, rhizomatic thinking encourages one to see knowledge structures, like the 
machinic world, as an interconnected network. It therefore strives to develop relations between 
                                                          
13‘When information is translated into some form of private language’; in this case psycholinguistics (Buchanan, 1997, 
p. 84). 
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differing discourses. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 7) write, ‘It is not impossible to make a radical 
break between regimes of signs and their objects’. Thus, rhizomatic thinking encourages one to see 
past social barriers, such as status, age, race, or language. 
No pattern of connections in a rhizome is identical. This is why rhizomatic thinking opposes 
homogeneity created by ‘arborescent assemblages’, such as hierarchical structures, normalization 
mechanisms, and state policies. Instead it encourages a readdressing of logical assumptions, a 
disorganising of structures, and effectively a refusal to reproduce ‘sameness’. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987, p. 24) create a contrast between heterogeneity and reproduction more than once, suggesting 
that culture and society should not be remembered (reproduced) but rather forgotten (so as to create 
anew) if it is to become rhizomatic.  
Rhizomes are made up of many multiplicities. A multiplicity has neither subject or object, 
only magnitudes and dimensions which cannot increase in number without changing in nature 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 21). Rhizomatic thinking is an attempt to create an ‘irreducibly 
multiple’ identity – one which prevents it from ever becoming ‘overcoded’.14 Therefore, rhizomatic 
thinking as a multiplicity ensures that identity remains ‘open to metamorphosis as its constituent 
elements increase or decrease’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 8; 21; Bogue, 2005, pp. 12-13). 
Rhizomatic thinking is not reliant on a pre-existing subject, an ‘I’ that is ‘cut off’ and 
isolated from the world, but instead relies on affects and relations of connectivity. Therefore, like 
the decentred rhizome, it may be shattered, broken or cut, but it will still be capable of starting up 
anew without a sense of loss as there is no self to lose (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9). It is an 
ontology which lives for the moment, and thus as long as a sensation is present, that sensation is 
your body and therefore is you (Watts, 1951, p. 84). One should not be living through the moment, 
absently lost in representation, but for the moment actively engaged without any self from which to 
move away.  
There is no starting or ending points to the conglomeration of connected machines that the 
machinic world is composed of. Similarly, the continual flux and unstructured nature of the rhizome 
prevents it from being navigated using a linear or systematic approach. This is why Deleuze and 
Guattari use the concept of the map to illustrate how rhizomatic thinking is developed and grown. 
Like a map, a rhizome has no designated starting points and so can be entered from any point or 
position. Its map-like qualities also suggests that a rhizome is always able to be added to and is 
therefore never completed. Conversely, consider a sketch, diagram, or tracing; all these images have 
specific stages of completion, and once complete are not normally added to (Deleuze & Guattari, 
                                                          
14
Multiplicities and rhizomes, unlike systems of unity or tracings, are unable to operate in an empty dimension 
supplementary to that of the system considered (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 8). 
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1987, p. 12). As a result they are said to represent fixed and closed representations of the world 
(arborescent model).  
Rhizomatic thinking arguably has value in its ability to embrace the dynamic atmosphere of 
change, creativity, and desire. ‘Emergent motivators’ (such as those experienced in a state of 
‘flow’) provide a useful image of how dynamic this atmosphere actually is. Similarly, unlike the 
fixed perspective that attempts to ‘chain’ the body down to definitions which are quantifiable, such 
as medical-scientific classifications, rhizomatic thinking provides an ‘emergent’ description of the 
experience of embodiment. Here, instead of stifling the body’s potential, its immense capabilities of 
‘becoming-other’ are acknowledged. Thus the body of ‘becoming’ is always, like a rhizome, 
entirely unique and never ending. Colebrook (2002, p. 26) writes: ‘Rather than a product, final or 
interim, ‘becoming’ is the very dynamism of change, situated between heterogeneous terms and 
tending towards no particular goal or end- state’.  
Rhizomatic thinking has been applied to studies in a number of fields, including health, 
sociology, education, medicine, knowledge management, information systems, organizational 
activities and art (Parsons & Clarke, 2013; Reardon et al., 2006; Semetsky, 2004). In education, 
rhizome thinking better connects students to their environments, creates strong bonds between 
peers, reduces competitive behaviours, and replaces the story of the individual (the one) with that of 
the group, forming an interconnected assemblage (Parsons & Clarke, 2013, p. 95). In books and 
writing, like education, more often than not arborescent models are used. Honan and Sellers (2006, 
p. 2) argue that in order for texts to meet academic requirements they are expected to run linearly 
using order, demonstrate progression of theoretical ideas, and produce practical applications so as to 
arrive at coherent conclusions. In an attempt to remove writing and books from exactly this type of 
structured thought, Deleuze and Guattari wrote A Thousand Plateaus in a true rhizomatic style. For 
example, the book can be read by starting at any particular chapter. In this way the book has no 
beginning and no end; each chapter is both connected to the others and able to exist and develop on 
its own as it contains all the necessary components (heterogeneous) within its pages. Furthermore, 
in order to move beyond subjective constructs, both writers erase their own identity by 
supplementing ‘we’ for ‘I’, thus the reader never knows who is writing at any particular point. The 
large range of disciplines that have utilized the ideas in A Thousand Plateaus speaks to its success 
as a rhizomatic formation; hence it has helped form connections between previously unconnected 
discourses. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
 
In sum, Deleuze and Guattari resist the domination of arborescent models in society as they cause a 
slowing down or damming effect on the flow of desire, which, one could argue, is used as a simile 
for creative potential. However, arborescent models/structures remain necessary. For example, how 
would one travel safely while driving on a road without the structure and order created by robots, 
stops signs, and demarcated spaces? But these systems of thought are becoming so ingrained in 
consciousness, especially through new technological advancements, that it is often difficult to see 
beyond their symbolism, resulting in a confusion whereby representation misplaces reality. Thus, its 
rationality, efficiency, and its power to regulate our lives are dangerously tempting. Arguably it has 
become necessary to apply a system which, like that encouraged by the rhizome, has the potential to 
promote creative change and acknowledge the complexity inherent in the embodied experience (e.g. 
its emergent qualities). For example, medical generalizations and normalizations are necessary and 
do save lives, for instance in the case of health screening; however, they do not acknowledge the 
uniqueness of the affects and relations. In this way not all high risk patients will have the same 
affects and relations, and equally the affects and relations of that same patient are never going to be 
identical the second time round. In other words, they do not acknowledge that these generalizations 
and normalizations are nothing more than ‘abstract and logical elements - inferences, guesses, and 
deductions’ which cannot predict the future in its entirety (Watts, 1951, pp. 60-61). 
These generalizations and normalizations are thus just parts of the experience of 
embodiment, which consists of a whole that is far more than its parts (an assemblage). As an 
alternative it is suggested that one find temporary, as opposed to fixed, ways of understanding 
embodiment. ‘Punctuated equilibrium’ is a mainstream theory of organizational activity that 
understands life in a similarly non-static manner. It defines it as predominantly stable; however, it 
also acknowledges bursts of instability and randomness. This theory aims to open a person to new 
experiences by encouraging one to ‘acknowledge the fear of letting go and giving up the stability 
that routine provides’ (Reardon et al., 2006, p. 162).  Reardon et al. (2006) argue that in trying to 
understand the complexities of life, ‘punctuated equilibrium’ provides an example of how rhizomes 
and arborescent structures can and do coexist.  
Arguably, the challenge put forth by this theorization of the self (or lack thereof) is in 
gathering the courage to leave the ‘known’ behind in an attempt to find a dynamic encounter with 
the world that is experimental in nature. ‘To find out about thresholds, you must experiment, which 
means always, necessarily, relationally or in encounters with others’ (Braidotti, 2006, p. 140). One 
way in which to do this is to liberate the ‘I’ (subject) by encouraging him/her to think differently 
about the nature of things, particularity his/her own subjectivity. Here actions, specifically 
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‘involuntarily actions’, offer valuable suggestions of how to move the body into experiences which 
promote new affects and relations (Cull, n.d.; Fox, 2002, p. 351).  ‘Involuntary action’ effectively 
means acting in the present, not wanting to separate oneself from life through representational 
projections. In involuntary action, no feelings but the present feelings are embraced, and whatever 
those feeling are, that is considered to be all there is. Such an ontology must become sensitive to the 
wisdom of the body, to the hidden depths of its own substance, where the desire for ‘becoming’ is 
made an ethical endeavour (Watts, 1951, p. 71; Braidotti, 2006, pp. 133; 134). Such an ethic is 
arguably found in the complexities of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of embodiment as it 
strategically welcomes, for example, the ontology of safety in medicine (an arborescent model), but 
not without drawing it back into the present experience, ensuring that it and its patients are 
effortlessly aware of the uniqueness inherent in each experience (Watts, 1951, p. 73; Parsons & 
Clarke, 2013, p. 91). In other words, they encourage a person to see and feel what he/she is 
experiencing ‘…as it is, and not as it is named’ (Watts, 1951, p. 76). 
What will follow in Chapter 7 is an outline of possible ways in which the biokineticist and 
his/her patient can learn to appreciate the uniqueness inherent in each moment, while 
simultaneously existing within the arborescent model of contemporary medicine. Such an approach 
hopes to free the biokineticist from the worry of not being fully identified or defined, as for 
instance, in the confusion of the general public regarding the difference between a biokineticist and 
a physiotherapist. It also presents examples of best practice in light of the discussions in Section B. 
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Section C 
Chapter 7: Redefining the biokineticist’s role and relation to patients 
 
It is the becoming-artistic of scientific knowledge and the becoming-scientific of artistic 
creation (Grosz, 2005, p. 12). 
 
In such feeling, seeing, and thinking life requires no future to complete itself nor 
explanation to justify itself. In this moment it is finished (Watts, 1951, p. 152). 
 
7.1 The ‘gap’ 
 
A biokineticist understands the body’s biological responses and adaptations to repetitive and 
stressful physical activities. As a result, helping clients achieve fitness is a key aspect of this 
profession and providing measures of safety in order to prevent injury becomes an essential 
component in achieving this goal. In order to reduce the risk of injury the profession is dominated 
by assessments and testing (standardization), programs and planning (long term goals), health 
education, data collections (surveillance), and classifications (normalisations). In addition, 
biokineticists use reasoning and practices which provide valuable quantitative information useful in 
directing exercise in a safe manner. However, there is a tendency, for example, to repeat ad 
infinitum bio-politic and anatom-politic procedures (see Chapter 3 & 4). In such repetition, the 
information ‘unpacked’ by the professional becomes a narrow and sterile procedure of 
specialization, diagnostic reasoning, and standardizations techniques (see Chapter 2). 
Unfortunately, these practices have resulted in a reduced interest in the subjective voice of the 
patient (see Chapter 2). Similarly, they support a corpus of knowledge referred to as ‘the political 
rationality’, which strives to create politically passive (docile) patients (see Chapter 5). In sum, 
these practices serve to produce a ‘gap’ between the practitioner and patient.  
But on a macro scale, health discourse, having become an operation largely dictated by 
professional techniques which valorise a particular mode of reasoning
15
, is also responsible for 
creating a significant ‘gap’ between the patient and practitioner (see Chapter 2). Mirroring this 
‘sterile’ environment is the confusion of the general public regarding the roles of the biokineticist 
                                                          
15
 ‘The whole problem of reason will be converted by Spinoza into a special case of the more general problem of the 
affects. Reason indicates a certain type of affect’ (Vincennes, 1980). 
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and the physiotherapist mentioned in the Introduction to this study. Although in some ways their 
scopes of practice overlap, and, therefore, would result in some confusion, the confusion arguably 
points to the entire plane of health/medical discourse in which the patient has developed a growing 
mistrust towards the practitioner (see Chapter 2). Thus, in spite of the ‘need’ for biokineticists in 
South Africa, they remain underutilized. 
 
7.2 Professional reasoning and safety 
 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that, historically, exercise has not always been associated with health. 
Instead, its associations are politically determined and have ranged from mythology, war, 
entertainment, religion and education; suggesting contemporary discursive reproductions of 
‘exercise as health’ are, therefore, temporary (unfixed). “Why then have professionals allowed these 
practices to dictate what experiences are produced to the point whereby what is often (re)produced 
is ‘sameness’ (homogeneity)?” For example, patients are being made into objects of the medical-
scientific ‘gaze’ (see Chapter 2 & 5), are manipulated into becoming ‘active’ consumers through 
capitalist-economic agendas (see Chapter 3), and stratified and classified according to risk criteria, 
which effectively creates docile/disciplined subjects who are politically inactive, but economically 
‘useful’ (see Chapter 4). Essentially, the ‘event’ of exercise remains ‘shut’ to the unknown 
capabilities of the body through its consistent association with safety and health. 
 Perhaps one reason these systems are tolerated is because it is still professionally acceptable 
to remain within the confines of these practices, “so why change or challenge them?” However, if 
they are creating docile patients it becomes ethically irresponsible (perhaps even negligent) to 
contribute to the continued framing of everyday actions in a ‘hard shell of tradition’ (Watts, 1951, 
p. 94). Ethical responsibility requires action that goes beyond ‘the call of duty’; that is, action that 
faces contemporary society’s need to cope with the uncertainty of change in what is commonly 
referenced as ‘the age of anxiety’ (Watts, 1951, p. 94). Professionals must realise that not all 
conditions are known, nor will they ever be. A quote from the Paramount film Into the Wild 
(directed by Penn, 2007) helps to disclose the essence of this ethical responsibility, ‘If we admit that 
human life can be ruled by reasons, then the possibility of life is destroyed’. As such, professional 
reasoning must not be used as a shield of protection which safeguards the professional from new, 
unknown experiences and growth. Rather, it is a matter moving beyond professional expectations 
set by health discourse which often stifle the potential of the body.  
Unfortunately, practitioners have become facilitators and implementers of a reasoning which 
favours: 1) the mechanism of ‘the political rationality’ (e.g. observation, normalization, and 
examination) (see Chapter 2 & 5); 2) the reproduction of ‘sameness’ whereby all health actions and 
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decisions of the patient are made according to health related reasoning and professional advice (see 
Chapter 6); and 3) the tactics and strategies that appeal to human emotions, desires, and insecurities 
in order to secure or lock identities in ‘known’ bodies, and the reduction of all human potential into 
terms of capital investments, i.e. human capital (see Chapters 4 and 5). This reasoning finds its 
power in the insistent need to define and categorize all spheres of life and has significantly widened 
the gap between the professional and the patient (see Chapters 5 & 6). Therefore, it is posited in this 
study that it is to no avail to redefine the role of biokineticist (or any other professional) as this 
would simply be another reproduction of this insistent desire to name or define, i.e. to ‘box in’. 
Instead, what is required is a ‘thinking of difference’ whereby things are appreciated in their 
specificity and generality, and not just according to terms and definitions. 
 
7.3 A ‘thinking of difference’ 
 
A philosophy of change, understood as, ‘… an undoing, unbecoming, of this proper place, the 
unhinging of place and space itself, a return to the fluxes of becoming that constitute the real’ has 
become necessary (Grosz, 2005, p. 12). This rationality is open and engaged in dialogue with the 
real, while it also understands that the real, in its complexity, will ironically resist any such method 
of encoding. Hence, both fixed, and unfixed states are understood as temporary in nature. As such, 
this philosophy acknowledges the importance of structure in the form of rules, procedures, and 
methods in health practice, but equally it appreciates the responsibility to move fixed, rigid 
structures into states of flux through techniques of imagination, discussion, and creating of new 
concepts, so as to reject the illusions of certainty. As this study has shown, health pedagogy tends to 
ignore the necessity of the latter. The absence of such a philosophical approach in health pedagogy 
has resulted in an inability to deal with the emerging grey areas.  
In response, practitioners and patients are encouraged to actively challenge these systems 
which are often based on ‘false assumptions and remain closed to dispute from contradictory 
arguments’ e.g. evidence based medicine (EBM) (Morin, 1999, p. 7). In the field of research, for 
example, empirical studies are given priority by the health sciences (Holmes, Murray, Perron, & 
Rail, 2006). However, these studies are said to ignore the impact cultural and historical 
circumstances have on the body and its treatment; and, thereby, ignore the body’s inherent 
‘multiplicity’ (Wright, 2000, p. 21). Conversely, the equal inclusion of non-empirical studies in 
research circles has the potential to challenge the current hierarchical character of empirical studies 
by ensuring that freedom of speech and thought is maintained within the interactions of health 
practice (See Chapter 2). Therefore, to encourage the promotion of non-empirical studies is one 
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method in which to stimulate critical intellectual ‘wars’ that offer potential for deterritorializations 
of homogeneity in the form of hierarchical preferences to empirical studies (Holmes et. al., 2006, p. 
185). 
Similarly, biokineticists are bound by their professional status to practices which rely on the 
illusions of certainty and safety in health, and, therefore, are limited in the degree to which they 
may venture so as to realise new relations (unknown bodies) and free exercise from its fixed 
position within health discourse. Thus, biokineticists must realise the contradictory nature of their 
position; that is, that they are both, agents of the medical/health discourse and its methods of 
territorialization, as well as ethical agents of change/difference with the potential to deterritorialize 
these assemblages of health.  
As an agent of ethical change/difference biokineticists have a responsibility to investigate, 
acknowledge, and attempt to transcend the discursive structures dominating their profession even if 
at times this ‘pushes’ the boundaries of their professional status. One way to do this is by 
developing a commitment to the ‘unparalleled learning created when things break down’ e.g. pre-
defined concepts or expectations, as recommended by supporters of ‘experiential learning’ 
(Bannerman, 2009). ‘Experiential learning’ is currently being applied in educational spheres. It 
understands that learning only really takes place when individuals are given a chance to try it out 
and experience it. Simply knowing about something is only the first step of ‘true’ learning 
(Bannerman, 2009, p. 1).   
Biokineticists are in a unique position in which to challenge these fragmented and 
mechanistic conceptions that understand the body using reductive conceptualisations, for two 
reasons: 1) biokinetics is a relatively new profession, meaning it finds itself in a space which is less 
striated or territorialized than other older or more traditional professions. This suggests it would be 
easier for biokineticists to make connections between other discourses or to create hybrid concepts 
which uniquely challenge the discursive structure; 2) because biokineticists generally spends more 
time
16
 with their patients than other health professionals e.g. doctors, nurses, nutritionists, and 
psychologists, strong relationships are often built; thus the time shared between professional and 
patient acts as valuable space in which to challenge preconceived ideas about health.   
Understanding exercise as an experience and not as a set of instructions, biokineticists can 
attempt to temporarily invert power relations. For example, the hierarchy of the professional’s voice 
may be challenge by encouraging patients to use their exercise experiences to challenge ‘cultural 
inscriptions’ of the body. Here patient become producers of their own experiences of health/life 
                                                          
16
 Biokineticist consultations usually last between thirty minutes and one hour. Thereafter patients may see this 
professional anywhere between one to five times per week for a period of usually three to six weeks. However, some 
relations may last years. The duration of each session is usually between 30 minutes and one hour.   
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and, as such, may learn to appreciate their body as a site of ‘resistance and refusal’, that is 
‘constructed and restructured (territorialized) continually’ (Fox, 2002, p. 352) and not fixed, 
objective and docile.  
In addition, patients must realise they have a responsibility to recognize the threshold, 
borders or limits of health pedagogy (Braidotti, 2006, p. 142). For example, practitioners are not 
immune to using poor reasoning to justify their methods; often making appeals to ‘the art of 
medicine’ or ‘gut feeling’ (Czeresnia, 1999, p. 704). Equally some practitioners apply one-size-fits 
all approaches thereby dismissing the complexities inherent in medical decisions (Czeresnia, 1999, 
p. 704). Therefore, patients must learn to see health pedagogy in a relative light (Braidotti, 2006, p. 
142). Patients need to appreciate this so as not to harbour false illusions regarding their health e.g. 
that health can be achieved without any risk, complication, pain or pressure (see Chapter 2). 
 
7. 4 Asubjectivity 
 
Grosz (2005, p. 12) suggests that a Deleuzian-Guattarian ontology favours a temporal movement 
whereby ‘flow’ and ‘connectivity’ is preferred to a privileging of substance, form and self-identity. 
This can be explained by the fact that time only becomes relevant in the Cartesian provoked split 
between subject and object (mind and body) as a result of a perceived distance/duration. 
Presumably then, as an experience becomes more asubjective (e.g. as the boundaries between the 
self and environment dissolve) the experience of time becomes less relevant because of the 
perceived reduced distance between subject and object. Therefore, the asubjective experience 
approaches a state of empty time. The high speed at which the flow of desire moves in ‘well-
connected’ machines arguably reduces the distance between the subject and the object (the gap), 
ultimately creating the asubjective experience. Hence, without connectivity, and the speed it 
produces, the asubjective experience is unachievable. One might assume then that the more 
connections a machine (body) has to other machines (bodies or assemblages) the less it will be 
affected by the realm of time. Although speculation, this relationship might offer some useful 
options for principles and activities (exercises) presented in biokinetic practice, so as to, stimulate 
and create new forms of effects and relations of the body. These proposed activities, for example, 
may be less governed by the constraints of routine, protocol and obligation and rather focus on 
methods of increasing connectivity and de-emphasising time as a point of focus. Further still, this 
may lead to alternative approaches in exercise prescriptions, testing, instruction, and education for 
biokineticists.  
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In sum, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) arguably revive an age old philosophical discussion 
specifically regarding the nature of time in their appeal to a rhizomatic connectivity of thought and 
asubjectivity. For them the present is the productive moment of ‘becoming’, which means that 
‘becoming’ is without past or future and as such it exists within a pure and empty time (Colebrook, 
2002, p. 27). Essential to this state is the experience of asubjectivity created when the distance 
between object and subject (mind and body) is reduced or dissolved.  
Following from this, biokineticists cannot know in advance what ‘distinctive affects and 
relations a complex body may be capable of’ (Duff, 2010, p. 626). A body does not simply have 
affect like it has attributes. It is, therefore, essential to realise ‘...relations are external and thus do 
not rely on an author or a self’ (Buchanan, 1997, p. 78). Buchanan (1997, p. 82), following from 
Deleuze and Guattari, explains health as, ‘The happy union of a capacity to form new relations and 
the new relations themselves, which, in their turn, permit the body to go on to form other new 
relations’. It is arguably in creating a desire to form new and multiple relations from an asubjective 
perspective which must remain central if one is to facilitate experiences which are promotive of 
health in this sense. One way of doing this would be to teach patients to transcend, at least 
temporarily, long-term motivations, which are often associated with solitude and isolation of the 
prior self, into a desire to apply themselves to the process at hand forming ‘emergent motivators’, 
which are associated with interaction and collaboration between the body and its immediate 
surroundings (see Chapter 6). 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
In closing, if one is to create a completely unmatched and incomparable new experience between 
the practitioner and patient it becomes necessary to dissolve any pre-defined conceptualizations of 
their relationship. As Buchanan (1997, p. 75) comments, ‘think these practices of the self for 
themselves instead of interpreting them according to the dictates of a previously stipulated clinical 
condition’. As a profession, biokinetics has the responsibility to challenge these dominant structures 
so as to prevent the monopolization of exercise by a fixed conceptualization of health pedagogy. As 
such practices which stimulate new ideas, create connections between different systems and their 
signs, facilitate states of flow, and other asubjective experiences must be encouraged. It is the aim 
of this study to emphasise the impact culture and history have on the current power relations 
invested in the body, and, in response, to give a voice to other methods of analysis, such as 
philosophical insight, which are ostracized under the new scientific-capitalist regime of health 
pedagogy. Thus, the study attempts to prevent biokinetics from becoming a naive distributor of neo-
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liberal health practice. Health is about choice, and the realization that the kind of knowledge that 
does not promote choice (in the form of seeing difference) is limiting. In sum, redefining the role of 
the biokineticist is not the answer as it will not remove the confusion surrounding his/her role just 
as naming a bad desire doesn’t automatically remove it. Instead the foundation to the proposed 
paradigm shift is to encourage enquiry which asks what more a practitioner (a body) can do in order 
to form multiple relations with the patient (another body) and thus reduce the ‘gap’ currently 
presented between these two parties. Key to the success of this operation is to foster 
deterritorializations that remain sensitive to the entire spectrum of forces making up our 
understanding of the body and health, while simultaneously being able to invent new experiences 
by appealing to the multiple affects and relations of a body.  
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Conclusion: Recommendations for best practice in contemporary 
biokinetics 
 
8.1 Best practice recommendations 
 
Scientific construction cannot escape the need for a circumscribed plane of reference. 
Within these limits, explanation becomes possible by creating operative resources to deal 
with reality (Czeresnia, 1999, p. 704). 
 
Best practice recommendations are provided as a summary to the points of departure discussed in 
this dissertation. They should not be interpreted as set or fixed principles, e.g. protocols or standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), as an interpretation of this kind would contradict the process of 
‘becoming’ promoted in this study.  Thus, these best practice recommendations are by no means 
being set out here as a method to be followed rigorously, nor a set of practices that will remain valid 
for all of time. 
Firstly, the reduction in trust, respect and communication apparent within contemporary 
health practice has resulted in a critical collapse in the connection between the practitioner and the 
patient. In order to mend the collapse, elaborate mechanisms of connectivity and interaction on both 
a community and individual level are needed. These mechanisms should operate across racial, 
social, economic and national boundaries. Fox (2002, p. 361) concludes: ‘To engage productively 
with such agendas collapses disciplinary boundaries and establishes a pressing need for 
collaboration between medical and caring professions, social and political, social activists, indeed 
everyone with a body’. In conjunction with Fox’s (2002) conclusion, the appeal to the humanities to 
achieve better methods to prepare individuals to ‘analyze, judge and sort out competing values’ 
inherent in health discourse, mentioned in Chapter 4, is not entirely misplaced (Pellegrino, 1984, p. 
256). However, collaboration may do well not to ‘stop’ with the humanities, but should be practiced 
everywhere; that is it should become rhizomatic.  
Interdisciplinary approaches allow practitioners from different disciplines to work together 
in order to ensure that biological interpretations are no longer given priority when considering 
relations of the body. In this way, interdisciplinary approaches promote the collapsing of boundaries 
through building of bridges between various disciplines (connectivity) and they also stimulate 
diversity (heterogeneity), thereby resisting the arborescent models of homogeneity from being 
hierarchized. In sum, biokineticists who adopt a role of diversity, connectivity and open mindedness 
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arguably realise that the health professional is dealing with something as ‘broad as the notion of life 
itself’ (Czeresnia, 1999, p. 705). 
Secondly, patients are also encouraged to build bridges (make connections) between 
different discourses such as philosophy, art, politics, and the health pedagogy. In this way, patients 
put themselves in a better position from which to frame critical questions capable of challenging 
both the expectations and the ‘known’ bodies of health assemblages. 
Critical questions must not merely be presented in hopes of receiving quick and simple 
answers. In such cases, the answers are always already ‘known’ (pre-defined). Rather, questions 
should be conceptualized as opportunities for learning collaboratively, whereby they are framed as 
processes in which new relationships may be developed. Here, for example, the patient must no 
longer be represented as a consumer who needs fast and efficient answers (see Chapter 3) and the 
biokineticist as a dashboard of answers for frequently asked questions (FAQs). Instead identity must 
be seen as an open-ended and continuous process. In adhering to principles of the multiple 
(multiplicity) of rhizomatic thinking, practitioners and patients force each other outside of their 
comfort zones, creating new opportunities of enhanced learning created from unique asubjective 
perspectives.  
What is of importance within this dynamic struggle between practitioner and patient, no 
matter the outcome, is the realisation that perspectives, identities, and modes of being are constantly 
shifting as information is being processed, past experiences are being drawn from, ideas are being 
negotiated and presented, and decisions are being made. As such, contemporary fixed signs of 
health pedagogy which associate, for instance fat with laziness and strength with valour, can be 
challenged. Here, nobody is thought to know the ‘answer’ in its entirety. Instead, the focus shifts to 
the ‘event’ and, with creation as the aim, both patient and practitioner are able to temporarily 
remove their illusions of absolute truths, so as to appreciate what is not yet known (they invent 
something different by temporarily forgetting what they know). 
Thirdly, either party may enter the experience from any point and begin a line of flight or a 
deterritorialization by critically engaging with this dynamic relationship of affects and relations. 
However, such decisions are not without their risks. The biokineticist and patient may be projected 
into something dangerous (cancerous) whereby reterritorializations occur which further solidify 
their belief in the rules of safety and their ideological appeal to certainty. However, this does not 
mean these parties cannot once again resist their discursive surroundings. The ‘couple machine’ of 
the bio-patient is understood as a myriad of forces capable of deterritorializations and 
reterritorializations which are ‘enacted and engaged with, not simply imposed’ upon these 
embodied entities (Fox, 2002, p. 354). In remaining engaged with these forces, one ensures that the 
material world is openly investigated, thus allowing a continual re-inventing of the self (unknown). 
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The patient, who is understood as multiple, removes the need to ‘lock’ identities into ‘boxes’ which 
perceive him/her as a passive, obedient, disciplined and, essentially, docile subject. 
These recommendations reflect only the tip of the iceberg. There are many ways in which 
one may stop, momentarily, and reflect, so as to challenge the mundane prescriptions of everyday 
life. What is encouraged in this study is that practitioners take the time to reflect
17
  in order to make 
the necessary alterations enhancing of change. However, the necessity of structure and organization 
must not be overlooked either as constant change is not sustainable. No system is able to survive 
within a constant state of metamorphosis. Thus, limits will arise if one tries to change a constant. 
There is value in both fixed and unfixed; the difficultly and complexity lies in deciding when to 
remain in the organization and structure that definitions and constructs provide, and when to accept 
the uncertainty that moments of ‘becoming’ demand. It is, therefore, in accepting this dynamic 
relationship that is ironically both for and against the mechanisms of the current discursive system 
in which this philosophy of ‘becoming-health’ arises and acts.   
 
8.2 Final remarks 
 
A doctor who looks after the overall  health of people, time, race, humanity – who will even 
once have the spirit to take my suspicion to the limit and venture the proposition: all of 
philosophizing to this day has not dealt with  ‘truth’ but with something else; call it health, 
future, growth, potency, life...(Nietzsche, 1983, p.190). 
 
‘Known’ reality consists of shared representations created by discursive structures. These discursive 
structures are formed through the interactions of forces including the technologies of power, social 
forces, as well as forces of self and production (see Chapter 1). In Chapter 1 of this study it is 
argued that the discursive structures influencing the practice of biokinetics and its interpretation of 
the body have produced three fundamental concerns, namely: 1) The segmenting of its parts into 
organic, physical matter and explained through the lens and ontology of biomedicine (see Chapter 
2); 2) The dilution of barriers between health pedagogy and commercialisation whereby techniques 
of subjectification and significance are applied so as to create a continual artificial desire for a 
                                                          
17 Although these concerns have come to light through reflection, it is not only through reflection that philosophy has 
effect (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 6). Actively investigating the biological, physical, psychical, historical, sexual and 
emotional thresholds of ‘sustainable’ becomings is an important real- time philosophical enterprise (Braidotti, 2006, p. 
142). Without knowledge of these limits and their affects, there would be nothing to challenge, but equally, and what is 
being called for in this study, without challenging the known there would be nothing new to give limits to.  
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product instead of for a life that is content (see Chapter 3); and 3) convinced of its powers of 
predictability, health pedagogy prescribes lists of risk to be avoided, which, through its affiliation 
with other parties, e.g. insurance, corporate, and government institutions, has resulted in a 
reproduction of ‘sameness’ (homogeneity) throughout society whereby individuals are forced to 
adhere to these rules under the guise of safety and its ideological appeal to certainty (see Chapter 4). 
Because this discursive structure is largely responsible for the way in which biokineticists and 
patients act, are acted upon, articulated into society, adopt certain self-practices, and produce 
particular types of products, there is a necessity for methods of deterritorialization in contemporary 
health discourse.  
Initially, a social constructivist viewpoint was taken to widen the scope through which the 
body is understood. A social constructivist approach suggests the body is not independently 
determined by biological forces but is also shaped by historical, cultural, social, and psychological 
forces. However, social constructivism has been criticized for neglecting the body’s potential for 
resistant or revolutionary action as it understands the body to be completely determined by its 
discursive structure. Acting like a polar opposite, essentialist approaches, which appeal to a prior 
human essence, are criticized for overemphasising the individual’s ability to act freely despite the 
discursive structures surrounding him/her (Fox, 2002, p. 348). Another problem with essentialist 
approaches is they acknowledge the existence of a prior self, which effectively is unable to develop 
equally valued new versions of itself after being diagnosed with an illness.  
Constructivists and essentialist approaches have been predominately adopted by 
contemporary health to problematize disease and treatment. As such, it becomes necessary to take 
caution in how one approaches concepts and definitions in health pedagogy as they have the 
potential to produce concrete practices (e.g. treatments) which are portrayed, despite these 
ontological shortcomings, as if they are able to capture the lived experience in its entirety (e.g. the 
experience of falling ill) (Czeresnia, 1999, p. 702).  
In response to these concerns, this study proposes a post-structuralist approach to health, 
which accepts the complexity inherent within the treatment of the body and, as such, understands 
the body and health, to exist within a social milieu dominated by discursive structures, while 
simultaneously understands them to have both the potential to transcend the power relations created 
by these structures. In other words, it understands that the body and health cannot be reduced to 
constructs that are ‘incapable of resistance, nor can they ignore the impact of context on experience 
by elevating subjectivity as prior and essential’ (Fox, 2002, p. 348). 
The proposed philosophy is one in which signs are freed (at least temporarily), along with 
conceptual and pragmatic constraints, not through resistance but via engaging actively with life in 
its timeless state of ‘becoming’, i.e. through accepting the experience or the 'event' without 
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expectations. Fundamental to this conceptualization is the realization that when dealing with health, 
one is dealing with something as complex as life itself. Hence, it is argued that the rigidity of 
science, its isolation and inability to make connections as result of its closed systems and definable 
terms is unable to appreciate the state of ‘flow’ necessary for life, and thus health.  
In addition, science’s arborescent structures have resulted in an over-supply of homogeneity 
within society. The study highlighted two related areas of concern specific to health discourse: 1) 
Medical-scientific and risk discourse apply mechanisms which invest in structuring what patients do 
and do not think, act, speak, or hear, limiting their potential to move beyond the production of 
‘sameness’ (homogeneity) inherent within this discourse; and 2) The capitalist – economic 
discourse, which is progressively influencing medical practice, strategically proliferates difference, 
however, not without reducing it to market- related ends. As a result, although a unique operation, it 
is an equally reductive technique producing ‘sameness’ because all human endeavours are 
inevitably reduced to the derivatives of human capital. Thus despite the difference created, all 
action is eventually reterritorialized into the confines of the economic discourse.    
Conversely, a thinking of difference embraces asubjective experiences that do not adopt 
‘known molds of identities’, but rather embrace effects and relations which are created within/by an 
experience and, as a result, are not dictated by mechanisms of the market or health discourse. As a 
result, practitioners and patients are not crippled by desires that lack; that is are ‘locked’ into 
specific modes of subjectification. Furthermore, the patient is not interacting within set parameters 
which are supervised by the biokineticist, but instead parameters are temporarily set by both parties 
during the experience (e.g. emergent motivators), and as such are removed from ‘sameness’ in the 
form of normalized or standardized data.  
Thus, interactions of the bio-patient ‘coupled machine’ effectively aim to remove pre-
conceived ideas about health, challenge false assumptions, as well as to create new ‘becomings’ of 
health. This study argues that to remain oblivious to the creative potential harboured by a life of 
‘becoming’ is to exclude a truly holistic conception of the body.  
In short, it is all for nothing should healthy pedagogy manage to prolong life or make life 
more ‘safe’ using professional reasoning if in the process both parties forget how to live (Watts, 
1951, p. 104). 
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